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Chapter 1. 
 
Part 1. 
 
Abstract 
 
“Phenomenology is the place where hermeneutics originates, 
 phenomenology is also the place it has left behind.”(Ricoeur )1 
 
 
In this thesis I shall examine possibilities for bringing into dialogue the practice of social 
documentary photography and the conceptual resources of the post-Structural and critical 
philosophical hermeneutics of text and action developed by Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005) 
from the 1970’s onwards. Ricoeur called this an ‘amplifying’ hermeneutics of language, 
defined as ‘the art of deciphering indirect meaning’ (ibid). 
Social documentary photography is an intentional activity concerned with the visual 
interpretation, ethics and representation of life, the otherness of others, and through them 
something about ourselves. The narratives form social histories of encounters with others. 
They raise challenging questions of meaning and interpretation in understanding the 
relations of their subjective agency to an objective reality. Traditionally the meaning of 
such work is propositional. It consists in the truth conditions of bearing witness to the 
direct experience of the world and the verifiability of what the photography says, or 
appears to say about it. To understand the meaning of the photography is to know what 
would make it true or false. This theory has proven useful and durable, although it has not 
gone unchallenged. The power it has is remarkable and new documentary narratives 
continue to be formed in this perspective, adapting to changing technologies, and 
reverberate with us today. 
A more subtle way of thinking about this is given by a pragmatic theory of meaning. This 
is what I am proposing. The focus here is upon use and what documentary photography 
does and says. A praxis that I refer to by the act of photographing: a discourse of 
locutionary, illocutionary and perlocutionary utterances in whose thoughtful and informed 
making are unified theories of visual texts within the theories of action and history. The 
key is the capacity to produce visual narratives made with intention and purpose that in 
their performative poetics and their semantic innovations attest to the realities of 
                                                           
1 Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and 
John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. 
NorthWestern University Press. 
 4 
experience and sedimented historical conditions witnessed, and communicate those to 
others within a dialectic of historical consciousness and understanding.  
The narrative visualisations disclose a world, a context in which the drama of our own life 
and the lives of others makes sense. In their interpretations of an empiric reality can be 
found ethical concerns and extensions of meaning beyond the original reference that 
survive the absence of the original subject matter and the original author of the 
photography whose inferences our imaginations and later acquired knowledge can 
meditate upon and re-interpret. Thus in the hermeneutic view, the documentary 
photographic narrative is a form of text that comes to occupy an autonomy from, a) the 
author’s original intentions, b) the reference of the original photographic context, and  
c) their reception, assimilation and understanding by unknown readers-viewers.  
Ricoeur argues that hermeneutic interpretation discloses the reader as ‘a second order 
reference standing in front of the text’, whose necessary presence solicits a series of 
multiple and often conflicting readings and interpretations. Consequently Ricoeur’s 
critical, philosophical hermeneutics brings us from epistemology to a kind of ‘truncated’ 
ontology that is only provisional, a place where interpretation is always something begun 
but never completed. Interpretation according to Ricoeur engages us within a hermeneutic 
circle of explanation and understanding whose dialectic is mediated in history and time. 
For Ricoeur this implies that to be able to interpret meaning and make sense of the world 
beyond us is to arrive in a conversation that has already begun. His hermeneutic wager is, 
moreover, that our self-understandings will be enriched by the encounter. In short, the 
more we understand others and what is meaningful for them the better we will be able to 
understand ourselves and our sense of inner meaning. The central thesis of his 
hermeneutics is that interpretation is an ongoing process that is never completed, 
belonging to meaning in and through distance, that can make actively present to the 
imagination what is objectively absent and whose discourse is undertood as the act of 
“someone saying something about something to someone” (Ricoeur 1995: Intellectual 
Autobiography).2 
 
 
The research question. 
 
The question to which this thesis is addressed can be stated in the following terms: 
Paul Ricoeur’s concept of a critical philosophical hermeneutics is centred in the theory of 
the text, the theory of action, and the theory of history, that he grounded in Language and 
notions of semantic innovation, narrative, and ethically informed practical reasoning. 
Can the conceptual resources of this amplifying hermeneutic be generalised, extended 
beyond this sphere of discourse and brought into dialogue with the visual domain and 
discourse of the theory and practice of a humanist, social documentary photography and 
                                                           
2 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: Intellectual Autobiography in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. 
 5 
visualising narratives of social and cultural life, in imagination, action, and history? How 
can the dialogue be best carried out? What new understandings will the dialogue bring? 
Where do the limits of the dialogue lie? 
 Ricoeur states that in his view, “…for a theory constructed within the sphere of language, 
the best test of its claim to universality lies in determining its capacity for extension to the 
sphere of practice…” (Ricoeur 1995 ibid). 
This thesis puts that transition to the test, unifying the interpretive practice and poetics of 
a particular genre of social documentary photography as intentional interventions in the 
world, to the theorising model of Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics of language, text, action 
and history. The photographic narratives are thought of as a form of text with close 
similarities to the texts of written language of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic. Both are ordered 
and structured creations in which motivation blends with cause, explanation with 
understanding in their discourse. Each creates an autonomous world in actions to be 
defined using Ricoeur’s own formula as: 
“the act of someone saying something about something to someone”. 
 
Innovation I: Literature review. 
A thorough literature review shows that within the published literature and the practice of 
social documentary photography, critical analysis and discussion of Paul Ricoeur’s 
philosophical hermeneutics scarcely exists. Conversely, within the philosophical literature 
devoted to the hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, discussion and any critical analysis of a 
possible dialogue between the two domains also scarcely appears to exist. This is 
surprising because Ricoeur extended his hermeneutics into the humanities, recognising the 
two have an affinity and much ground in common; 3 for the photography is about agency, 
action and interpreting life, and Ricoeur’s philosophy of hermeneutics is also grounded in 
action, agency and the notion that meaningful life is a constant re-interpretation of life.  
This thesis is addressed to this perplexing and challenging aporia in both domains. 
 
Methodolology 
 
Theory into Practice. 
The thesis submission is entirely the original work of R.G.Brown. 
The thesis is part practice in social documentary photography fieldwork, part written 
theory in Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics, and their analysis and evaluation. The 
photography is contextualised in contemporary ethnography and historical, archaeological 
forensic science. The work has, in parts, been previously published and the photography 
publicly exhibited. The previous written publications are not in the form presented here, 
                                                           
3 Ricoeur P 1981: Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences. Essays in Hermeneutics I. J.B.Thompson 
(ed). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 
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but developmental exercises in earlier thought. Developmental presentations and 
discussions of the work have also been delivered to academic peer conferences in 
philosophy, visual sociology and visual archaeology. All are listed here and in the full 
Bibliography. 
 
The written text. 
The written thesis follows standard hypothetico-deductive techniques of examining and 
analysing the writings on philosophical hermeneutics by Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), and 
by selected commentators. I am focusing upon the books and essays Ricoeur wrote in 
which he adopted the model of Language and the theories of the written text, action and 
history, in which to organise and structure a critical post-Saussurean hermeneutics of 
amplification and affirmation. To develop the theory of the text he added the theory of 
action and the theory of history in a move that signifies the passage from phenomenology 
to a hermeneutics with a focus upon language and practical reasoning (Agis-Villaverde 
2012). 4 Ricoeur’s hermeneutic proposition is tested and evaluated by practical application 
through two fieldwork Case Studies in digital, social documentary photography, that I 
have photographed, exhibited, written on and published. The written thesis and the 
resulting two books of photographs with their own written texts are where I am looking to 
mediate an affinity between written language and the visual image that Ricoeur holds 
apart and yet feels natural.  
 
Case Studies: Fieldwork in social documentary photography. 
The photographic Case Studies give examples of a continuum of social documentary 
practice that extends from the historical and ethnographic to the historical and 
archaeological. Both make full use of descriptive and aesthetic considerations in the 
deployment of photographic skills, knowledge and techniques to achieve their 
documentary goals. The photography is central to both and supplemented by a written text 
that I have researched and authored, that provides the social and historical context.  
 Case Study 1: Regeneration Waterside South, the fieldwork 
photography lays stress on following standard anthropological techniques of qualitative 
participating observation and grounded theory where description, representation and 
theory emerges through processes of reflection and disclosure of things relevant to the 
narrative5. This is supplemented by informal interviews and oral dialogues with the people 
affected, and complimented by research in published histories and other secondary 
sources that I have written up as a text to complete the narrative. 
  Case Study 2: Imperium, the photography lays stress on studio lighting 
techniques and skilled macroscopic levels of observation and descriptive documentation 
of the forensic evidence revealed. The skills and techniques are those widely found and 
                                                           
4 Agis -Villaverde, Marcelino 2012 (a): Knowledge and Practical Reason: Paul Ricoeur's Way Of  
Thinking. International Studies in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology. Vol 5. Prof.Dr.Dr Andrzej  
Wiercinski (Ed).LiT Verlag. Munster. 
5 Glazer, B & Srauss, A 1967: The Discovery of Grounded Theory, strategies for qualitative   
research. Chicago. Aldine.  
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emphasised in studio still life, food and advertising photography. The photography is 
supplemented with a written text that I researched and authored that draws upon published 
archaeological resources, historians and chronicles of C14th Medieval England, that 
provides an authorative context and completes the narrative. 
 
The two Case Studies both make full use new and emerging digital photography, printing, 
and publishing techniques. The photographs in both are systematically intended for a dual 
purpose. Their primary purpose is to support the written thesis by providing concrete 
examples of documentary photography as hermeneutics in action. Both projects were 
commissioned, and their purpose is epistemological, made to fulfil the broader 
requirements of their commissioning agents for knowledge of their subject. They form 
two poles in a continuum of applied applications and historical consciousness in which are 
raised questions about the relations of a visual narrative to interpreting history and 
phenomenological reality. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 1.1: Case Study 1. ‘Regeneration Waterside South’ 
 Original Exhibition Poster 
17th March - 26th April 2008 
The Dresden Street Community Centre &St. Luke’s Church Hall. 
Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire 
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Fig 1.2: Case Study 2. ‘Imperium 1326: The Death of a Tyrant? Hulton Abbey and an 
 archaeological mystery.’ 
Exhibition titled: ‘Hanged, Drawn, Quartered: CSi 1326 a.d’ 
October 14th - November 14th 2012 
The Science Centre Staffordshire University, Stoke-on-Trent. 
 
Examples. 
 
        Case Study 1          Case Study 2 
 
   Fig 1.3: Waterside South, new housing   Fig 1.4: Hulton Abbey skeleton      
development along the Caldon Canal. The         HA16. Cervical Vertebra C3 showing  
old Wellington District is in the background.        peri-mortem trauma of  beheading.    
          
The Case Study photography is commissioned work. Both Case Studies are supplemented 
each by a published hardback book, photographed and written by me, that provide the 
photographic illustrations with a written historical context for the work. A copy of each 
book is submitted with the written thesis (Brown R.G 2012 (b) (c)). A PDF file of each 
book is included within the Appendices, but I must point out that the .pdf files (supplied 
by the book publisher, Blurb.com) lose the design integrity of the books as a consequence 
of the transfer from the publication format to the .pdf format. The documentary 
photography of both Case Studies have been given public exhibition. A peer reviewed 
article drawing on the thesis fieldwork and research has been published in a new textbook 
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for visual social science, A Guide to using Visual Methods in the Social Sciences: 
Awakening Visions. S. Spencer (Ed) 2011, by Routledge, Taylor & Francis Ltd. (Brown, 
R. G 2011). 
The Case Studies are referred to again in Chapter 3: On Documentary Photography, and 
discussed more fully in Chapter 4: Photography Case Studies. 
 
Exhibitions and Publications. 
 
Case Study 1: Regeneration, Waterside South is original digital photography 
commissioned by The Arts Council, West Midlands and RENEW: the North Staffordshire 
Housing Regeneration Agency, for a community arts project Place, Space & Identity I, on 
the theme of the social and economic regeneration of a district of central Stoke-on-Trent, 
Staffordshire. The photography extended part-time over the six month period of 
September 2007 - February 2008. I subsequently researched and monitored the progress 
of the regeneration programme until it was cancelled in March 2011 to write the text 
providing the social context for the photography. 
 
Exhibition 2008:  
Brown, R.G 2008 (c): 'Waterside South'. 17th March - 26th April 2008.  
The Dresden Street Community Centre & St. Luke’s Church Hall. Hanley, Stoke-on-
Trent, Staffordshire. The Arts Council West Midlands / RENEW North Staffordshire / 
BArts / 'Place, Space & Identity 1' Community Arts Commission. (Self curated and 
digitally printed). 
 
Publications 
Brown, R.G 2008 (d): 'Waterside South'  in Lock. E and Henner. M (eds) 2008: 'The Art 
of Beauty and the Earth'  Newcastle-u-Lyme. BArts Publishing. 
 
Brown, R.G 2011 (a): 'Photography as process, documentary photographing as discourse' 
in Spencer. S 2011: 'Visual Research Methods in the Social Sciences, Awakening Visions' 
London and New York. Routledge.  
 
Brown, R.G 2012(b): Regeneration: Waterside South. Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-
publishing. Digitally printed on-line by Blurb Inc. @ <www.blurb.co.uk>. Hard back. 
 
Case Study 2: Imperium 1326: The Death of a Tyrant? Hulton Abbey and an 
archaeological mystery. The original digital photography was commissioned by 
Professor John Cassella, Deparment of Forensic Science, Staffordshire University, for an 
inter-disciplinary research project HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation 
Project, funded by the Higher Education Academy (HEA) and the JISC Physical Sciences 
e-Learning Programme II. The commission was to photograph a skeleton excavated from 
Hulton Abbey, Stoke-on-Trent, thought to be unique in the archaeological and medieval 
history records for showing the severe peri-mortem trauma associated with a State 
execution by hanging, drawing and quartering of the victim, dated to 1326 and 
circumstantially attributed to being the remains of Hugh Despenser, Chamberlain to King 
Edward II. Despenser was executed in this way for treason in November 1326. The 
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intention was to make macro-photographs of such precision and clarity they could 
downloaded to an especially designed DVD and used in the teaching of forensic 
archaeology and anthropology sciences trauma diagnostics, obviating the need to handle 
the fragile original skeleton bones. The skeleton was photographed at Reading University, 
Department of Archaeology, July 2008. I subsequently researched the reign of Edward II, 
his wife Isabella, and the role of Hugh Despenser and wrote the accompanying text to 
provide an historical context for the photography. 
 
Exhibitions:  
Brown, R.G 2011(b): Photography, Agency and Hermeneutic Understanding. 
International Visualisation in Archaeology Conference 2011. English 
Heritage/Southampton University. (Conference paper & poster exhibition). 
 
Brown, R.G 2012(a): 'Hanged, Drawn, Quartered: CSI 1326 a.d'. The Science Centre. 
Staffordshire University, UK. (Curated by Professor J.P Cassella and Mrs S. Lawton, with 
digital prints by Mr D.Mullany). 
 
Publications:  
Brown. R.G 2008 (a): 'HASDiP: The Photography Protocols' in Cassella. J; Lewis, Mary. 
E; Brown. R; & Lucking, P 2008: ' HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation 
Project'  HEA Physical Sciences Centre / JISC Academy Distributed e-Learning (DeL) 
Programme11:  
<www.heacademy.ac.uk/physsci/home/projects/digitisationproject/final report >.  
 
Brown, R.G 2008 (b): 'HASDiP: the Inter-active DVD' in association with Cassella. J; 
Lewis, Mary E. ; Lucking, P 2008: 'The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Project 
Teaching & Learning DVD.  Staffordshire University / HEA Physical Sciences Centre / 
JISC Academy Distributed e-Learning (DeL) Programme II. Available for PC and MAC 
OS-X platforms.  
 
Brown, R.G 2011 (a): 'Photography as process, documentary photographing as discourse' 
in Spencer. S 2011: 'Visual Research Methods in the Social Sciences, Awakening Visions' 
London and New York. Routledge 
 
Brown, R.G 2012(c): Imperium 1326: Hulton Abbey and the Death of a Tyrant? 
Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-publishing. Digitally printed by Blurb Inc  on-line @ 
<www.blurb.co.uk>. Hard back. 
 
Other Publications: 
A peer reviewed article discussing aspects of the theme of the thesis in a new visual social 
sciences textbook: 
 
Brown, R. G 2011: Photography as process, documentary photography as discourse. In 
Spencer, S  2011: A Guide to using Visual Methods in the Social Sciences: Awakening 
Visions. London. Routledge, Taylor & Francis. ISBN: 978-0-415-48382-7 (hbk). ISBN: 
978-0-415-48385-8 (pbk). ISBN: 978-0-203-88386-0 (ebk). 
 
I have discussed both projects at peer international conferences in visual sociology and 
visual archaeology. The details are given below. I have also published, recently, an article 
based upon this thesis in a new textbook for visual research in social sciences. A copy of 
the article is included within the Appendices. The case study in forensic science and 
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archaeology resulted in the publication of a co-authored inter-active teaching and learning 
DVD. A copy is included within the appropriate book. The full HEA/JISC research report 
authored by Professor John Cassella also includes a section on the digital photography 
protocols that I have written. I give examples of the photography from each case study on 
page 7 and elsewhere within the written thesis.  
 
Conference presentations related to the thesis. 
Brown, R.G 2005 (b): "Documentary photography the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul 
Ricoeur". International Visual Sociology Association Annual Conference. Santorini. 
Greece. 
Brown. R.G 2006 (c): "On Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005), Hermeneutics and Photography" 
International Visual Sociology Association Annual Conference. Urbino Free University. 
Urbino. Italy 
Brown, R.G 2009 (a): ‘Documentary discourse, narrative and Ricoeur’s hermeneutic.’ 
International Visual Sociology Assocation Annual Conference. University of Cumbria, 
Carlisle. UK. 
Brown, R.G 2009 (b): HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Project 
Photography: a hermeneutic visualism. Visualisation in Archaeology Conference 2009. 
English Heritage. Southampton University. 
Brown, R.G 2011(b): Photography, Agency and Hermeneutic Understanding. 
International Visualisation in Archaeology Conference 2011. 
Brown, R.G 2013: Documentary Photography, Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the 
World of the Text. Staffordshire University & Glyndwr University Research Conference. 
Staffordshire University. Stoke- on-Trent, North Staffordshire. 
 
 
Part 2. 
Introduction 
“Hermeneutics is the art of deciphering indirect meaning”(Ricoeur). 
 
Scope of the thesis: Core problem. 
This thesis brings the theory and practice of social documentary photography into 
dialogue with the conceptual resources of the critical, post-Structural, philosophical 
hermeneutics of text, action and history developed by the French philosopher Paul 
Ricoeur (1913-2005). 
At the core of the thesis lies a single problem common to both the photography and the 
hermeneutics. That is: how to combine the perspective of a single agency, a person, inside 
the world with an objective view of that world, and to do so in such a way that the 
subjective viewpoint of the agent is included but does not over intrude on the desire for an 
objective observation? A satisfactory resolution to the problem brings together questions 
about ethics and morality, knowledge, reason, freedom and free will, consciousness and 
self-consciousness, the self, meaning and the relation of mind and self to the physical 
world of reality and others. In short how the inner and outer perspectives on the world and 
experience are to be related, and give a satisfactory account of that. 
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Paul Ricoeur offers through his later hermeneutics a stable and coherent conceptual 
perspective that can provide answers to this question. In recognising that social 
documentary photography is centred in an individual agency and grounded in the 
reasoning and social actions of a capable subject, that by its’ nature is interpretive and 
produces work of an historical text-like structure, there is the recognition of an affinity 
with Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Ricoeur’s post-Structural and critical hermeneutics that he 
developed from the 1970’s is also grounded in the agency of a capable subject whose 
social actions and meaningful interpretive events and moments Ricoeur analyses through 
the structure and methodology of the theory of the text, the theory of action, and the 
theory of history. Ricoeur’s idea of ‘a moral and capable person’ owes much to Kant. It is 
the idea of a rational being, capable of choice, and therefore endowed with dignity, 
worthy of respect, having rights and obligations met through practical reasoning and 
emotional responsibility (Kant 1785: Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals).6 A 
figure that must be regarded always as an end in itself (Midgley 1996 (b): Utopias, 
Dolphins and Computers. p111).7 
Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutic (‘Critical’ because always open to amendment and 
modification), is constructed in a dialectic of meaningful explanation and understanding 
of human knowledge and experience, in fluid relations that link author, text and reader 
together, in a three-fold mimesis of interpretation and affirmation of authorial Figuration 
(mimesis1); textual Configuration - the ‘world of the text’ (mimesis2); and reader 
Refiguration (mimesis3);  that he designates as an attestation, a credence that is also a 
trust, and what is commonly called a matter of conscience (Ricoeur 1992: Oneself as 
Another p21-23).8 
 
An “Elective Affinity” & Max Weber. 
How might the dialogue between the two fields unfold? Social documentary photography 
is centred in the visual. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic is centred in language, and written 
language especially. To help answer this I shall turn to Weber’s sociological construct of 
“elective affinity” within a scheme of Kantian reason. Weber utilised the notion of 
“elective affinity”, which he absorbed from the literary thinking and practice of Goethe, as 
a conceptual tool and mediation between ideology and practical living. He did so in 
seeking to understand, sociologically, different types of rational social action that people 
could be seen to adopt amidst social conditions of often radical historical change, from 
traditional agrarian economies and modes of production and consumption to C19th 
industrial economies structured on capitalist modes of production and consumption.  
Weber’s most notable example, perhaps, being to show how an ideological Calvinist 
                                                           
6 Kant 1785: Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten. Translated as Foundations of the Metaphysics 
of Morals. Trans. Lewis White. New York. Bobbs-Merrill. 1959. 
7 Midgley. M 1996 (b): Utopias, Dolphins and Computers'. London. Routledge. 
8 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
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Protestant ethic of personal responsibility and self-discipline enabled people to apply 
themselves, in practical terms, rationally and responsibly to the specific tasks of ‘work’ 
assigned them in an industrialised occupational world (Weber 1905: The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism).9 In Weber’s sociological construct, “elective affinity” is not 
well defined, but used flexibly across a range of topics and concerns. It is, in my view, a 
concept that mediates between different states of affairs that might otherwise appear to 
have little in common. I discuss this further in Chapter 3: On Documentary Photography. 
 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic provides us with a coherent methodology through which a 
Weberian conception of an elective affinity can mediate and be seen to work. That is, 
between what we might call the practice of documentary photography and the ideology of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Curiously enough, I think we can also stand the notion of its 
head, and see that Ricoeur’s hermeneutics effectively mediates the mediation of Weber’s 
notion of an elective affinity. 
 
Innovation II. 
The thesis innovates in a further number of ways. It begins the process of addressing the 
central aporetic of two domains concerned with the interpretation of life not, apparently, 
having yet been unified; not-withstanding Ricoeur’s own desire to extend his hermeneutic 
beyond philosophy into the humanities, a process he began in his lifetime. Current 
research in Ricoeur’s hermeneutic, post-mortem, is working further to that end, as I will 
show. The thesis is aligned with this desire. Second, it examines and questions the 
subordination made by Ricoeur, of the visual image to the primacy of Language in the 
domain of a hermeneutic of imagination, action and discourse (Ricoeur 1991: Imagination 
in Discourse and in Action).10 Third, it addresses the perplexing lack of awareness about 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic in the literature theorising the domain of Photography that is 
currently dominated by aesthetics and residues of a post-modern interest in semiotics. 
Fourth, it innovates in being written by a practising, published, exhibited and until 
recently teaching humanist documentary photographer.  
 
A philosophical anthropology and photographic anthropology. 
Ricoeur called his philosophy “a philosophical anthropology” because of the central 
importance he gave to the subject as Self and Self-Consciousness coming to realisation 
fully in an active social world on inter-actions with others. A self who achieves and yet 
                                                           
9 Weber, Max 1905: The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, and other Essays.  
Harmondsworth. Penguin Classics 2002 edition. 
10 Ricoeur, P 1991: Imagination in Discourse and in Action. In - Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to 
Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 
2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. NorthWestern University Press. (FTA). 
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suffers (Ricoeur 1992: Oneself as Another). 11 I like to call the social documentary 
photography that interests me “a photographic anthropology” because of its ethical 
concern and focus upon human life. It feels natural to do so. 
My education lies within anthropology and archaeology in which I hold an Honours 
Degree from Christ’s College, Cambridge University (BA Hons 1974; MA 1976). I have 
actively pursued this interest since within the fields of visual anthropology, visual 
sociology and visual archaeology.12 I am neither a professional philosopher nor a 
professional historian but one who is very interested in both, for pleasure and the 
intellectual enrichment of ideas and understanding this brings of the ‘examined life’. My 
interest is both for its own sake, and for the pragmatic utility in being able to bring that 
knowledge to bear upon documentary photography as a way of thinking and practical 
reasoning about the human social imaginary and life. As I discuss in Chapter 3 On 
Documentary Photography the photography is there to do a job. The question is how and 
how well does it do that in ways that are intellectually, aesthetically and emotionally 
satisfying? 
 
From phenomenology to hermeneutics. 
The thesis examines Ricoeur’s analysis of the grounding of a hermeneutic logic in 
Husserl’s phenomenology, through Heidegger, Gadamer and Habermas, to his own 
distinctive hermeneutic of Language surpassing phenomenology that is structured upon 
the theory of the text, the theory of action and the theory of history. I shall systematically 
examine Ricoeur’s development of this, and his proposition that the hermeneutic dialectic 
passes through an empiric detour of the text and indirect reference, to an ontological 
horizon of world-meaning and semantic innovation that he calls the autonomous ‘world of 
the text’, that is opened up to imagination and discourse by the narrative poetics of 
language (Ricoeur 1991: From Text to Action).13 Ricoeur extended this hermeneutic into 
two further domains of concern. A return to examining subjectivity and the being of the 
self-conscious Subject coming to self-realisation through Other (Ricoeur 1992: Oneself as 
Another);14 and the development of a functional hermeneutic of practical reasoning in 
areas of the social imaginary and ideology (Ricoeur 1986: Lectures on Ideology and 
Utopia).15 
 
 
                                                           
11 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University 
Press. 
12 I have, also, extensive experience as a professional studio still life advertising, and a location 
industrial photographer working in Aberdeen, London and Oxford. 
13 Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. (FTA ibid). 
14 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University 
Press. (OAA) 
15 Ricoeur, P 1986: Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. New York. Columbia University Press. (LIU). 
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Social Documentary Photography. 
‘Photography’ as a general category has active and passive aspects. Photographic theory 
reflects that duality. 
Like water that flows everywhere and finds its own level, ‘Photography’ is everywhere in 
our lives and in that ubiquity finds its own level. In this it is also like Language. In speech 
and writing, language is everywhere and serves all needful purposes of communication, 
from the most mundane technical instructions of a cookery recipe to the most sublime of 
literary expressions. Where photography and language unite is that both are 
fundamentally about communication to others, from the ‘here’ of an individual percept to 
the social universe consisting in those who can understand that language. We know this to 
be the case empirically. I had occasion recently to be standing beside a group of a dozen 
or so young men from India. They were talking and laughing together in their own 
language. To my ears it was simply sound with an appealing musical rhythm. Very 
pleasant and entirely without meaning for me. I asked them what was their language and 
they told me in English they were speaking Tamil and dialects of Tamil from southern 
India. They also happily told me that there are twenty-six different languages spoken in 
the Indian sub-continent, few of which are mutually intelligible. I was suitably impressed.  
Similar circumstances have applied historically to photography. People need to learn how 
to ‘read’ the photographic image. We learn as we learn language when a child, by endless 
repetition and being told that such and such configuration of marks in the picture is such 
and such in reality. Maynard takes this as his starting point in discussing his philosophy of 
photography (Maynard, P 1997: The Engine of Visualisation).16  
The historical literature in anthropology has many examples of indigenous peoples in the 
past who when first shown photographs of themselves by the visiting anthropologist were 
unable to recognise what they were seeing, but learned when shown how. Even today both 
ourselves and others feel there is a certain spiritual mysticism bound into both the written 
and visual artefact that somehow connects us to the author or the subject of the picture, 
and/or the maker of the picture, despite our supposed education, sophistication and 
familiarity with language and photography. We are quite comfortable with the idea that a 
piece of paper or a viewing screen bearing symbolic marks joins us to the original cause 
of those marks as being Great Aunt Nellie, and to the author of a text or picture. Wright, 
for example, elaborates the distress of certain contemporary Solomon Islanders whose 
colour prints of photographs of the parents and ancestors are now fading into oblivion 
                                                           
16 Maynard, P 1997: The Engine of Visualisation: thinking through photography. Ithaca. Cornell 
University Press. 
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(Wright, C 2009: ‘Faletau’s Photocopy, or the Mutability of Visual History in 
Roviana’).17 
From this cosmos of ‘Photography’ I am selecting a certain type of practice: Social 
Documentary; and from within that universe I am further selecting certain examples  to 
examine and  discuss. From a secure foundation in that particular we might anticipate 
worthwhile generalizations emerging. The humanist social documentary photography that 
interests me is a photography that is intentional, reflexive and self-aware, examining and 
questioning aspects of contemporary life, the histories and historical contexts that gave 
rise to it, whilst respecting the purposes and interests of its practitioners and co-operating 
subjects. This is the approach taken to the fieldwork photography for the thesis Case 
Studies. It is an ethical photography of action, judgement and skill, a phronesis 
reconfigured into a Kantian schematism of visual and written texts.  
 
Photography: A Three-Fold Structure. 
Mine is a process approach, a photography whose hermeneutic is bound to intention, 
action, reflection and history. To make this clear I am dividing the category ‘Photography’ 
into a three-fold structure of: Photography, The Photograph, Photographing.  
My emphasis is on Photographing. 
  Photographing: This is an ostensive definition describing an historical process 
of agency, intention, action, purpose and reflection in making social documentaries, to 
which I attach the Aristotelian definitions of praxis and phronesis. It has professional (that 
is, critical, philosophical and theoretical) and amateur aspects which overlap in areas of 
technical knowledge and technique in their application. 
 ‘The Photograph’:  An ostensive definition. The Photograph is the typical 
subject for post-modern social critical and semiotic photography theory. It is applied to 
the single photographic image, isolated from its historical context and analysed by using 
varieties of methods. Analysis and debate is theorised within art historical discourse 
(Elkins 2007),18 or within an Anglo-American philosophy discourse. Both meditate upon 
photography as an art form (Walden 2008: Photography and Philosophy).19 Both 
theorising perspectives share in an over-riding concern for the aesthetics of the image and 
photographic art practice subsumed within an historical canon, (Szarkowski 1965/2007: 
                                                           
17 Wright, C 2009: ‘Faletau’s Photocopy, or the Mutability of Visual History in Roviana’. In 
Photography, Anthropology and History: expanding the frame. ed. by Christopher Morton and 
Elizabeth Edwards. Ashgate. pp. 223-239 
18 Elkins. J 2007: Photography Theory. London. Routledge. 
19 Walden, S (ed) 2008: Photography and Philosophy, essays on the pencil of nature. Oxford. 
Blackwell. 
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The Photographer’s Eye),20  (Costello & Iversen 2010: Photography after Conceptual Art 
),21 Amateur interest overlaps with these in areas of technical knowledge. 
 ‘Photography’: is an ostensive definition where scientific theory attends upon 
the manifold of physics, chemistry and technology that make possible the visual medium 
of Photography. 
 ‘Photography’ is also an ostensive definition describing a general category or 
domain of endeavour, into which professional and popular understanding lumps together 
all or some of the above, under the widely understood rubric ‘Photography’ (Badger 2007: 
The Genius of Photography)22 and making pictures of anything and everything by means 
of technology (Flusser 2000: Towards a Philosophy of Photography).23 No particular 
knowledge of the science is necessary, except in areas of applied professional practice 
such as high-end advertising photography, or certain individual practices of art 
photography, where the potentials of the science and technologies are frequently pushed 
to their maximum. The general definition becomes accepted as social knowledge through 
endless processes of recognition of things called photographs, whose repetition leads to 
the creation of habit. So although different photographs may be of different things, 
whether pictures of the distant reaches of the known universe, or of rocks on Mars, the 
feeding habits of the duckbill platypus, or portraits of Great Aunt Agatha, people have no 
difficulty in applying the same name to these various epiphanies (Russell 1948: Ostensive 
Definitions).24 
 
The Concerned Photographer. 
From the cosmic generality of Photography and the universe of Documentary, I am 
isolating and examining a particular kind of humanist, social documentary photography 
theory and practice. It is often referred to as a photography of ‘Concern, Care and 
Compassion’ (Capa 1972: The Concerned Photographer).25 This is a photography with a 
long history rooted, on the one hand, in nineteenth-century concerns for reform of the 
worst consequences for people of industrialisation that gave rise to social and economic 
circumstances denominated by Disraeli as the ‘Two Nations’ of rich and poor (Disraeli 
1845: Sybil);26 (Newsome 1997: The Victorian World Picture);27 on another hand, that 
                                                           
20 Szarkowski J 1965: The Photographer's Eye. reprinted 2007. New York. The Museum of Modern 
Art. 
21 Costello, D (ed) & Iversen, M (ed) 2010: Photography after Conceptual Art (Art History Special 
Issues). Wiley-Blackwell. 
22 Badger, G 2007: The Genius of Photography: how photography has changed our lives. London. 
Quadrille Publishing. 
23 Flusser, V. 2000: Towards a Philosophy of Photography. London. Reaktion. 
24 Russell, Bertrand 1948: Ostensive Definition. In Human Knowledge: Its scope and limits. 
London. George Allen & Unwin. pp78-86. 
25 Capa. C 1972: The Concerned Photographer 2. London. Thames and Hudson. 
26 Disraeli, B 1845: Sybil: or the Two Nations. 2008 edition. Smith, S (Ed). Oxford. Oxford World 
Classics. 
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reached maturity of expression within professional journalism and photo-reportage, 
(Hamilton 1995 (b): Willy Ronis..),28 (Lardinois 2009: Magnum,Magnum),29 (Shore 2004: 
Uncommon Places);30 (Strand & Davidson 1962: Tir a’Mhurain);31 on a third hand, found 
expression in the exuberant adoption of picture making by enthusiastic amateurs 
photographing their lives and events as a hobby, for fun and family records, (Taylor 2007: 
Impressed by Light),32 (Ford & Steinorth 1988: You Press the Button..),33 (Badger 2007: 
The Genius of Photography..);34 and on a fourth hand, in the adoption of documentary 
photography into the social scientific methodologies of visual anthropology and visual 
sociology, (Banks & Ruby 2011: Made to be seen..),35 (Gardner 2009: Giving Visual 
Witness..),36  (Harper 1998: An Argument for Visual Sociology..)37  I discuss this further in 
Chapter 3: On Documentary Photography. 
 
Limits. 
I am not in any sense writing a history of documentary photography, nor am I attempting 
to be comprehensive but selective and choosing from amongst the huge amount of work 
available, within a field of practice that is everywhere evolving rapidly.  
What strikes me as significant about this, is that humanist documentary is a field of 
photography that continues to reverberate with meaning in our lives today. New 
technologies and new media have not blunted that, only opened the practice to new ways 
of doing things and new ways of distributing the work. The distribution is however biased 
economically towards serving the art market because of the collapse we have experienced 
of weekly or monthly printed magazines, such as ‘Life’, that gave prominence to 
documentary and solid apprenticeships in the practice to their staff photographers, such as 
W. Eugene Smith, with a critical editorial oversight that was not always without tensions. 
                                                           
27 Newsome, David 1997: The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an Age 
of Change. London. John Murray. 
28 Hamilton, P 1995(b): Willy Ronis: Photographs 1926-1995. Oxford. The Museum of Modern Art. 
29 Lardinois, B (Ed), 2009:  Magnum Magnum. London. Thames & Hudson. 
30 Shore, S 2004: Uncommon Places: the Complete Collection. London. Thames & Hudson. 
31 Strand, P & Davidson, B 1962: Tir a'Mhurain. Photographs by Paul Strand & Text by Basil 
Davidson. London. MacGibbon & Kee. 
32 Taylor, Roger 2007: Impressed by Light: British Photographs from Paper Negatives 1840-1860. 
New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art; New Haven and London, YaleUniversity Press. 
33 Ford, C & Steinorth, K (eds) 1988: You Press the Button, We do the Rest: the birth of snapshot 
photography. The National Museum of Film and Photography. Dirk Nishen Publishing. 
34 Badger, G 2007: The Genius of Photography: how photography has changed our lives. London. 
Quadrille Publishing. 
35 Banks, M & Ruby, J 2011: Made to Be Seen: Perspectives on the History of Visual Anthropology.  
Chicago and London. Chicago University Press. 
36 Gardner, R 2009: Giving Visual Witness. in Warren, C (ed) 2009: Human Documents: Eight 
Photographers. Harvard College. Peabody Museum Press. 
37 Harper, D 1998:  An Argument for Visual Sociology. in Prosser, J (ed) 1998: Image-based 
Research, a source book for qualitative researchers. London. Falmer. 
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That has gone (Loengard 1998: Life Photographers: What they saw);38 (Maddow 1985: 
Let Truth be the Prejudice: The Life and Photographs of W. Eugene Smith).39 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic proposition is tested and evaluated by practical application in this 
thesis through two fieldwork Case Studies in digital, social documentary photography, 
that I have photographed, written, exhibited and published. The written thesis text and the 
resulting two books of photographs and their own written texts are where I am examining 
and mediating an opposition between the domain of written language and the domain of 
the visual, that Ricoeur holds apart (Ricoeur 1991: Imagination in Discourse and in 
Action).40 
 
A continuum of practice. 
The two Case Studies represent a continuum of applied documentary practice from a pole 
of forensic science and archaeology to a pole of ethnographic social science and the social 
imaginary, in which histories and ideologies that inform and constitute socio-political 
action and lived realities are disclosed. Both are narratives of a shared identity and the 
social imaginary. One is contemporary and of the immediate past of memory, and the 
other is of medieval history and written chronicles. Both touch upon how we construct 
history and how history mediates life. Through them I find the opportunity to examine 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of text and action but also his thesis that one of the central 
functions of hermeneutics and practical reasoning is the interrogation of the social 
imaginary that governs society and motivates its peoples, that he analyses under the 
dialectical headings of Ideology and Utopia.  
The written thesis and the Case Studies are further linked by a sense of the photography 
writing history within an ontological social imaginary, and by notions of cultural myth, 
disclosed by the photographic interpretations and constructed narratives that themselves 
become examples of cultural myth. This is to understand ‘Myth’ as meaningful in the 
anthropological sense, as powerful symbols held at a distance and through which 
perplexities and particular ways of interpreting the world are made possible, not 
‘falsehoods’ and lies, as in common usage (Midgley 2005: How Myths Work).41 I discuss 
these further in Chapter 4: Photography Case Studies. 
 
In my own practice the mood of my documentary is celebratory of people and their lives, 
even when circumstances look bleak. The production of the photography grows out of the 
relationships built up with people and their communities over time, from within which the 
                                                           
38 Loengard, J 1998: Life Photographers: What They Saw. Boston, New York, London. Bulfinch 
Press. Little, Brown and Co. 
39 Maddow, B 1985: Let Truth be the Prejudice: the Life and Photographs of W. Eugene Smith. New 
York. Aperture Foundation. 
40 Ricoeur, P 1991: FTA.pp168-187. 
41 Midgley, M 2005: The Myths We Live By. London. Routledge.  
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stories emerge. The work of the Amber Film and Photography collective in Newcastle-
upon-Tyne is an exemplary case of contemporary work (Rigby et al 2013: Amber).42 
There are many others, for example Olivia Arthur, James Ravilious and Sebastio Salgado 
(Arthur 2012: Jeddah Diary);43 (Ravilious 2007: An English Eye..);44 (Salgado 2013: 
Genesis).45 
 
In summary: 
A humanist, social documentary photography. My interest is with the particular form of 
social documentary photography and its narratives, that is humanist, ethical and social 
scientific in attitude. I am limiting the scope of my study to a well established and 
critically examined form of the photography commonly labelled as one of care, concern, 
and respect for others.46 The photography is an activity whose systematic intention is 
looking outwards to the otherness of Others, making sense of what is found, and saying 
something about it that is truthful and honest.47 It is a photography built upon the 
phenomenology of an intentional contact with concrete reality subsisting in duration, and 
bearing witness to that encounter.48 The practice has much in common with the notion of 
an ethical ‘responsibility-for’ others, given us by Levinas as the ontological meaning of 
being presented in the face-to-face relation.49 It’s methodology bears a close relationship 
to the dialectic and reflection of traditional ethnographic fieldwork methods of 
participating observation and understanding.50  
 
Paul Ricoeur and a critical, philosophical hermeneutics. 
I am isolating and examining one part of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy, albeit a major and 
comprehensive fraction: what he thought and wrote on a critical and emancipating 
philosophical hermeneutics that grew from and surpasses Husserl’s Phenomenology, 
referred to by Ricoeur as an ‘amplifying’ Hermeneutics.51 I am not in any sense 
attempting to write a study of all Ricoeur’s philosophy. What I am always doing is 
looking for correlations and mediations between Ricoeur’s amplifying philosophical 
                                                           
42 Rigby, G et al 2013: Amber, The Film and Photography Collective. Accessible @ <www.amber-
online.com>. 
43 Arthur, Olivia 2012: Jeddah Diary. London. Fishbar Publishing. 
44 Ravilious, J 2007: An English Eye: The Photographs of James Ravilious. 2nd edition. Alan 
Bennett, Peter Hamilton & James Ravilious. Oxford. The Bardwell Press. 
45 Salgado, Sebastio 2013: Genesis. Bonn. Taschen. 
46 Capa. C 1972: The Concerned Photographer 2. London. Thames and Hudson. 
47 Dening, G 2004: Beach Crossings: Voyaging across Times, Cultures and Self. Pennsylvania 
University Press. 
48 Gardner, R 2009: Giving Visual Witness. in Warren, C (ed) 2009: Human Documents: Eight 
Photographers. Harvard College. Peabody Museum Press. 
49 Levinas, E 1994: Ethics as First Philosophy. Newly translated and reprinted in Hand, S 1994: The 
Levinas Reader. Edited by Sean Hand. Oxford. Blackwell Publishers. 
50 Robben,A & Sluka J (eds) 2007: Ethnographic Fieldwork, an Anthropological Reader. Oxford. 
Blackwell. 
51 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. pp 3-53. 
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hermeneutics of this period and the pragmatic business of thinking about and making 
social documentary photography and piecing together their interpretive visuals into well 
ordered and intelligible narratives.  
Ricoeur’s epistemological and critical hermeneutics centres in Phenomenology, 
Language, written Text and “the problematic of the text” articulated as Discourse. 
Distinguishing between spoken and written language, Ricoeur developed a hermeneutics 
of amplification of meaning and semantic innovation within the certainty of language and 
the theory of the written Text, the theory of Action and the theory of History. The theory 
of the Text is of central importance to these and Discourse the hinge around which the 
three fields articulated. A Text he defines as an ordered creation, a structured totality fixed 
in writing, or by any other process of inscription equivalent to writing (which I take 
documentary photography to be), with the sense of being open to its own-most 
possibilities, and thus being available to examination. A text holds the means of inscribing 
and communicating multiple meanings and new semantic innovations in their expression 
of sense and reference, within a three-fold mimesis of pre-figuration (mimesis1), 
configuration (mimesis2), and re-figuration (mimesis3). 
Hermeneutics in Ricoeur’s hands also reflects his deep concern for the conscious social 
Subject in self-realisation and individual freedom. Ricoeur adopts the model of the 
‘capable person’ to express this. This is a social and autonomous individual embedded in 
history and dynamically engaged with their world. It can be understood in something like 
Kant’s sense of Mundigkeit. Sometimes translated as ‘maturity’ what this means for 
Ricoeur is a subject with the capacity to use one’s own reason and to think for oneself.  
His later work extended hermeneutics into what he calls a “little ethics” of practical 
reasoning that has much to do with an ideal of democratic politics. He continues to 
develop a hermeneutic of practical reasoning examining the grounds of moral and 
ideological values, such as jurisprudence, liberty, rationality and truth, and their 
depredations by external forces. whose consequences he saw so clearly in the futility of 
the death of his father, and thousands of others in WWI; in WWII;  in the aftermath of the 
so-called “Cold War” through the 1950’s stand-off between the West of the USA and 
allies and the East of communist USSR, dominated by the threat of nuclear annihilation; 
and the violence of political events of the late 1960’s in Paris, London, and elsewhere in 
Europe. His thinking bears close resemblance to Habermas for whom emancipation means 
not only the freedom of the autonomous individual to think for themselves and act 
accordingly (within social, moral and legal norms), but the identification and fostering of 
social institutions that create the conditions of possibility for that.52 
 
Conclusion. 
                                                           
52 Finlayson, J.G 2005: Habermas: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford. OUP. 
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My thesis is asking new questions about familiar and practical things from an unfamiliar 
theoretical perspective in which I query Ricoeur’s opposition of language and the visual. 
Both the narrative discourse of the photography, and the discourse of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutic, in my view fulfil the definition that he gives of being “…the act of someone 
saying something about something to someone…”.53  
The process of documentary photographing and the hermeneutics of text and action have 
much in common. In their ways of proceeding both unify ‘scientific’ technicalities with 
imagination and aesthetics. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic ultimately rests upon an aesthetic of 
the beauties and pleasures of language. Both deal with observation, structured 
speculations, visualisation, imagination, the exploitation of symbol, metaphor and 
analogy, periods of experimental testing out ideas and possibilities, the representation of 
experience remade in particular styles, all placed before an audience. In more technical 
terms both can be understood as a Kantian schema of text, agency and action, history, 
imagination and practical reasoning that are interconnected and externalised within stable 
configurations of narrative. Both are mediated in their processes by an Hegelian method 
of the dialectic, whose procedures articulate a combination of perception with thought, 
sensation with understanding, in making sense of the world and the place of the subject 
within that. Underlying this we find an Hegelian sense of Nature as process, activity, 
becoming and disclosure, that can never be completed but is always evolving in a process 
without end. 
Humanist social documentary photography is surely something with which we are 
familiar. Yet it is also something about which we can ask new questions. Ricoeur’s 
philosophical hermeneutics allows us that privilege. In his carefully developed 
hermeneutic, Ricoeur brings conceptual clarity, method and new understandings, allowing 
us, as Collingwood says of philosophy, “to know in a different way things which we 
already knew in some way…”.54   
The thesis is written from the perspective of a professional documentary photographer 
active in fieldwork, research, publication, exhibition, and until recently teaching.  
 
Key Primary Texts by Paul Ricoeur. 
These are the principal books and essays written by Ricoeur that have been used in 
writing this thesis. They have all been read in translation. Following standard practice, 
their first citation is named in the body of the thesis and the full reference is given in the 
page footnotes. They are then referred to by the abbreviations indicated. 
 
                                                           
53 Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and 
John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. 
NorthWestern University Press. 
54 Collingwood, R.G 1933: An Essay on Philosophical Method. Oxford. The Clarendon Press. 
revised edition with an introduction by James Connelly and Giuseppina D'Oro, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
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1974:  The Conflict of Interpretations, Essays in Hermeneutics. ed. Don Ihde. Evanston. 
Northwestern University Press. (CoI) 
1975:  Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the surplus of meaning. Fort Worth. The 
Texas Christian University Press. (IT) 
1978:  The Rule of Metaphor: multi-disciplinary studies of the creation meaning in 
language.trans. Czerny, R; Blamey, K; Costello, J.  Toronto. University of Toronto Press. 
(RM) 
1981:  Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays in Hermeneutics I. 
J.B.Thompson (ed). Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. (HSS) 
1984/85/88: Time and Narrative. 3 volumes. Chicago. Chicago University Press. (TN 
1/2/3) 
1986: Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. New York. Columbia University Press. 
1991:  From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and 
John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. 
NorthWestern University Press. (FTA) 
1992:  Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
(OAA) 
1995:  'Intellectual autobiography of Paul Ricoeur' in Hahn.L (ed) 1996: The 
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XX11. Chicago. Open 
Court. (IAPR) 
1998:  Critique and Conviction: Conversations with Francois Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay. trans by  Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge. The Polity Press. (C&C) 
2005:  The Course of Recognition. trans. David Pellauer. Harvard. Harvard University 
Press. (CoR) 
2006:  History, Memory, Forgetting. trans. Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer. 
Chicago. Chicago University Press. (HMF) 
2013:  Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. trans. David Pellauer. 
Cambridge. Polity Press. (HWL2) 
 
Secondary texts. 
These are the principal authors and secondary texts that I have found most useful. It is not 
a comprehensive list. Further references will be found throughout the thesis. Their full 
citation will be given in the page footnotes and will be found in the complete 
Bibliography at the conclusion of the thesis. 
 
Agis -Villaverde, Marcelino 2012 (a): Knowledge and Practical Reason: Paul Ricoeur's  
way of Thinking. International Studies in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology. LiT Verlag. 
Munster. 
Dauenhauer, Bernard and Pellauer, David: "Paul Ricoeur". The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Summer 2011) Edward N. Zalta (ed)  
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/ricoeur/> 
Ihde, D 1971: Hermeneutic Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Evanston. 
Northwestern University Press. 
Kaplan, David M. (ed) 2008: Reading Ricoeur. Albany. State University of New York  
Press. 
Kearney. R 2004: On Paul Ricoeur, the Owl of Minerva. Aldershot. Ashgate. 
Madison. G.B 1994: Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur. In Kearney, R 1994: 
Routledge History of Philosophy Vol V111, Continental Philosophy in the Twentieth 
Century. London. Routledge. 
Pellauer, D 2007: Ricoeur: A Guide for the Perplexed. London. Continuum Publishing. 
Pellauer, D 2012: Looking for the Just. Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies. Vol 3.  
No 1 (2012) pp132-143. 
Reagan. C 1998: Paul Ricoeur, his life and work. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
Thompson, John B. 1981: Critical Hermeneutics: a study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur  
and Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press. 1995 edition. 
 
These books and articles have been supplemented by further essays from a variety of 
writers commentating and analysing aspects of Ricoeur’s life, philosophy and 
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hermeneutics. They are cited individually in the body of the thesis and listed in the 
bibliography. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Paul Ricoeur and critical hermeneutics. 
 
    
   
    
 
 
 
 
 
   Fig 2:1: Paul Ricoeur (1913-2005). 
          (Photo: Anon) 
 
“Phenomenology is the place where hermeneutics originates, the 
unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics; phenomenology is also 
the place it has left behind” (Paul Ricoeur 1991/1995).1 
 
The scope of the chapter. 
Looking at the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur as a whole, the immediate impressions are of 
an extraordinary diversity of enquiries and productivity of output. Ricoeur worked and 
wrote primarily within the fields of philosophy and religion, including existentialism, 
phenomenology, philosophical anthropology, ontology, hermeneutics, biblical 
hermeneutics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, narrative theory, critical 
theory, philosophy of action, law and history, moral philosophy and political philosophy, 
as Kaplan points out (Kaplan 2008: Reading Ricoeur).2 In practice he kept philosophy 
apart from religion as separate fields of enquiry, describing them as his two Hellenic 
Cultures (Ricoeur 2013: Hermeneutics, Writings and Lectures vol 2).3  Scratch the surface 
and it can be seen that the narrative of his life is, in its concrete humanism, within his 
thought a prolonged meditation upon, and within his person, a mediation of the two 
domains. Underneath the rippling surface there run some constant currents in the quest for 
human understanding. In philosophy the most enduring themes are perhaps: the concern 
for the conscious subject in self-realisation; the hermeneutic understanding that life 
interprets life; the importance of history and the sense of historical consciousness this 
brings to us of life being a conversation already begun, something that we briefly join 
with and that continues when we depart; and the desire to resolve speculative 
                                                           
1 Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and 
John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. 
NorthWestern University Press. (Hereafter referred to as FTA). 
2 Kaplan, David M. (ed) 2008: Reading Ricoeur. Albany. State University of New York Press. 
3 Ricoeur P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. 
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philosophical thought into practical reasoning and pragmatic useable actions for the 
common good. A ‘little ethics’ as he calls it (1992: Oneself as Another).4  
In this chapter I am concentrating upon Ricoeur’s critical philosophical hermeneutics. 
Centred in Language and modelled in the theory of the Text, the theory of Action and the 
theory of History. Ricoeur developed this hermeneutic over an approximately thirty-year 
period from the late 1960’s (Ricoeur 1995: Intellectual Autobiography. IA).5 I begin with 
the historical context and a brief survey of Ricoeur’s philosophy; Ricoeur’s enduring 
allegiance to Husserl’s philosophy of phenomenology; a first engagement with a 
hermeneutics of the symbol, the proposed double meanings they hold and Freudian 
psycho-analysis; before moving to his effort to synthesise phenomenology and 
hermeneutics in Language that arose from the confrontation with linguistic Structuralism, 
and then to an examination of the critical hermeneutics of the Text and Action, Time and 
Narrative that he resolved. 
 
The chapter is divided into two Parts. 
Part 1.                   Page 
1. Introduction.        27 
1.2 The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, a summary.     27 
1:3 Hermeneutics and phenomenology in the twentieth-century.  33 
1:4 Phenomenology.       37 
       Intentionality       37 
       Summary        39 
       Intentionality II       39 
1.5 Ricoeur and symbolic hermeneutics     41 
1:6 Symbolism into Language.       43 
1.7 Structuralism to critical hermeneutics.      43 
1.8 Coda: a neo-Kantian/neo-Hegelian?     48 
1.9 Summary.        50 
 
Part 2.          
Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the Text, Action and History  52 
2.1 The hermeneutics of the text.      53 
2.2 Discourse        53 
2.3 Explanation and Understanding.     54 
2.4 Interpretation        56 
2.5 Language and Text       56 
2.6 The notion of the text.       57 
2.7 Summary        59 
                                                           
4 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
(Hereafter referred to as OAA). 
5 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: Intellectual Autobiography in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. (Hereafter referred to as 
IA). 
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2.8 The World of the Text: Distanciation, Sense & Reference, Poesis,  
      Metaphor, Predication, Reference, Narrative and Plot.   60 
2.9 Time and Narrative, Time, Emplotment, Narrative Identity.  65 
2.10 Summary        69 
2.11 Text to Action and Practical Reason     70 
2.12 Agency and moral ascription      73 
2.13 Fixation of Action       75 
2.14 Summary        76 
 
 
 
I have chosen to structure the chapter in this way in an attempt to place Ricoeur’s critical 
hermeneutics, which is the principal focus of interest, into a necessary historical context. 
Not to do so would be a mistake. I find myself agreeing with Ricoeur that history is 
obligatory mediation to understanding. Whilst it is quite possible to go straight to his 
critical hermeneutics, without a knowledge of its’ antecedents, the scale of his 
achievement is much diminished. Even so I am not in any sense attempting to write a 
study embracing all of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy. Nor do I take account of Ricoeur’s 
extensive writings in theology. What I am doing is always looking for mediations between 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the social human being modelled in the notions of text and 
narrative that are grounded within language, and the pragmatic business of thinking about 
and making social documentary photography texts and narratives about the social human 
being, that are grounded within the visual domain. 
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Part 1 
 
1. Introduction. 
Agis-Villaverde suggests Ricoeur’s philosophy, overall, can be structured into four broad 
phases:  
1. Formation and influences (up to about 1950). 
2. Phenomenology (from about 1950 to about 1960). 
3. Hermeneutics (from about 1960 to about 1990). 
4. Practical Philosophy (from about 1990 to 2005). 
I am concentrating upon Villaverde’s phase 3: Hermeneutics, but also having regard to 
section 4: Practical Philosophy. The phasing needs to be treated with caution, however. 
The headings indicate currents and themes to which he gave the greater part of his energy 
at certain times, but the reality is there are no clean breaks from one phase to another. 
Instead they fuse, blend, advance and double back on themselves as his quest evolved in 
the flows of his life. They indicate an emphasis and process rather than a divide in moving 
from one theme to another. (Agis-Villaverde 2012: Knowledge and Practical Reason: 
Paul Ricoeur’s way of thinking).6 
 
1:2 The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, a summary. 
Paul Ricoeur stands in the tradition of twentieth-century French reflexive philosophy, in 
which he endearingly identifies himself, with characteristic humility, as a “sort of neo-
Kantian, neo-Hegelian” (Ricoeur 1995 IA ibid). One whose philosophy journeys by way 
of Aristotle and classical Greek philosophy, through Kant, Hegel and German idealism, to 
Nietzsche, Husserl, Heidegger and Gadamer, Levinas, Habermas and Derrida, and  
counting amongst his French colleagues at least, from Marcel, Mounier, Nabert and 
Merleau-Ponty, whilst embracing and absorbing into his thought aspects of Anglo-
American analytic language philosophy, particularly the work of Austen and Searle in 
speech act theory and the notions of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary 
utterances (Ricoeur 1998: Critique and Conviction).7  
The willingness to learn from another and often opposed tradition of philosophy is 
distinctive and characteristic of Ricoeur. Where others may hold analytic philosophy to be 
“…the unconditional rival of phenomenology and hermeneutics…” Ricoeur found there 
much of value (IA ibid. p32-33). In particular the distinction between the pragmatics and 
semantics of action-sentences, begun by Austen and continued by Searle for the analysis 
of speech acts, which he had no difficulty in absorbing into his views on the act of 
                                                           
6 Agis -Villaverde, Marcelino 2012 (a): Knowledge and Practical Reason: Paul Ricoeur's way of 
Thinking.International Studies in Hermeneutics and Phenomenology. Vol 5. (ed: Prof. Dr. Dr 
Andrzej Wiercinski). LiT Verlag. Munster. 
7 Ricoeur, P 1998: Critique and Conviction, Conversations with Francois Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. European Perspectives, a series in Social Thought and 
Cultural Criticism. Lawrence D. Kritzman, editor. New York. Columbia University Press. 
(Hereafter referred to as CC). 
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utterance and the involvement of the competent utterer, or author. Utterance is the ‘arena’ 
as he sees it, in which the ‘fate of the speaking subject unfolded’ (IA. ibid.). In this work 
from analytic philosophy, Ricoeur found a complement of logical semantics that served to 
strengthen the linguistic semantics that underpins his conception of Discourse that he 
places central to a critical hermeneutics.  
In the field of Action, Ricoeur, from about 1971 onwards, increasingly integrated some of 
the Anglo-American analyses of action theory into his hermeneutics of human action as a 
necessary mediation in self-understanding. This transposition of ideas began a journey 
that lasted a further fifteen years to reach a provisional conclusion in the Gifford Lectures 
in which he discussed ways of understanding the acting subject, that were published in 
1992 as Oneself as Another.8 This brought to an end the question of the ontology of the 
Subject in self-realisation and understanding. Hereafter his mind turned to pragmatic 
questions in the domain of the social imaginary where the ‘little ethics’ that he introduced 
in the concluding chapters of this book found expression in practical reasoning about 
issues and problems in the realm of he public good (2013: HWL2).9  
 
Style. 
Ricoeur’s procedure of work is incremental and developmental, a step-by-step process in 
which each step is tested and evaluated before moving on to the next. The next step 
invariably grows from questioning the earlier topic and finding that certain aspects remain 
unresolved. The unanswered question(s) then form the topic of the next enquiry. As 
Russell points out elsewhere, this is the procedure of a scientific mind (Russell 
1917/1963: Mysticism and Logic).10 Ricoeur’s method of work also owes much to Hegel 
and the theoretical teleology of fulfilment and Hegel’s method of the three-cornered 
dialectic that discloses new possibilities in new synthesis between apparent oppostions, 
and his procedure which follows a Socratic questioning and answering in the rigorous 
examination of a topic of interest. Out of this arise various polarities, such as that between 
Explanation and Understanding set up by Dilthey in nineteenth century hermeneutics to 
legitimate the human social sciences in contrast to the natural sciences. Ricoeur found the 
setting apart of the two procedures to be obstructive to a full understanding of matters. His 
resolution demonstrates Ricoeur’s fondness for taking philosophical ideas that apparently 
stand in opposition such as these two concepts, questioning and mediating between them 
to a new synthesis and an horizon of understanding that surpasses them both (2013: 
HWL2 ibid). In this case, to a new definition of interpretation that unifies both into a 
single concept that he formulates as a dialectical process alternating through time between 
explanation and understanding (1991: Explanation and Understanding. FTA ibid). His 
philosophy thus grows holistically and organically, and yet it keeps its feet firmly on the 
                                                           
8 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
9 Ricoeur P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. pp 1-44. Hereafter referred to as HWL2. 
10 Russell, Bertrand 1917/1963: Mysticism and Logic. London. Unwin Books. George Allen & 
Unwin. 
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ground in realities of the meaning, experience and suffering of life lived by the ordinary 
human being.  
By standing back a little, it can be seen that Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics of 
Language mediates between the ‘science’ of the linguistic technicalities of grammar and 
form, and the ‘art’ of the aesthetics, pleasures and beauties of the poetics of language put 
to use in making sense of experience, enriching life and making it meaningful. As Ricoeur 
expressed it, making of it “a life worth living” (IA ibid). The aesthetic sensibility is 
something we all possess as human beings. Not as something separate and set upon a 
pedestal, but as something implicit in our being, arising in normal, ordinary experience, as 
Dewey has so fruitfully shown (Dewey 1934/2005: Art as Experience),11 and the 
anthropological literature confirms (Morphy & Perkins 2006: The Anthropology of Art).12 
So too is the curiosity that leads to a path of scientific enquiry, both fields expressing the 
desire to explain and understand, to interpret and giving meaning to and make sense of 
human experience (O’Hear 1991: The Philosophy of Science),13 and the desire to give that 
visual representation (Kemp 2000: Visualizations).14 
 
Ricoeur holds the subjectivity of the self-realising Subject at the heart of his philosophy 
and his critical hermeneutics, for which history is the obligatory mediation to self-
understanding. (HWL2 ibid). Hermeneutics and documentary photography both arise 
within the subjective agency, actions and the productive imagination of the situated 
subject, a figure that Ricoeur calls the embodied 'capable person' who is anchored in 
social life and inter-acting with other people and their shared physical, historical and 
social worlds (IA ibid).15 Ricoeur’s hermeneutic, it can be seen, is a form of Kantian 
schematism modulated through a form of Hegelian dialectic. It is an ontological and 
epistemological conception of being and knowledge, according to which people are a part 
of a dynamic, ongoing historical process that requires constant interpretation and re-
interpretation. Life and the philosophical hermeneutic arising from it are processes 
without end, in which the subject being and their perceptions of the ways in which the 
world is, as found and phenomenologically encountered, each reciprocally determine the 
other, both in varieties of theories about its’ nature and through the varieties of practices 
of daily living.  
                                                           
11 Dewey, J 1934/2005: Art as Experience. New York. Perigee/Penguin Group USA. The 
archaeological record for Norfolk has revealed an Achulean style pear shaped flint hand axe that is 
carefully flaked around a central fossil shell, provisionally dated to 100,000-200,000 b.c.e; and for 
South Africa, a piece of red ochre carefully inscribed with a diamond pattern  dated to about 77,000 
years b.c.e, hinting at how deep rooted an aesthetic sensibility is within the human psyche.  
Doubtless our homo sapiens and homo neanderthalensis forbears used bodily decoration, clothing, 
masks and other ornamentation in life to beautify and express intricate spiritual beliefs that have not 
survived, as occurs today. See: Morphy, H & Perkins, M (eds) 2006: ibid. 
12 Morphy, H & Perkins, M (eds) 2006:  The Anthropology of Art, a Reader.  Oxford. 
Blackwell/Willey. 
13 O'Hear, A 1991: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford. The Clarendon Press. 
14 Kemp, M 2000: Visualizations: The Nature Book of Art and Science. Berkeley. University of  
California Press. 
15 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: ibid. 
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For these reasons Ricoeur also calls his philosophizing a “philosophical anthropology”. 
Through and through it is a “ philosophy of knowledge in the service of a concrete human 
being”, as his pupil and collaborator Villaverde expresses it (ibid p198).16 
The current runs throughout Ricoeur’s philosophy from the earliest to the latest period and 
reflects both his personal cultural upbringing, that he describes as having two sides, Greek 
(philosophical) and Biblical (Protestant theology). It also reflects the tradition of French 
reflexive philosophy in which he was schooled and worked, albeit influenced by German 
Idealism (IA ibid). Ricoeur refuses the Cartesian doctrine of the cogito as an autonomous 
subject transparent to itself. He is insistent that the self recognises and fulfils itself 
through mediations in and with the external Other, and the institutions of social life and 
the diverse fabrications of culture. Ricoeur proposes a doctrine of the subject as being the 
Self-as-Another, for whom the long journey through history and engagement with the 
products of culture (European in the case of Ricoeur) is the obligatory path to the 
discovery of meaning and self understanding (OAA ibid). Ricoeur gives his hermeneutics 
an anthropological explanation and refers to his philosophy as a philosophical 
anthropology without any absolute, which he held distinct from a philosophy of religion 
which has an absolute, God, in Protestant theology (IA ibid). 
 
Over a seventy year span as a philosopher, Ricoeur was extraordinarily prolific and 
intellectually curious writing on a broad range of subjects (Reagan 1998: Paul Ricoeur, 
his Life and Work).17 From amongst this diversity emerges Meaning and Language as the 
fundamental mediations of knowledge and our natural view of the world (Ricoeur 2013 
ibid). Language is the foundational mode of our being in the world and constituting it, 
meaning is the manner of comprehension of our percepts whereby we make sense of it 
(Agis Villaverde 2010: ibid). 
 
It is frequently said that Ricoeur’s greatest contribution to philosophy has been a 
distinctive development of philosophical hermeneutics, one entirely his own in which he 
elaborated an interweaving set of enquiries into the ontology of what he thought is a 
critical property of language: the property of semantic innovation. He asks, “How does 
new meaning come to be, and, in doing so, reconfigure the meanings of (the present and) 
the past?” (my modification in parenthesis, of Kearney 2004: Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of 
Minerva. p1).18 Ricoeur’s philosophy is also empiric in that it shares an important 
assumption within the traditional French concern for the Subject, and within the parallel 
German hermeneutics of emancipation. That is, that philosophy must find its place and be 
linked with everyday life by a concern for meaning and intelligibility in understanding 
and communication, thought and action, that is directed to the social imaginary and to 
making a difference to the lives and experience of people in the actual world.  
                                                           
16 Agis -Villaverde, Marcelino 2012 (a). 
17 Reagan calls Ricoeur’s life, “an intellectual life lived to the full”. Reagan. C 1998: Paul Ricoeur, 
his Life and Work. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
18 Kearney. R 2004: ibid 
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From beginning to end, Ricoeur’s is a philosophy in the service of a concrete human being 
and something constructive, positive and of practical value (Agis Villaverde 2012 ibid 
p193). 
Ricoeur, as we have earlier mentioned, wrote on a very wide range of subjects including 
Phenomenology, Symbolism and Myth, Freud and psychoanalysis, Structuralism, 
Language philosophy, Analytic philosophy, Deconstruction, Poetics, Historiography, 
Ethics, Epistemology, Hermeneutics, Political Science, Justice, Theology (Kaplan 2008 
ibid). Because the range of his work is so broad it would be mistaken to pigeon-hole 
Ricoeur as such-and-such a philosopher, or the advocate of a particular school. There is 
however a unity of development and continuities that run through his work, like a chalk 
stream sometimes disappearing only to re-emerge further along its’ journey across the 
landscape. Philosophy (the Greek) and Theology (the Biblical) are the twin pillars upon 
which his thought is built. A duality of rational and critical thought alongside biblical 
studies that he calls his ‘twin cultures’ that lasted throughout his life. He was much 
concerned that his philosophical thought be separate from his theological but that each 
should serve, pragmatically, the needs of practical reasoning in understanding and shaping 
human affairs, where possible (CC).19  
 
Through the course of his life, Ricoeur anticipated, debated and engaged with virtually 
every important school of twentieth-century French and European thought. His way of 
doing so is distinctive, generous and open minded. Characteristically he engages with 
others in ways that establish their value and absorbs from them what can serve his own 
agenda. Where others might proceed by a negative refutation of someone’s ideas as 
imperfect, misguided or simply wrong, and an exhortation that “their way” is the right 
way that all similarly right-minded people should accept, Ricoeur does not do that. Slow, 
perhaps, to claim credit for himself, Ricoeur was always meticulous and generous in 
acknowledging what he owed to other people from all stations in life. In finding value in 
others he does not disparage but profits from the creative tension that results. Even and 
especially so when this brings about a rethinking of his own views.  
 
In his method he applies to himself the triadic procedure of the Hegelian dialectic of 
mediating apparent opposites and in the resulting synthesis of opposing views, more often 
than not, leaving his own ideas clearer, more defensible, and less vulnerable to charges of 
insularity and parochialism.20 Linguistic Structuralism and Semiotics is a good example. 
Whilst critical of it’s a-historical character and refusal to account for the individual 
subject, Ricoeur found much in its precepts that was insightful and useful in their abstract 
hypotheses for understanding what language does and how we can use different language 
structures and expression in the analysis of specific cases. This he absorbed into his 
critical hermeneutics, but only as a first, albeit necessary, stage in the journey to a full and 
                                                           
19 Ricoeur, P 1995 CC ibid. p6. 
20 Andrews, D 2000: Tracing Ricoeur. Diacritics 30:2. Summer 2000 pp43-69. 
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enriching interpretation and understandings, but not to be accepted as a universal model of 
explanation. (IA. ibid). 
A prolific writer, Ricoeur published numerous books, articles and essays. Kearney lists 35 
books, 21 Agis-Villaverde 41 books,22 and at least 200 articles and essays, and Kaplan 30 
books and ‘over’ 500 articles.23 There is not, however a Great Masterwork, a book or 
small series of volumes that synthesises his whole philosophy into a totality. He did not 
see that as his purpose, as he himself said in conversation.24  
 
In producing his work Ricoeur, we can see, is again following Hegel with a method of 
proceeding by the examination of a topic step-by-step, incrementally developing his 
thought through the process.25 His essays lay out his ideas and progress before us. Thus 
we see both the phenomenological object and process in play. He calls it his bit-by-bit 
approach. A topic is examined with rigour and his thought about it laid before us in a 
published essay or series of essays. Typically the essays will each conclude with another 
question raised and to be examined in a further essay. Periodically he felt he had sufficient 
results to justify gathering together his thoughts into a book.26 Again the book, typically, 
will not be definitive but leave questions unanswered and the door open to new ideas and 
new revisions.27 Other people, his students and collaborators, have gathered together the 
essays from diverse journals and publications with his approval and sometimes his own 
added commentary, and placed them into a series of publications, for example the 
collection published as From Text to Action which contains essays central to the evolution 
of his critical hermeneutics.28   
It has been said that philosophers exist to ask questions, not to answer them. Ricoeur died 
in 2005 aged 92 years. His questioning has often been profound, and his hermeneutic of 
the text, and by extension, text-analogues (in which I include photo-documentary 
narrative) has moved our understanding onto a new plane. He made no attempt to build a 
grand all-embracing philosophical system but to participate forcefully in a conversation. 
Ricoeur’s work has, overall, the character of a philosophy under construction, a 
conversation that had already begun which he joined and contributed to and invites us to 
enter into as well; and a quest that was still being pursued wherein separate problems are 
laid out and examined, piecemeal, until his death. Reagan has called Ricoeur’s life, an 
“intellectual life lived to the full”.29 We can only and humbly agree. 
                                                           
21 Kearney. R 2004: On Paul Ricoeur, the Owl of Minerva. Aldershot. Ashgate. 
22 Agis-Villaverde (ibid) 
23 Kaplan, David M. (ed) 2008: Reading Ricoeur. Albany. State University of New York Press. 
24 Ricoeur 1995/1998 CC (ibid). 
25 Russell calls such a procedure the hallmark of scientific method. Russell, Bertrand 1917/1963: 
Mysticism and Logic. London. George Allen & Unwin. 
26 For example: Ricoeur, P 1984, 1985, 1988: Time and Narrative. 3 volumes. Chicago. Chicago 
University Press. 
27 Ricoeur, P [1995]/1998: (ibid) CC. 
28 For example: Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen 
Blamey and John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new Forward by Richard Kearney. 
Evanston. NorthWestern University Press. Hereafter referred to as FTA. 
29 Reagan. C 1998: Paul Ricoeur, his life and work. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
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Ricoeur’s work continues today, post-mortem, through the work and membership of his 
archive held at the Ricoeur Study and Research Centre, “Fonds Ricoeur”, Paris,30 and 
their active promotion of research and conferences held internationally to discuss and 
broaden the application of his thought, and by the Society for Ricoeur Studies and the peer 
reviewed journal ‘Ricoeur Studies’.31  
 
1:3 Hermeneutic philosophy in the twentieth-century. 
 Three major figures bestride twentieth-century philosophical hermeneutics: Heidegger, 
Gadamer and Ricoeur. In their hands, hermeneutics (the philosophy of interpretation) is 
closely associated with Phenomenology and with Language. Hermeneutics is broadly 
defined as interpretive activity based upon the existential thesis that life interprets life and 
that human existence is, itself, a mode of interpretation, hermeneia.  
Husserl’s philosophy of phenomenology can be defined as the dream of a science of 
philosophy without presuppositions. Hermeneutics can be defined at its most basic level 
as the interpretation of and making Sense of things in human experience (the 
hermeneutical question, par excellence). The primary subject matter is Meaning and the 
interpretation of Language and language phenomena in speech, writing and reading. It 
also embraces other forms of representational inscription whose properties are similar to 
those of a written linguistic text that can be de-coded, and in a similar way, “read” with 
meaningful understanding.32  
 
The hermeneutic interest in Language reflects the wider twentieth-century philosophical 
preoccupation with language and the belief that language is the distinctive way human 
beings rationalise and shape their understandings of the exterior world and the inner mind. 
Language is regarded as the distinctively human exercise of the mind shaping and 
understanding metaphysical, scientific, emotional and artistic beliefs about the world, 
ourselves and our place in the order of things. The philosophy of language in the Anglo-
American analytic tradition is informed by the belief that language is the fundamental 
basis of all philosophical problems since it needs to give an account of what it is in our 
experience and understandings that that enable us to use language. A belief given impetus 
by Wittgenstein with his notion of ‘language games’, but also manifested in diverse forms 
of logical positivism and the verification principle; and the wider ranging analytic 
philosophy of language embracing semiotics, syntax, semantics and pragmatics, in the 
quest for a general understanding of the elements of a working language, the relationship 
of the understanding speaker to its components, and the relationship they bear to the 
                                                           
30 Ricoeur, P: Fonds Ricoeur, The Ricoeur Archive and Research Study Centre, Paris. 
<www.fondsricoeur.fr> 
31 Ricoeur, P: The Society for Ricoeur Studies. <www.ricoeursociety.org>. 
32 Ricoeur was particularly attracted to architecture in this respect. Not only Classical but it is 
tempting also, to recall in the C19th Ruskin and ‘The Stones of Venice’ and in the C20th the work 
of Le Corbusier and Modernist architecture to be ‘read’ as ‘machines for living’. See Chapter 8 
Aesthetic Experience, in - Ricoeur, P [1995]/1998: Critique and Conviction: Conversations with 
Francois Azouvi and Marc de Launay. trans by Kathleen Blamey. Cambridge. The Polity Press. 
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world, to be seen, for example, in the work of Austen and later Searle (Austen 1962: How 
to do things with Words).33 
 
Hermeneutics also becomes closely associated with Perception, with perceptual 
phenomena and sensory interpretive activity. The Cartesian notion of the doubting Subject 
introspectively transparent to itself through consciousness and self-realisation is 
questioned and refused. The notion of the Subject-as-Self remains central to philosophical 
concern, but this subject is embodied in nature and very much part of and a product of the 
world in which they inhabit. For Heidegger and Gadamer hermeneutics becomes an 
ontology of universal being and understanding. For Ricoeur in his critical but amplifying 
hermeneutic, hermeneutics is centred as an epistemology that does something, informing 
action, practical reasoning and use in the world. 
 
Each of the three primary figures, in their different ways, follow the example of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey, who, in the nineteenth-century began to reshape 
hermeneutics away from a narrow preoccupation with the interpretation of biblical and 
scriptural texts to a broader, holistic attitude that called for a total literary, historical and 
humanistic examination of all texts. At the same time the notion of what constituted “a 
text” expanded. For example, with the metaphorical idea of there being a “Book of 
Nature” which science and philosophy must investigate and learn to “read”; to the idea of 
critically “reading” and interpreting all human social and cultural activities and products.34 
Kant argued in the first Critique that mind, mentality as such and pure understanding of 
the transcendental ego makes nature, it does not create nature. It is not arbitrary or 
irrational but essentially a rational and necessary product of the human way of looking at 
things. We cannot stand outside of ourselves and view things dispassionately. There can 
be no knowledge of anything transcendent that he called the noumenon. The knowledge 
we have is the product of intuition, our senses and an intelligent and thoughtful 
perception. Therefore, according to Kant, what we know is phenomenal appearance only 
(“sense data”) and that we know inductively. If we want to know what the mind really is 
in itself, said Kant, “act and you will find out”.35 
 
Hegel’s idealism differed from Kant. In his Phenomenology of Mind, Book 2, Hegel 
argued that Nature is real and not in any sense a matter of mere appearance and something 
that exists simply because we think it. For Hegel the concept of “Nature” is of something 
that really exists independently of any mind whatsoever. Nature is external and reality is 
the external world. What he means is that in the world everything is external to everything 
                                                           
33 Austen, J. L 1962: How to do things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered in 
Harvard University in 1955. 2nd edition, edited by J.O.Urmson and Marina Sbisa. Oxford at the 
Clarendon Press. Oxford University Press. 
34 Madison, G. B 1994: Hermeneutics: Gadamer and Ricoeur. pp290-349 in Kearney, R (ed) 1994: 
Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy. Routledge History of Philosophy Vol VIII. London & 
New York. Routledge. 
35 Collingwood, R.G 1945: (ibid 
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else. It is a realm of outwardness. This renders the historical distinction of Mind opposed 
to empirical Matter as untenable. As humans we are of nature, embodied, and nature is of 
us, although we have the distinction of self-consciousness and being able to distance 
ourselves from ourselves and from nature, observing, analysing, evaluating possible 
explanations, understanding and making it meaningful. 
Furthermore, Hegel’s concept of Nature is a concept of pure activity. Nature is always a 
process of becoming, of disclosure trying to become something definite, yet whose 
convergence upon its own goal scarcely ever altogether succeeds in being itself.36 Thus a 
bud develops into a blossom that develops into an apple; an egg develops into a chick that 
develops into a fledging that develops into a soaring golden eagle; the infant becomes a 
child who becomes an adult, who ages and finally decays. Yet each may be similar but 
each are not the same as their forbearers. Each is similar in process but not identical in 
physical or genetic make-up, not even apples from the same tree, and thus evolution has 
room in which to work to modify and adapt biological forms to their environment. 
 
It is an old idea traceable back to Heraclitus in 4th century B.C and Aristotle, who in Book 
2 of Rhetoric suggested there are Three Ages of Man: youth, prime of life, and old age.37 
The idea remained hugely influential in medieval European writing and thought,38 and 
Shakespeare in 1599/1600 rendered it anew as the Seven Ages of Man in As You Like It: 
the infant, schoolboy, lover, soldier, justice, pantaloon, and finally, sans, a non-entity.39 In 
twentieth-century British structural-functional anthropology Fortes was particularly 
influential in giving the notion new impetus in the form of lineage descent-theory and an 
essential element of the dynamic life cycle of inter-generational familial kinship relations 
structuring a cohesive and stable corporate society. An historical, diachronic doctrine 
standing in opposition to the a-historical, synchronic, Structuralist alliance theories of 
kinship and marriage advocated by Levi-Strauss.40  
Nature, in Hegel, is therefore a tendency and nothing in science fully describes what it is. 
Not because our scientific methods and descriptions are poor and in need of correction, 
but because there is always an element of indeterminacy, of potentiality not yet resolved 
and realised into a perfect actuality. Even quantum physics would seem to be a limitless 
regression into the perplexities of matter and anti-matter. 
 
Ricoeur laid great stress upon Language and Texts as “ordered creations”. That is, put 
together under certain rules and procedures. Perhaps we can say that Ricoeur found a path 
to mediating the tension between these opposing Kantian and Hegelian metaphysics in the 
apparent certainty of a hermeneutic constructed around Language and the written word, 
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inscribed in time and space within the narratives and poetics of the Text. A certainty that 
was grammatically ordered, methodical, and with rules of procedure, that provided a 
discourse of knowledge that was imaginative, open to new forms of expression and new 
levels of meaning, whilst remaining intelligible, useful and communicable to any others 
who could read the script. A sense of certainty he captured within his formula The World 
of the Text, and his formula for defining hermeneutic discourse as “…the act of someone 
saying something, about something to someone…”, that, as he says “makes life worth 
living”.  
 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey both returned hermeneutics to its classical sense of the Word, 
“to say” and “to interpret”, hermeneuein, the bringing into word what was not yet word. 
From this birth comes language, from which are derived meaning and multiple meanings, 
the explaining of matters as in bringing them to understanding, and the science and art of 
interpretation and the analysis of all possible types of human utterance.41 
Dilthey also gave a new dimension to hermeneutics situated at the level of epistemology 
and the claim to scientific status. Three things were at issue: first, the need to defend the 
autonomy of the human sciences; second, to establish their different methods of 
proceeding. To do this he divided hermeneutics into a hermeneutic of “explanation” as the 
method of the natural sciences, and a hermeneutic of “understanding” as the method of the 
emerging social sciences of sociology and anthropology. Third, there was the question of 
grounding this epistemological difference in a fundamental property of mental life, 
namely, the power of a subject to enter into the mental life of an alien Other. This was 
held to be possible on the grounds that, psychologically, we are all similar human beings, 
despite our cultural differences.42 To achieve this indicated a move of hermeneutics from 
a strictly epistemological method of interpretation to a neo-Kantian transcendental 
interrogation of the conditions of possibility for hermeneutics. 
 
Weber absorbed Dilthey’s use of hermeneutic understanding, verstehen, into his 
development of Sociology, notably in his examination of the Protestant work ethic 
underlying the rise of European industrialisation and capitalism.43 A study that, along with 
his other sociological works, hugely influenced, through Franz Boas, the twentieth-
century development of American cultural anthropology centred at Columbia University; 
and in British structural-functional,44 and symbolic schools of anthropology,45 informed 
the classic ethnographic fieldwork methodology of participating observation.46 
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By the end of the nineteenth century hermeneutics had become humanistic, linked to the 
problem of human and historical understanding. The principles of hermeneutics were to 
be understood, now, as basic to any kind of textual and historical understanding.47 
 
1:4 Phenomenology. 
By the early years of the twentieth-century the single most influential, albeit indirect, 
influence on the development of contemporary hermeneutics has been Husserl’s 
philosophy of Phenomenology, perhaps best expressed in the Cartesian Meditations, 
wherein Descarte’s ego cogito and reductive principle of “doubt” served as a foil for his 
thinking upon phenomenology.48 Phenomenology is a philosophical position that 
emphasises Consciousness and the through consciousness and the body the direct 
experience of the world. It stands opposed to philosophical positions that emphasise 
mental abstractions and Idealism. That is philosophies that set up an opposition of Mind 
and Matter in such a way that the world is seen as a construction of the Mind. Husserl 
held that the phenomena of the actual “lived world” - lebenswelt - must be the basis of 
philosophical reflection. 
Husserl sought for some absolute transcendental grounding from which to build, step by 
step, a universal philosophical science. To achieve this he proposed the method of “the 
phenomenological reduction” - epoche - in which all conventional assumptions are set 
aside. He called this “bracketing” and included the question of the very existence of an 
object or impression that is central to the mind : matter debate. 
To do so he sought to unify the traditions of rationalism and empiricism in facing the 
afresh the challenge posed to philosophy by science, of how our natural view of the world 
that we live in and experience day by day in common sense, is related to the apparently 
dispassionate and verifiable authority of scientific knowledge.49  
 
Intentionality. 
Intentionality is central to Husserl’s phenomenology. By this he means the intentionality 
of consciousness. It is the fact of living in the world that our consciousness is always 
focused upon something outside of itself. Husserl phrased this as: “…consciousness is 
always consciousness of something…”. Consciousness allows us to appreciate experience. 
Thus, the mind does not create reality but interacts with it. Intentionality offers the means 
of seeing the relationship between the subject and the object, and is, in consequence, 
regarded as being more fundamental than a position on either side of the mind : matter 
dualism. Merleau-Ponty emphasised perception in his philosophy, arguing that we 
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perceive the world as an interacting multiplicity of intentions.50 The social theorist, Alfred 
Schutz in his theories of the phenomenology of social worlds argued that phenomenology 
places an emphasis on the subjective and common-sense nature of people’s perceptions 
and assumptions about the life-world they inhabit. Schütz's main concerns were with 
understanding how people grasp the consciousness of others whilst living within their own 
stream of consciousness and the social nature of knowledge. People, he argued, create 
their social realities looking to the present, to the past and into the future. The ‘life-world’ 
created is not free but constrained be existing factors, such as geographic, environmental, 
social, economic, political. Nonetheless people can and do interact with each other and 
their inherited worlds in ways that are both traditional and dynamic in multiple ways that 
are, in their nature, dialectical.51 Schutz greatly influenced Ricoeur’s conception of 
hermeneutics as an epistemology if the lived world whose dialectical discourse is 
grounded in consciousness, action and inter-action with others in a shared world. 
 
Language. 
The second most influential factor for Husserl, was a return to the centrality of Language 
to human being. The condition of a linguistic phenomenology expressed best, perhaps, in 
the hermeneutic motto “Man is Language”.52 The problematic, for Husserl, took shape 
within the existing language and terminology of Modern, post-Descartes, philosophy. The 
problem to overcome was two fold: the opposition between Mind and Matter, expressed 
as Subject and Object; and the related problem of epistemology and how knowledge is 
constituted for us. 
Husserl was not alone in his concerns. We have noted the wider twentieth-century 
preoccupation with the philosophy of language. Russell, for example, at much the same 
period also became interested in the theory of knowledge, in his case with those parts of 
psychology and of linguistics that seemed to him relevant to the subject. In 1911 he 
proposed his celebrated inferential theory of knowledge by acquaintance and by 
description (Russell 1911); 53  and re-stated in 1948 as a central problem of philosophy as, 
“The question is not what can we know, but what can we know?” (Russell 1948). 54 The 
new interest marked, for him, what he describes as “…a more or less permanent change in 
my philosophical interests…” that led him towards a flirtation with logical positivism and 
the effort to synthesise science and empiricism, and resulted in three books.55 He did so 
with a number of prejudices in his mind, two of the most significant being, first, a 
questioning of the term “experience” which he thought over-emphasised, especially in 
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Idealist philosophy and many forms of empiricism, insisting that people (we/us/you and 
me) accept innumerable propositions about things not directly experienced. Second, that 
knowledge of what there is in the world if not known through perception or memory, must 
be inferred from premises, of which one, at least, is known by perception or memory. On 
the understanding that there can be no wholly a-priori method of proving the existence of 
anything, but that there are forms of probable inference which must be accepted, although 
they cannot be proven inductively by experience as Hume already had demonstrated.56  
 
In summary:  
What Phenomenology showed to Husserl’s apparent satisfaction was the “…ultimate 
indubitability of the World…”. Husserl’s method of the eidetic reduction, bracketing, 
showed that, “…’givens’ are in fact constituted by a complex process, and are not 
simplex…”. What the matter of Subjectivity now showed, he said, was “…a revealed 
inter-subjectivity of the transcendental…”. Husserl translated this notion into the motto 
that came to almost define phenomenology: that consciousness of the subject is not a 
matter of introspective transparency, but “…consciousness is always consciousness of 
something…”. Consciousness is directed outside of itself and turned towards sense. The 
eidetic reduction then leads consciousness to being-for -itself in reflection. Sense is placed 
at a distance in the phenomenological epoche, from the ‘lived’ to which we adhere in 
everyday terms. So in terms of perception, “…to perceive is to perceive something…”; of 
Imagination, “…to imagine is to imagine something…” and so on and so forth.57  
 
Intentionality II. 
As we have seen, central to Husserl’s Phenomenology is the doctrine of Intentionality. 
This has two aspects. The first is on the explicit level of understanding: an intention to 
give a literal description of the reference or object of the directed nature of consciousness. 
Husserl saw this as interpretation that is simply a descriptive psychology of conscious 
processes, and, for him, rather shallow. The second aspect lies deeper, and for Husserl, 
holds the true significance of its phenomenological function. Ihde gives this as: 
“…Intentionality may be described as the Foundational Correlation Rule of 
Phenomenology…”. In this deeper sense, intentionality is thus ontological. It postulates 
the conditions of possibility of there being either “Subject” or “Object”, or, for that 
matter, “World”. Subject and object arise in what Husserl calls the “…correlation a-priori 
which began as intentionality…”. Thus for Husserl intentionality is neither 
epistemological nor psychological. Neither “Subject” nor “Object” make sense in and of 
itself. Each term can exist only in correlation with the other, its opposite as a binary. Thus 
neither term can be dealt with in isolation. Ihde comments that the whole notion of 
Husserlian phenomenology revolves around this central correlation scheme (ibid).58  
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By following this rule of procedure, according to Husserl any area of possible knowledge 
whatsoever, is located and described as we experience it. As Matthews expresses it, 
“…this world was not a world of inner consciousness but the ‘life-world’, Lebenswelt, the 
pre-scientific and pre-philosophical but fully external world in which we act and have our 
being…” (Matthews 1996: Twentieth-century French Philosophy. p88).59 Thus, in the 
eidetic reduction, Husserl states the procedure is to begin with what is familiar, accepted 
as a ‘given’, then placing that into mental ‘brackets’, removing it from all received 
associations and categorisations. The abstract object is now held at a distance from the 
analyst, to be examined and systematically de-constructed, taken apart layer upon layer. 
This process of archaeology is supposed to reveal two things: a) the pristine object; b) the 
process of deconstruction and comprehension. Thus both the object and the process by 
which the object is constituted are discovered (Ihde. ibid). As might be imagined, this is 
not at all easy.  
 
It works like this. First there is the correlation of what Husserl calls “noema” and 
“noesis”. This simply means: noema is that which is experienced. This is the object-
correlate, the what of experience. 
Noesis is how the ‘what’ is experienced, the process of experiencing, or the activity of 
experiencing. This is the subject-correlate. Thus there can be no noema without noesis. 
There is nothing which is present as evidenced unless it is present to experience. This can 
be easily visualised: 
Noesis    -    Noema 
Husserl later in the Meditations adds a third element, a specific carrier of the act of 
mediation. This he calls “ego”, and he also changes the language in which the correlation 
is now expressed: 
Ego  -  Cogito  -  Cogitatum 
Thus there can be no activity of experience without an Ego, the active thinking of the 
cogito and something which is thought, the cogitatum. 
 
Interesting consequences flow from Husserl’s structural conception of intentionality 
within phenomenology. On the side of the object-correlate there can be no such thing as a 
“wordless” reference. There may be doubt cast on how to interpret the world, but that 
there is a world to be interpreted, that is, referents constantly present to experience, cannot 
be doubted. A constant presence of something-that-is-there exists, be that mouse or 
mountain. The sense of the world is primordially the sense of a phenomenological 
presence of something, and this is held as indubitable as the sensing ego. 
On the side of the “subject-correlate” there is, unexpectedly, a negative result. There can 
be no subject without a World. Neither can there be any subject that is immediately 
transparent to itself. Within the phenomenological correlation the Subject (Self) is 
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deprived of its singular immediacy, and of its presumed self-realisation. Put in a positive 
light this means something of huge import and goes to the heart of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics. It is this: “The subject can now know itself only by means of the world”. 
Phenomenology brought hermeneutics to reflect upon the conditions of its own possibility 
and the hermeneutical claim to universality and method of general understanding. 
 
There is an inherent flaw in Husserl’s procedure. The phenomenological project takes 
place within existing language. His method allows language to retain its non-neutrality. 
This occurs because the object is situated already in a language that is value laden with 
categories and terminology notwithstanding the eidetic reduction. It must be so if the new 
understandings given through the reduction are to be articulated and made intelligible to 
others. The findings must be open to all who can read or comprehend the language being 
used to express things through, not just in the mind of the experiencing subject. The 
alternative to using existing language is to devise a wholly new language, an Esperanto of 
some kind. Critics of Husserl thus dismissed phenomenology as an inherently idealistic 
metaphysic, anchored in the subjectivity of the analyst and a philosophy whose domain 
extended no further than psychology, a domain inherently problematic notwithstanding 
the efforts of Freud, Jung, Adler and their followers.60 It is a problem Husserl was unable 
to resolve. 
 
1:5 Ricoeur and symbolic hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur’s critical philosophical hermeneutic is grounded within Phenomenology, 
Language, the question of Meaning and what he calls the ‘enigma of semantic 
innovation’. That is the creation and interpretation of multiple levels of meaning and of 
new meanings through language. The questions Ricoeur asks are, how do we account for 
overflows of meaning that work at different levels of understanding, how do new 
meanings come into existence, and how do we understand them when shaping our 
interpretations of the world in which we live and the historical world from which we have 
emerged (2013: HWL2 ibid).  
 
In answer Ricoeur sought to unify phenomenology with the philosophy of hermeneutics. 
Grounded since the Middle Ages in the interpretation of biblical and scriptural texts 
hermeneutics was given greater force within the scholarship of eighteenth and nineteenth 
century German Higher Criticism, and the work of scholars such as Schleiermacher 
(1768-1834), Feuerbach (1804-1872), and Dilthey in hermeneutics and the philosophy of 
the humanities (1833-1911). Feuerbach, for example, argued for a materialist humanism 
and proposed that being in consciousness is consciousness of the infinity of his own 
nature (1854: The Essence of Christianity). Dilthey sought for a philosophical legitimation 
of the human sciences, arguing that the hermeneutic circle of the movement between the 
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implicit and the explicit must, in a ‘scientific’ theory of Nature, be completed with a 
theory of how the world is given to human beings through symbolically mediated 
practices. Ricoeur absorbed from these and others what was of value to him but not 
uncritically. The breadth of the problem of interpretation, he states, only became clear to 
him bit-by-bit. His thinking about hermeneutics developed slowly, in stages over time and 
each step forward on the occasion of a particular and limited problem to be resolved 
(2013: HWL2 ibid). 
 
During the 1950’s Ricoeur developed a hermeneutic paradigm of double meanings within 
symbols and myths. He began with a study of the problem of the Will. He did so with the 
intention of giving a practical counterpart to the theorising of Merleau-Ponty’s 
Phenomenology of Perception61 This brought his attention to symbolism and the limited 
problem of the symbols of evil. In what has become known as ‘a hermeneutics of 
suspicion’, symbols, he realised held a double meaning. A simple literal meaning lying on 
the surface with strata of double meanings lying beneath that and hidden from direct 
perception. These could be accessed and interpreted only by thought whose starting point 
is the literal symbol. Similar ‘suspicions’ of double meanings hidden behind appearances 
are to be found in the work of Feuerbach, Nietzsche, Marx and Freud. In Feuerbach 
suspicion centres upon Christianity as a creed of so many false doctrines. In Nietzsche, in 
the will to power and achievement and suspicion of all doctrines that oppose or dilute that. 
In Marx suspicion revolves upon with the supposed historical alienation of working class 
people ‘trapped’ unknowingly by the hidden processes and institutions of a capitalist 
political and economic system of governance. With Freud the suspicions are of an 
infantile state of mind and neuroses about sexuality hidden within the subconscious. 
The study of Freud and Freudian analysis of dreams proved to be of critical importance to 
Ricoeur. Freudian analysis is reductive and proceeds through a process of regression 
performed by an analyst upon a patient taking them back to infancy, whose findings there 
are manifest in adult neuroses and/or dreams. To overcome them requires interpretation 
by their projection onto the person of the analyst.  
 
Ricoeur found himself critical of Freudian thought and explanation. He called the 
therapeutic reductive, “an archaeology of the cogito” whose method involves a process of 
peeling back layer upon stratified layer of the psyche, reducing the patient to a core 
trauma and neurotic condition. In the interpretive section of his analysis Ricoeur 
confronted the discourse of psychoanalysis with the discourse of phenomenology and 
reflexive philosophy and presented the polar opposition he found there as a regressive 
movement towards the infantile and archaic on one side, and a progressive movement 
directed towards a telos of a signifying fulfilment on the other. Ricoeur represented 
Freudian psychoanalysis as one of a mixed discourse, that threw together the language of 
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force (drive, repression, displacement etc) and the language of meaning (thought, wish, 
interpretation).  
He justified his interpretation of Freudian thought by reference to the mixed nature of its 
object, which he situated at a point of inflexion of desire and language. A reductive 
methodology alone did not give the full picture. In contrast to Freud’s methodology, 
Ricoeur, for the first time, took from Hegel and Phenomenology of the Spirit, the telos of 
a progressive movement towards spiritual fulfilment. Hegel presents the spirit as moving 
from the sparest of meanings towards the richest in an expansive movement to a fulfilling 
and meaningful life. Ricoeur saw here a teleology of the self-conscious cogito that was 
emancipating and dialectic, in which the truth of a ‘figure’ was contained within the one 
that followed, in a process of continual disclosure about the world and the living subject 
(IA: ibid).  
For Ricoeur this meant there were now open to him alternative hermeneutic paths, a 
hermeneutics of ‘suspicion’, in the German tradition, and a hermeneutics of neo-Hegelian 
‘fulfilment’ to be found in the French reflexive tradition of Nabert, in the phenomenology 
of Merleau-Ponty, and in the German hermeneutics of Gadamer. Ricoeur chose the 
Hegelian path of openness, disclosure and transformation for his own version of 
hermeneutics. 
 
1:6 Symbolism into language 
In this mood a new phase of work followed upon the study he made of Freud (Ricoeur 
1970: Freud and Philosophy).62 Previously he had concentrated on the hermeneutics of 
one particular set of symbols, those associated in ancient Greek, Hebraic and Babylonian 
texts dealing with the symbolism of evil and guilt (Ricoeur 1967: The Symbolism of 
Evil).63 Now Ricoeur expanded his hermeneutic to Language, and opened it to the notion 
of the symbolic structure as a specific structure of language. As a structure of language, 
there is, he says, “…hermeneutics, that is interpretation, wherever there are found 
expressions where a second meaning is unfolded from a first meaning…”. As a structure 
of language, a hermeneutic meditation upon symbols begins from language that already 
exists and entails thinking from the linguistic presuppositions held in the symbol. 
(Husserlian Phenomenology attempts to neutralise language and free interpretation from 
any linguistic presuppositions) (2013: ibid). 
 
1:7. Structuralism-from symbolism to critical hermeneutics. 
The intellectual challenge of Structuralism introduced the next phase of Ricoeur’s 
development of hermeneutics and a paradigm shift from symbolism to a hermeneutics of 
Language and the Text. The influence of post-Saussurean doctrines of linguistic 
Structuralism, Semiotics, and of the sciences of language, was spreading throughout 
European thought within the humanities and social sciences in the years following WWII. 
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Structuralism proposes itself as an objective and universal model of explanation 
applicable across a wide range of disciplines and enquiries. So for example, in semiology 
(Barthes 1957: Mythologies); 64 in semiotics (Greimas 1966: Structural Semantics;65 in 
literary criticism (Genette 1980: Narrative Discourse: an Essay in Method),66 in French 
anthropology (Levi-Strauss 1963: Structural Anthropology).67 All of these authors confine 
themselves to the structure of the text or text-analogue alone, without reference to the 
intentions of the author, (forshadowing the curious notions of the ‘intentional fallacy’ and 
presumed ‘death of the author’ proposed by Barthes in a 1968 essay, who argued that in 
the interpretation of a text, the written text and its’ creator are unrelated),68 or in the case 
of Levi-Strauss, the actors involved. Ricoeur suggests that Structuralism wrought a 
Kunhnian paradigm change within French philosophy (1995 IA ibid). 
The claim to be universal posed for Ricoeur an intellectual challenge and a polemic 
conflict. The critique Structuralism posed European and French neo-Kantian reflexive 
philosophy was aimed, in Ricoeur’s view, at existentialism and diverse philosophies of 
existence, and all philosophies of the subject.69 Heidegger became a particular target, with 
his followers making a shift in their attention away from an existential reading of Being 
and Time, (that Ricoeur though to be mistaken anyway), to his works produced in the 
1930s following the so-called “Turn” (Kehre) in his thought. In these works, Heidegger 
focuses upon the question of language and a fascination with poetry, and the exegesis of 
philosophical and literary texts, especially those of the Pre-Socratics but also by Kant, 
Hegel, Nietzsche and Holderlein. Heidegger’s later works are held by his supporters to 
have removed any sense of the subject ego. They were placed in opposition to the alleged 
humanism of his earlier phenomenological hermeneutic philosophies (1995 IA ibid). 
 
The thesis of Structuralism and its’ offshoot Semiotics, is that hidden within language are 
structures which operate without our consciously being aware of them (Tallis 1999: 
Enemies of Hope).70 Language was reduced to the functioning of a system of signs 
without anchorage in a subject. The language system mirrored, it is supposed, the 
functioning of neural structures of the mind. Chomsky, for example, argued that 
sequences of words, utterances, in speech have a syntax that is characterised by a formal, 
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generative grammar that is context-free, reflecting unconscious mental operations of the 
functional mind. This would account, in his view, for the creativity of language and the 
ability of a speaker-hearer of a language to spontaneously produce new utterances, and 
interpret and understand an infinite number, including new and novel ones, in 
communication with others (Chomsky 1957: Syntactic Structures).71 Greimas working in 
the field of semiotics developed the notion of the ‘The Greimas Square’, a narrative 
programme that sought to bring together two fields of operations that he called a semantic 
universe and a discourse universe. These are held to consist of signs in webs of meaning 
(semantics), and webs of extended cultural use and modification (discourse), spread 
across multiple layers of the social imaginary. Greimas proposed that in narrative and 
narratology the semiotic webs are or can be made tangible in written and spoken 
(transcribed) texts, some of which become culturally iconic (Greimas 1966: ibid).  
 
Structuralism is a theory of abstract, hypothetical relations between points in a system 
from which anything of an extra-linguistic nature is barred. In Saussurean linguistics the 
points are designated Signs. Saussure’s linguistics is concerned with speech (others 
extended it to written language and beyond). In Saussure’s syntactic analysis of the 
phonetic system of speech, the signs have no meaning, there are only differences 
operating within a system of internal relations. Signs have a binary structure. On one side 
is the concept designated, the signified, and on the other the form which the sign takes, the 
signifier. The binary relationship constitutes the signification of the sign. Barthes terms 
these aspects denotation and connotation. The semiotic strain of linguistic structuralism 
begins with the word as sign aligned to a denotation, to which connotations can be linked. 
Thus for Barthes haute couture clothes are a sign. Their denotation is fashion, their 
connotation is style and fashionability. In written language the word as sign has only the 
limited semantic content of a dictionary, but language in use by the human subject does 
more, and overflows with meaning. There is a surplus of meaning within a written text 
that a semiotics of the word struggles to account for.  
 
The problem as Ricoeur clearly sees is that the primary unit of meaning in language is not 
the lexical sign, the word, but the sentence. A sentence contains the synthetic act of 
predication and forms a basic unit or utterance of discourse. I hold that the single 
photograph fulfils a similar function as an illocutionary utterance of visual discourse of 
variable complexity. I will return to this in Chapter 3: On Documentary Photography, and 
Chapter 5: Conclusion below. 
In Structural theory the systems are established synchronically, a closed system and a kind 
of a-historical balance sheet, where the webs of signification can be analytically laid out 
in a series of binary oppositions, and like a map their lines of inter-connection traced. The 
model is conceptually three-dimensional and lines have horizontal and vertical axes. The 
horizontal, syntagmatic plane, links words together grammatically into sentences. The 
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vertical paradigmatic plane intersects these where a given word can be substituted for 
another, eg: ‘linear’ for ‘horizontal’, as in a thesaurus. Webs of signs, signifiers and 
signified can in language overlay further webs ad infinitum and their syntagmatic and 
paradigmatic inter-connections and variations plotted in three dimensions. Saussure 
further distinguishes between the structure of grammatical language which is bound by 
rules, that he termed langue, and speech, parole, which is more spontaneous, on a similar 
model.  
Meaning, if there be such, is held to lie within the interstices of relationships, not in the 
signs. The theory is attractive and indeed brand advertising is largely constructed upon its 
principles to build a brand identity and a halo of associations (connotations) consumers 
will, it is hoped, desire. The rhetoric of political parties extolling the virtues of their 
policies to an electorate do likewise, to the point of sophistry. 
 
In Ricoeur’s thought on hermeneutics an “interesting polarity was formed”, he tells us, 
between semantics and semiotics. From this basic polarity other polarities are disclosed 
that constitute a conflict of interpretations that affect the entire realm of language and 
linguistic significations (1995: ibid p22-23).  
Ricoeur examined and analysed the conflicting claims in a series of essays, that are 
gathered together and published as a book The Conflict of Interpretations.(1974).72 
 
Lying beyond these antagonisms, however, Ricoeur perceived an important mediation. 
Semiotics attempts to be objective and systematic. Ricoeur now sees this as valuable to 
his purpose. The semiotic viewpoint became for him “…the necessary passage for a self-
understanding that was increasingly indirect…”. It is the beginning of the long and 
imaginative detour through the institutions of society and culture that, it is to be hoped for, 
will ultimately lead to an emancipating self-understanding and self-fulfilment of the 
subject, and enrichment of the lives of others, through the works and activities produced 
by the subject as a dynamic and creative agency in affairs. 
 
In the humanities the affect of Structuralism has been profound in challenging traditional 
orthodoxies, although much less so now as the fury of the initial confrontations has 
petered out, and the failings in the theory became ever more apparent. Geertz (1926-2006) 
for example, absorbed semiotics into American cultural anthropology of the time, to 
provide descriptions of the ethnography of indigenous cultures with various degrees of 
content, detail and complexity. The most complex he called “thick descriptions” and 
conversely the least complex “thin descriptions” (Geertz 1973: The Interpretation of 
Cultures).73 In France, Levi-Strauss (1908-2009) argued that the human mind was the 
same everywhere and adopted linguistic structuralism as the model for a distinctively 
French structural anthropology, with studies of mythology and of kinship and marriage 
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(Levi-Strauss 1969: The Elementary Structures of Kinship and Marriage).74 Leach (1910-
1989) introduced Levi-Strauss and structuralism into English anthropology as a counter to 
the structural-functional model for analysing kinship and juridico- political systems that 
then prevailed. By no means convinced he became highly critical for reasons simlar to 
those arrived at independently by Ricoeur (Leach 1974: Claude Levi-Strauss).75  
 
In England, Burgin (b.1941), a conceptual artist theorising photography, was an early 
advocate of applying semiotic analysis to photographs, in the style of Barthes and his 
semiology of literature and the myths of French cultural life expressed in areas such as 
fashion, cheese and the Citroen DS motorcar. He was also an advocate of structural 
Freudian psycho-analysis in the style of Lacan. Both doctrines he attempted to transpose 
into a universal theory of Photography in a radical transformation of photography theory, 
whose influence although fast waning continues to be felt (Burgin 1982: Thinking 
Photography).76 
 
Ricoeur now recognised that a hermeneutics of the symbol defined as the decipherment of 
double meanings was “too narrow” in scope and insufficient in power to provide answers 
to the challenge posed by structuralist theorising. Symbolism alone cannot display its 
resources of multiple meanings (plurivocity) outside of an appropriate context, for 
example a poem or a text. Symbolism also gives rise to conflicting interpretations, 
whether of reducing it to its literal basis or amplifying it to the expression of multiple 
meanings. For Ricoeur the greatest challenge structuralism and semiotic theorising posed 
is that it takes no account of the subject, and without anchorage in subjectivity there can, 
for him, be no dimension of meaning. Structuralism in its diverse forms of thought and 
application aimed at removing any association with subjective intentions, and the removal 
of the speaking subject from any form of systematic organisation of “linguistic 
ensembles”.  
 
This can be seen very clearly in Levi-Strauss’ studies of marriage and kinship relations 
that wholly ignore the people involved. They are merely ciphers in a system. Ricoeur 
refers to the thought and work of Levi-Strauss as that of “ a transcendentalism without a 
subject…” (IA.p18). In photography theory, the title of Burgin’s book is instructive. This 
is speculation about photography whose ontology requires little or no empiric content. 
Indeed the art historian Tagg writing on photography and the power of institutions to 
shape meaning, was to take this line further and declare that photographs held no intrinsic 
meaning in their representations and subject matter. Any meaning they had was entirely 
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due to the institutional setting in which they were viewed. That is images, as signs, were 
merely seen as ciphers without author or intention, free of the irksome burden to represent 
something, floating without meaning in webs of signification to be decoded by an analyst 
using terms of reference decided by external forces, such as the particular prejudices of an 
art historian or the particular policies of a gallery curator (Tagg 1981: The Burden of 
Representation).77  
 
Furthermore the subject individual, for Ricoeur, is anchored within the diachrony of 
history, whilst the frame of reference for linguistic semiotics is synchronic, an abstraction 
of linguistic relations standing outside of history between signs, themselves without 
meaning. It was thus incapable of contributing to the historicity of the self-conscious and 
self-realising subject. History, Ricoeur objected, is the “…obligatory mediation for any 
self-understanding…” (2013: ibid). 
 
 
Ricoeur describes Freudian psychoanalysis and structuralism coming to him as a “double 
shock” that set him looking for a broader and critical definition of hermeneutics. Ricoeur 
turned to the emancipating horizons offered by the model of the theory of the text, the 
theory of action, and the theory of history in which to articulate this. The notions of text, 
action and history provided the structures and intellectual horizons in which he found it 
possible to map the diachronic and dialectical procedures and methods of a hermeneutics 
of broad and general understanding. The theory of the text is central to this new 
hermeneutic, the fulcrum on which action and history pivot (2013 ibid). I examine 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the text in Part 2 of this chapter, p42. 
 
1.8  Coda “A sort of neo-Kantian/neo-Hegelian”? 
To return for a moment to Ricoeur’s self-characterisation as a “sort of neo-Kantian/neo-
Hegelian”, what might he mean? I think that he absorbed into the structure of his thought 
certain features from each without necessarily accepting the whole of their philosophical 
thesis. From Kant, we can see that Ricoeur takes the notion of rational structure and 
ordering knowledge, in the sense of following methods and procedures of enquiry and 
analysis in which to systematically organise thought and understanding. To this he applies 
the notion of the transcendental ego, of pure understanding lying immanent in all human 
thought and a transcendental schema that the life of action is the life in which the human 
mind achieves consciousness of its own reality. From Kant, Ricoeur absorbs the notion 
that mind makes nature intelligible, rather than the doctrine of mind that creates Nature 
through our human senses and the move of thought thinking itself.  
 
Ricoeur absorbs Kant’s idea that Time and Space are fundamental things in Nature, the 
necessary double framework over which all natural facts, phenomena, are spread out 
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(Collingwood 1945: The Idea of Nature).78 It seems clear that we accept the idea that 
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutic is a form of Kantian schematism of the 
transcendental subject.79 After all, Ricoeur calls his work in philosophy a ‘philosophical 
anthropology’ of the incarnate and capable person, a subject that he early sums up in the 
formula: “Man is one as living, two as human”. (homo simplex in vitalitate, duplex in 
humanitate) (Ricoeur 1995 IA ibid; 2013: HWL2 ibid).80 Ricoeur offers a model of a 
transcendent subject who is master of him or her self and can set at a distance their powers 
and desires. In the First Critique, Kant differentiates general from scientific knowledge 
and argues that life of action is where the human mind achieves its own reality 
(Collingwood ibid). At the same time it is a model for a social and ethical subject, living, 
feeling and inter-acting through relations of an Hegelian type dialectics with others in 
their shared worlds of direct experience and the social imaginary.  
 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic is also a model for emancipation of the subject, a means of 
expressing a humanism, in which he or she is able to enjoy a freedom of will and the 
creative capacity to reflect, think, imagine and act for themselves, whilst yet remaining the 
servant of the necessities of the unconscious, of character, of circumstances and other 
people, and of the inescapable facts of birth and death.  
 
From Hegel we can see that Ricoeur absorbs his differing idea of Nature, as a complex 
system in which parts are but aspects of the whole (which for Hegel is the Absolute Idea, 
a doctrine of idealism that Ricoeur refused for his philosophy). For Hegel, Nature, or our 
experience of it, is permeated through and through by process in perpetual motion, 
unfolding and disclosing.81 As Hegel acknowledged, it is an old idea that derives from 
Heraclitus and his doctrine of nature as perpetual flux in the empire of time; in Plato as a 
belief in universal change, expressed as “nothing ever is, everything is becoming” (that 
he, Plato, sought to refute with the doctrine of ideal forms); and in Aristotle as “nothing 
steadfastly is”. “There is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted into my 
logic…the origin of philosophy is to be dated from Heraclitus…” wrote Hegel.82 
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From Hegel, Ricoeur also adopted the procedure of the three cornered, triadic movement 
of the ‘dialectic’, thesis-antithesis-synthesis, vital to forming a cornerstone of his own 
philosophical and hermeneutic method of mediating philosophical oppositions, 
‘antagonisms’ as he called them, and in their mediated synthesis surpassing their 
singularity. A basic structure which recurs over and again in his philosophy and 
hermeneutics. From both Kant and Hegel we can see also that Ricoeur adopted a model of 
process as activity and action, a dynamic and logical necessity of agency and purpose as 
fundamental to his developed conception of hermeneutics. This notion of process revolves 
upon concepts whose inherent power is that one concept generates another, moving 
through a step-by-step procedure of examination of that initial concept held away at a 
distance, that gives rise to a new concept and new form of itself. Thus a concept grows 
like an organism, passing from potentiality to actuality by ‘sprouting’ new, heterogenous 
determinations of itself, new forms from which yet further new forms can evolve in an 
ordered and methodical way.83  
 
It is to Husserl, however, that Ricoeur owes the methodology of the phenomenological 
eidetic analysis and polarity of the noema (that which is experienced) and the noesis (how 
that is experienced) that unified object and subject together in a dialectic relation. But 
what then of the Kantian doctrine that there can be no knowledge of anything 
transcendent, that which he called noumenon it might be asked? Ricoeur gave a great deal 
of attention to the logic and epistemological status of hermeneutics (2013: Hermeneutical 
Logic? ibid). 
 
1.9 Summary 
Ricoeur in the immediate post-war years of the 1940s and early 1950s devoted his 
philosophy to examining the phenomenology of the human subject and human will. This 
he found expressed in ancient and modern symbols of evil and guilt. Phenomenology 
alone could not account for the psychological mechanisms of interpretation at play. The 
philosophy of hermeneutics, which is the philosophy of interpretation, offered a possible 
solution. It became apparent to Ricoeur that symbols held a double meaning, the visible 
surface meaning and the suspicion of a hidden complex of meanings within that. Only 
through the literal meaning could thought access the hidden meanings be interpreted and 
their meanings revealed. Ricoeur turned to the then fashionable psychology of Freud for 
greater insight. There he discovered a semantics of desire and the possibility of two routes 
for hermeneutics to follow. The Freudian, which is reductive, and the Hegelian which is 
emancipating and fulfilling. Ricoeur chose the latter. 
 
Attempting to unify his allegiance to phenomenology with hermeneutics, Ricoeur moved 
away from symbolism as such, to symbolism as a structure of language. Language had 
become a major topic of interest for twentieth-century philosophy, particularly within the 
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Anglo-American analytic tradition. Language was thought the essential instrument 
through which we constitute, understand and articulate our understandings of the world in 
which we live, not an epi-phenomenon. Philosophical interest was broadly with how 
language is used and deciphering the logic lying behind that. Words are considered not as 
mere labels imposed on a given order of things, but are the collective products of social 
interactions (Harris 1988: Language, Saussure and Wittgenstein).84 
 
Abstract understanding of how the structures of language and speech worked internally 
was greatly influenced by the studies of the Swiss linguist, Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-
1913). Saussure’s studies of linguistic structure that he developed in studies of speech and 
phonetics, gave rise to his theories of semiology, the study of signs and sign processes.. 
Language was reduced to a system of words as signs and their inter-relations. Formally, 
semiology has three analytical strands: semantics and the relation between signs and their 
meaning, denotata; syntactics and the relations among signs within formal structures; 
pragmatics and the relations between signs and sign users. 
In America, Charles Sanders Pierce (1839-1914), a philosopher and logician, in a parallel 
development within logic, proposed all the universe is composed of signs. Any thing is a 
sign, not as itself, but as standing in some relation or other. Logic, suggested Pierce, is a 
formal branch of semiotics. Signs are rooted “in the social principle”, in the broadest 
sense of their referential (pointing to something) and inferential (about meaning) relations.  
Others realised this way of conceptualising things had wider implications for the study of 
literature and the structures of texts, and the study of the structures of cultural and social 
institutions and aspects of life. Saussure’s theories about the structures of language and 
speech, along with those of the Russian linguist Roman Jakobsen (1896-1982), which 
together became more widely known than those of Pierce, entered into mainstream 
European thought from the 1940s onwards at an increasing pace of acceptance within the 
humanities and social sciences as the doctrines of Structuralism and Semiotics. 
Structuralism is a theory of abstract relations between sounds in speech, or signs in 
writing in which there are only differences. The greatest emphasis was given to the 
syntactic structures of signs and linguistic systems. The logic of their interactions were 
understood as based only on negative difference, ‘a’ - not’a’. It is a closed system without 
meaning and without history. The pragmatic subjective actor is excluded. 
This way of thinking presented Ricoeur with a major challenge. He responded by 
developing a new type of philosophical hermeneutics that has ontological and 
epistemological parameters. The subjective self as actor and agency in making sense of 
experience is placed centre stage. He adopted the model of the theory of the written text, 
the theory of action and the theory of history in which to articulate this. The concentration 
is on more than an analysis of the structures of the text, but also on the narrative play of 
language doing something, saying something about something to someone that is 
meaningful, intelligible, imaginative, and enriches life. 
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Part 2 
 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of the Text, Action and History. 
 
Consider for a moment, if you would, these two passages of text. 
 “I suppose the greatest exit which we are called upon to make, or which is 
wished upon us, is our birth; that…bewildering affair which brings us often breathless into 
the long corridor of life leading directly, sometimes indirectly, but always inevitably, to 
our final supreme exit, death. The corridor is lined all its length with doors; some open, 
some just ajar, some closed. Closed; but seldom, if ever, locked. It is entirely up to us 
which ones we choose to try, and we are only given a cerain amount of time in which to 
arrive at the inevitable door at the end. Nothing very original about that.” (Bogarde 1988: 
Snakes and Ladders p156).85 
 
 “Two roads diverged in a yellow wood, and sorry that I could not travel both and 
be one traveller, long I stood and looked down as far as I could to where it bent in the 
undergrowth. Then took the other, as just as fair, and having perhaps the better claim, 
because it was grassed and wanted wear; though as for that passing there had worn them 
really about the same, and both that morning equally lay in leaves no step had trodden 
black. Oh, I kept the first for another day! Yet knowing how way leads on to way, I 
doubted if I should ever come back. I shall be telling this with a sigh somewhere ages and 
ages hence: two roads diverged in a wood, and I - I took the one less travelled by, and that 
has made all the difference.” (Frost 1988: Robert Frost p34).86 
 
Both writers are using language as written text with the intention to describe their 
intuitions about the enigma of life and the journey in the world that we must all make in 
all its moods, in language that is lapidiary, deeply felt and full of meaning. Both are works 
of imagination about the ineffable, the difficult decisions we make for good or ill, 
gladness in those that turn out well and regret at others passed over. Bogarde, an actor and 
writer, died in 1999; Frost, a poet, died in 1963. We can never meet them, and yet their 
words remain for us to share as they intended, interpret and re-interpret as we wish. Their 
words picture a world couched in realism and easily recognisable yet is not real but 
metaphorical and symbolic, that enters into our imagination, in ways I at least find 
interpretable, moving and meaningful, that enriches my life. Such is the power of the 
written word. Wonderful. No wonder that Ricoeur constructed his hermeneutics of an 
emancipating subjectivity, and an amplifying language open to its own possibilities of 
expressing manifold meanings, on the model of the text and of intentional actions in the 
mediations of history and time. Both texts are examples of intentional interventions in the 
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world, and of the act of discourse by which Ricoeur came to define hermeneutics:  
        “Someone saying something about something to someone.” 
 
2.1: The hermeneutics of the Text. 
Ricoeur defines hermeneutics “…as the theory of the operations of understanding in their 
relation to the interpretation of texts…”. The key idea will be “…the realisation of 
discourse as a text..” (1991: The Task of Hermeneutics. FTA p53-74). 
Ricoeur adopts to his revised and critical hermeneutics, the central paradigm the model of 
the Theory of the Text, the Theory of Action, and the Theory of History. The Theory of 
the Text is the fulcrum upon which these three functions pivot and interweave, discourse 
is the power that energises them (HWL2).87 
The attraction of the Text is that writing opens language to new and original resources for 
discourse. It allows semantic innovations and multiple meanings to enter and overcomes 
the limitations of face-to-face speech. Writing allows language a semantic autonomy that 
has a three-fold structure:  
The Speaker’s intentions 
The cultural, social & economic circumstances of its production 
The Reception of its’ original audience, and other audiences later. 
 
The written text opens language to the condition for discourse of language and its’ own-
most-possibilities for becoming-text (OI ibid. p17). The task of hermeneutics is now two-
fold, states Ricoeur. On one side, it is to examine the internal dynamic governing the 
structure of the text. On the other side, it is to examine the power of the work to project 
itself outside of itself and create an accessible, intelligible, world of its own. A world of 
the text that is “…truly…the ‘thing’ referred to by the text…” (ibid).  
 
2.2: Discourse. 
Writing in 1991, Ricoeur still felt it necessary to say that hermeneutics, the general theory 
of interpretation, had not yet finished “having it out” with Husserlian phenomenology. 
Hermeneutics comes out of the phenomenology, he says, “… it is the place where 
hermeneutic originates, but phenomenology is also the place that hermeneutics has 
surpassed and left behind… “ (1991: Preface. FTA ibid). Structuralism and the linguistic 
turn brought Ricoeur to the notion of Discourse that arises from the act of predicative 
synthesis of an opposition between semantics and semiotics, defined as someone says 
something to someone about something, in accordance with rules of language: phonetic, 
lexical, syntactic, stylistic (IA ibid p22). Three things flow in consequence: 
 1. The notion of Discourse implied the recognition of another speaker, standing 
over and against the act of discourse and interlocution between one speaker and another. 
This raised into consideration the problematic of inter-subjectivity and communication. 
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 2. The distinction between Sense and Reference within discourse opened 
discourse to something more than itself. It opened discourse to the world. “Saying” is 
saying something about the world. This, for Ricoeur, agreed with what he held to be the 
intentionality of saying which is, the act of affirmation. Affirming, Ricoeur insists, is the 
act of ratifying what is. 
 3. The dimension of speaker to speaker interlocution and the referential of saying 
something about something through language came to the foreground of attention. 
Discourse brought into the hermeneutic field three intersecting lines as problems to be 
resolved: 
 a) The mediation brought by the objective doctrines of semiotics and signs. 
 b) The recognition of others implied in the act of interlocution. 
 c) The relation to the world, and to being, implied by the referential direction of 
discourse. 
Discourse thus involves three moments of interpretation, at least, namely locution, 
illocution, and perlocution in the explanation and understanding of the narrative of texts, 
the intentional intervention in the world they represent, and the autonomous world the 
narrative creates. Discourse articulates a locutor: a subject of discourse, illocution: an act 
of discourse, a content of discourse in a meta-linguistic code, perlocution and extra-
linguistic references. Discourse reaches its ultimate destination in the form of an 
interlocutor, a reader. All of this Ricoeur sums up in the formula: Discourse is the 
hermeneutic act by which and by following common rules, “Someone says something 
about something to someone” (HWL2 p12). 
 
2.3: Explanation and Understanding. 
As Ricoeur encountered philosophical hermeneutics, the two forces of explanation and 
understanding were aligned as polar opposites in a schema of method that dated back to 
Wilhelm Dilthey in the nineteenth-century. Ricoeur thought the opposition now to be 
“disastrous” to his purpose and set himself to resolve it by finding a way in which to unify 
the two into a single thesis of explanation and understanding. He did so through 
reconsidering the notion of Interpretation. What is it to “interpret” something by 
explanation and understanding? 
The question of Interpretation and discourse re-instates the polarity between explanation 
and understanding into Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics as a problem to be mediated. 
Writing in the nineteenth century, Dilthey sought to legitimate the human social sciences, 
as ‘scientific’ in their procedures by giving them a distinctive hermeneutical methodology. 
He called this “understanding” verstehen. Understanding is characterised by an overall 
and intuitive insight into what is in question taken as a mode of nature. The premiss is that 
all human beings are alike beneath their cultural differences and therefore accessible to a 
committed analyst and fellow human being. To the natural sciences, taken as being a 
mode of mind, Dilthey ascribed a hermeneutic methodology of “explanation”. 
Explanation is characterised by the subordination of a particular case to analysis 
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conducted by inductive rules, laws, and structures of procedure, notably experimentation 
to prove or disprove an hypothesis. The rules of the game are designed to ensure an 
objective, dispassionate analysis of what is in question and remove the possibility of 
subjective bias. To achieve this the procedures deliberately set the object of analysis at a 
distance apart from the observer. Popper has shown the questions asked when establishing 
an experiment are subjective, and the effort to inductively prove an hypothesis to be a 
mistake. Instead he argued that scientific method should be directed in favour of empirical 
falsification (Popper 1934: Logic der Forschung. 1959: The Logic of Scientific 
Discoveries).88 
 
Ricoeur sees in the dichotomy ontological and epistemological difficulties for a 
hermeneutics of the text. What is at issue is whether science constitutes an homogenous 
whole, or whether there is a necessary epistemological break between the natural and the 
human sciences. Ricoeur finds the dichotomy presents comparable aporias in the fields of 
the text, of action and of history and their parallelism with the narrative genre of discourse 
passing from an explanation of the narrative object to an understanding of the narrative 
operation. At a deeper level he argues that the fate of philosophy is at risk if it cannot 
subordinate the idea of method to a more fundamental conception of our “…truth-relation 
to things and to beings…” (1991: Explanation and Understanding. (EU) in FTA ibid 
p125-147). Ricoeur wishes to mediate the opposition, which are presented as irreducible 
alternatives, with a subtle dialectic in which explanation and understanding could be 
considered as relative moments in the complex process of interpretation. 
 
If the opposition is upheld, explanation would reduce a text to a machine with strictly 
internal workings. Thus it is not open to questions about authorial intention, the reception 
of the text by an audience, even less the density of sense and meanings of the text distinct 
from its form. ‘Understanding’ in hermeneutic terms is held to establish a link between 
the subjectivities of the author and the reader. Explanation alone would eliminate this. 
However for the method of understanding, the move to objectivity that explanation aims 
for would be unacceptable. In the realm of Understanding Dilthey points towards a 
psychological empathy between people on the grounds we are all homo sapiens. Ricoeur 
argues that Dilthey made a mistake in confusing ‘understanding’ and ‘understanding 
others’, as though, he says, “…it were always first a matter of apprehending a foreign 
psychological life behind a text…(EU ibid p131). In the narrative genre of discourse what 
is to be understood first, is what is being talked about. That is, the thing of the text, the 
kind of world that it unfolds. Not the psychology of the person speaking behind the text, 
the author. 
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2.4 Interpretation. 
Ricoeur resolves the problem by proposing that Interpretation consists precisely in the 
subtleties of the dialectic found, “…in the alternating of phases of understanding and 
those of explanation along a unique hermeneutical arc…”(HWL2 p9). How this dialectic 
of explanation and understanding operates in practice, is determined in terms of the 
specific epistemological field under consideration. The style of alternation between 
explanation and understanding will differ in the respective fields of text, action and 
history (ibid).  
Ricoeur refers to Aristotle and the theory of tragedy. He says that in this is a key that is 
valid for all narratives (EU. ibid. p131). The poet, says Ricoeur, offers a mimesis in 
composing a fable. The fable has a plot, muthos, in a creative imitation of human action. 
In the same way a logic of possible narratives finds completion only in the mimetic 
function by which the narrative remakes the human world of action. Therefore denial of 
the subjective character of understanding by which explanation reaches its conclusion is 
no longer in question. There is always a someone who receives and appropriates the 
meaning of the text for themselves. There is, however, no short route between an 
objective analysis of narrative structures and the appropriation of meaning from the text 
by readers. Lying between the two is the entire illocutionary world of the text open onto 
the world of experience which it redescribes and remakes. If then, the reader as subject 
feels called upon to understand themselves better, or at all, in light of the text; if their 
imagination is fired sufficiently to do so then possible paths to real action are opened to 
them (ibid). 
 
2.5:  Language and Text. 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the text extends interpretation to all phenomena and inscriptions 
having a readable, textual nature. Thus the narratives of documentary photography are 
eligible as a form of readable text. Over a period of thirty, or so, years Ricoeur extended 
his thought on hermeneutics in two overlapping and inter-weaving directions. One 
followed through the theory of the text and the language phenomenon of semantic 
innovation (1978: The Rule of Metaphor;89 1984,85 & 88: Time and Narrative, 3 vols )90; 
and another followed the concern for the Subject as self, ethics and for practical reasoning 
in the social, juridical and political worlds of the social imaginary (1986: Lectures on 
Ideology and Utopia).91 This brought Ricoeur further into dialogue with the humanities 
and the social sciences at what he felt was the border of proper philosophical concern, but 
opened stimulating new lines of thought that reverberate today. Ricoeur argues that 
hermeneutics transcends disciplinary limitations. It lies between their traditional 
boundaries and, operating as a general theory, mediates between them (1981: 
Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences).92 2000: The Just.93).  
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2.6: The notion of the Text. 
The notion of the text is a means-end rationality. Ricoeur is always concerned to work 
from a foundation of language as the defining human condition. Text first implies 
discourse. Second, text presupposes a distinction between speech and written language. 
Speech involves face-to-face utterances and dialogue. It’s time horizon is the present of 
both parties. What passes may rest in memory of one or both but otherwise disappears.  
Written language is language recorded, inscribed and given permanence. The link of 
utterances and dialogue between locutor and inter-locutor is broken. The written text can 
be read by anyone literate in the language in which it is inscribed (1991: What is a Text? 
(WIT) in FTA ibid p105-124). The written text goes beyond the inscription of speech, 
recording something that has already appeared orally, to language that is now open to 
utterances of its own-most-possibilities of expression and to new semantic innovations in 
a semantic micro-universe.  
 
In writing a new “instrument of thinking and discourse is born..”(HWL2 ibid). Writing 
calls for reading, a someone with the literacy skills sufficient to decode the symbolic 
marks on a page or screen, and make sense of them. Making sense introduces the notion 
of interpretation. The relationship between writing and reading is not an instance of 
dialogue of reader to author, for the relationship of reader to text is of a different nature 
(WIT p107). Dialogue implies conversation and exchange of questions and answers. 
There is no such exchange between a reader and a text. The text is inert, it does not 
respond to the reader. Thus the writer is absent from the act of reading, as the reader is 
absent from the act of writing (except perhaps within imagination, or if there is prior 
knowledge in either direction). Assuming neither condition holds then in this way the text 
produces, says Ricoeur, a double-eclipse of the reader and the writer (ibid). 
 
Ricoeur continues with an allusion to the semiotic notion encountered in Barthes, when he 
writes, “…sometimes I like to say that to read a book is to consider its author as already 
dead and the book as posthumous…”. For only then is the relation to the text, the book, 
complete and intact. The author can no longer respond, “…it only remains to read his 
work…” (ibid). As indeed the two examples of text that I began this chapter with, and the 
examination that I am subjecting Ricoeur’s writing to, testify. Whilst true it is an 
unsettling thought. Yet precisely the same relation holds with the narratives of 
documentary photography. In these there is a double eclipse of the people photographed, 
and myself as the photographing author of the pictures. They are history and I am history, 
the photo-narratives are thus a form of historiography, of writing history. For myself, I am 
acutely conscious of this when photographing. Two fields are brought into relationship, 
the epistemological and the semantic, causation and motivation and hence to explanation 
and understanding. To overcome it my practice is to inform myself about the people and 
their circumstances before beginning any photography. I will give a presentation of past 
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work so they are informed about me. Then I will meet and talk with people, over and 
again. For the Case Study ‘Waterside South’ I spent days doing this to win people’s trust 
and co-operation, and days tramping the streets, absorbing the place, making notes, 
comparing what I saw and heard with what I had previously read or been told. Only then 
did I feel that I could, tentatively, begin photographing. Always ruefully aware that I 
might need to change my mind and do something differently. In other words I entered into 
a world of discourse. 
 
For Ricoeur, the relationship between the original author, the text, and the readers is now 
one of discourse in a discourse universe. Both the semantic and discourse universes are 
actualised in written texts, whose time horizon is history. Furthermore, to write is a 
deliberate action and one imbued with intention and purpose. The phenomenon of 
inscription gives to the written text a special authority. However, the act of inscription 
establishes a distance between what is spoken in dialogue and speech, and what is written. 
This leads to a certain suspicion and a question. How can such meaningful affects be 
produced? Ricoeur suggests that there is here a certain conflict between authority and 
genesis. 
 
A further consequence to be noted is that being written down as inscribed language, 
means those texts have the possibility of becoming archives ever more deeply bound in 
history, which can be examined at a later date, and whose meanings could be disclosed 
through the procedures and methods of hermeneutic analysis. 
 
What is more, the discourse of the written text has a history separate from its author. The 
meaning of the text is independent of the possible intentions of the author The text has a 
semantic autonomy whose history unfolds distinct from its author. There is thus ambiguity 
between what an author may have intended to signify (i.e: ‘mean’) and what a text 
signifies to a reader, who brings their personal knowledge, values and prejudices. The 
ambiguity is unavoidable because it is a product of the creation of the text. All of this 
holds good for documentary photographing. 
 
There is a further consequence yet of writing language into a text. It abolishes the 
ostensive reference of speech, Ricoeur claims. (I am uncertain on this point). Ricoeur 
claims that in writing there is a shift in relation to every kind of reality capable of being 
pointed to. The question he poses is thus, whether literature can be said to refer to 
something that can be called ‘a world of the text’. This is logical given the text eclipses 
the ‘real’ world experienced empirically. It substitutes an interpreted version of that 
world, that is the imaginative world of the text. So we speak easily of “the world of 
Shakespeare, of Dickens, of Frost” that they create through their writings and we respond 
to. 
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Finally the notion of the written text implies texture, composition, voice. Elements that 
make a text into a work. The act of inscription invites the writer to consider with care the 
structure, composition, mood, flow and voice of the text. This is a different state of affairs 
to speech and normal conversation where there is rarely this luxury. An exception, 
perhaps, comes with the formal circumstance of speech as a monologue, a Speech 
delivered by one person to an audience. There formal rhetoric soon enters the equation to 
good, sometimes great effect, as Churchill knew very well. 
 
Different writers from different backgrounds have variously sought to formulate this 
event. Searle, for example, uses the phrase “illocutionary utterance” (Searle 1969 ibid)94 
and Kemp refers to “structural intuitions” (Kemp 2000 ibid).95 Ricoeur quotes with 
approval the Finnish philosopher, Georg Henrik von Wright and his reformulation of the 
conditions of explanation and the conditions of understanding into a combination that he 
terms, “intentional intervention” in the world (EU ibid p135; von Wright 1971: 
Explanation and Understanding).96 Ricoeur notes his indebteness to von Wright, writing 
about systems theory, with whom only the notion of a closed, partial system is 
conceivable, and not universal systems. Thus Ricoeur conceives the text and the world it 
creates as a form of closed system that has a three fold structure of an initial state, various 
stages, and a terminal state. The point being that a text thought about in this way is “an 
elegant model” for narrative which, in its fabrication must include and pass through a 
series of phases, each opening onto a greater or lesser number of alternatives, in a 
progressive order. Much like the process of writing this thesis, and certainly what occurs, 
in my experience, in the processes of fieldwork documentary photographing, as I have 
indicated above. 
 
2.7 Summary. 
For Ricoeur, the attraction of von Wright’s thesis is that human action, agency, can now 
be situated. Explanation unified with understanding are a dialectic of interpretation. 
Explanation now belongs in the domain of system theory. Understanding belongs in the 
domain of motivation, intentional and motivated human action. The two elements, which 
he defines as a) the course of things, and b) human action, are woven together in the warp 
and weft of a notion of intervention in the course of things. This notion provokes a 
conception of cause different from that proposed by Hume. Cause is now synonymous 
with the initiative of an agent. It is not set in opposition to motive but includes it. In a 
lambent phrasing, Ricoeur formulates this as “…intervention in the course of things 
implies that we are following the articulation of natural systems…” (EU ibid p137).  
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Writing a text is a matter of acting to intervene in the world. There is no intervention 
without an initial state and without the exercise of a power. ‘Acting’ is always doing 
something, so that something else happens in the world. There is no action without there 
being the relation between knowing how to do something, and that which the doing brings 
about. Causality goes hand in hand with recognising and identifying a power that belongs 
to the repertoire of capacities for action that we all possess as human agents. There is thus, 
in Ricoeur’s eyes a convergence between the theory of the text and the theory of action. 
He writes, “…the same aporias and the same necessity for a dialectical solution have 
arisen in both fields…”(ibid). 
Profound reasons justify the synthesis of the theory of the text and the theory of action. 
The notion of the text is a good paradigm for human action. The notion of action is a good 
referent for diverse categories of texts. Again I find this holds good for my conception of 
documentary photographing praxis. We shall return to this below in the section ‘Text to 
Action’. 
 
2.8 The World of the Text. 
What is a Text, asks Ricoeur? (1991: What is a Text? In FTA ibid p105-124). The written 
text is, in Ricoeur’s view, an ‘ordered creation’ that follows prescribed rules, methods and 
a narrative programme to which he gives the brief formula: “…a text is any discourse 
fixed by writing…” (ibid p106). Thus writing is constitutive of the text itself. What comes 
to writing is discourse as intention-to-say and writing is a direct inscription of this 
intention. Writing preserves that discourse and makes it available for individual and 
collective memory as an historical archive. 
As with Greimas, narratology and the notion of narrativity are the basis of Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics of the text and action (Greimas 1966: Structural Semantics..).97 Ricoeur 
explores these by drawing upon Aristotle and the Poetics,98 with detailed examinations of 
the properties of metaphor (1978: The Rule of Metaphor. RM);99 that was followed with a 
similarly rigorous examinations of the literary devices of emplotment and narrative in the 
cathartic structure of texts, and our conceptions of Time as the necessary historical 
mediation of narrative form (1984, 1985, 1988: Time and Narrative. 3 volumes. T&N).100  
 
Ricoeur identifies and is intrigued by two phenomena of language that he finds enigmatic. 
These are the phenomenon of Sense and Reference. On the one hand, inscription closes 
language in upon itself, concerned only with its own poetics and structure. The sense or 
meaning of the text is internalised.. It is thus ‘exiled’ from the world. On the other hand, 
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inscription refers, it amplifies and augments our understanding through its power to look 
outwards, discover and transform human reality. In addressing another speaker or reader, 
the author as the initial subject of discourse engages in saying something about something. 
That about which is spoken or written is the referent of the discourse. 
 
2.8.1 Distanciation. 
Distanciation is a concept taken from phenomenology, where in the method of the epoche 
consciousness places sense at a distance from the lived experience of things to which we 
daily adhere (IA ibid p36). Reference occurs by a curious backwards and forwards 
movement. On the one hand writing draws things to our attention and brings them close 
(what I have called making “the active presence of absent things” in the title of this 
thesis), on the other the act of writing removes things from us, isolates and places them 
apart. Ricoeur calls this the phenomenon of distanciation. 
The act of writing places events at a distance from the author. Writing can now only refer 
to something, unlike speech and face-to face dialogue that has a deictic function whose 
ostensive reference and meaning is dependent on the context in which it occurs. Writing 
suspends that deictic function. The reference of a written text can be any kind of reality 
capable of being pointed to, whether empirical ‘fact’, imaginative poetry, imaginative 
fiction, or even fantasy and science-fiction. The reference of the text is now the World of 
the Text that is created within its’ narrative. That is it’s moment of discourse. However 
written text enters into another realm of discourse over time and history, further distancing 
it from the author and their intentions. 
 
The text is ultimately addressed to an audience, perhaps known but more likely quite 
unknown. The written text is open to anyone literate in the language in which it is 
written.101 By definition the audience of readers of a text is unlimited and undetermined 
except, perhaps, in closed disciplinary worlds, such as acadaemia. Even then most people 
in those worlds are not known to each other personally.  
 
Finally behind the idea of a written text lies the presupposition of composition, the 
structuring of the narrative and the texture of the aesthetics held in the choice of 
vocabulary, the tone of voice, the mood of expression and the rhythm of the flow, and the 
pace of its unfolding. In a word, the challenge of performance and choice of poetics. 
These are all similar to the conditions for making documentary photographic narratives 
considered as inscriptions with a text-like character. For an author it is question of the 
praxis of writing, for the photographer, the praxis of photographing. Both can be 
encapsulated in the Aristotelian formula of phronesis. Doing what you are good at with 
command of technicalities, skill in their deployment, judgement in their application. 
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Kemp refers to this as structured intuitions, I think it is less abstract than that, both 
intuitive and more pragmatic and hands-on at one and the same time (Kemp 2000 ibid).102 
To write it is necessary to stand back from what is being written about in order to see 
things clearly, and the act of writing brings close and yet pushes what is being written 
away from the author. It is a curious phenomena in which the mental intention of the 
author and the verbal meaning of the text are disassociated but one Ricoeur thought 
essential to our understanding how a text works. He called it distanciation (1991: The 
Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation).  
 
A written text creates its own world of the imagination that can be factual, fiction or 
poetic. Once written the text lies at a distance separate and autonomous from the author. 
Being written, the text is also a vehicle of communication to others lying distanced from 
them. They can bring themselves in to contact with the text along with their own 
prejudices in the expectation that it can provide them with information, meaning and food 
for their imaginations.  
 
2.8.2 Sense and Reference. 
There is however a paradox. That is the phenomena of semantic innovation. Ricoeur 
teases out language open to new alternatives of expression and meaning. The alternatives 
are not those between an authority and the genesis of a text, as all the above would 
indicate, but between the consistency and inconsistency of a text as a structured event. 
Ricoeur refers to this as “the problem of the dialectic of Sense and Reference, on one side, 
and of writing and reading on the other…” (HWL2 ibid p13-14). The similar dualism 
raises its head in the dichotomy of photography as Document or Art which traditionally 
are polarised and defined in negative terms by what they are not, within the milieu of 
photography theory. Thus Documentary is not Art and Art is not Documentary (Edwards 
2006: The Making of English Photography).103 
 
In writing new forms of expression create new forms of meaning and thus of 
understanding. The paradox lies in deciding at what point does semantic innovation 
eclipse any reference to the world? Even to the point of rendering the world of reality as 
superfluous to the text? The production of meaning is bound to synthetic operations that 
create new forms of discourse. Metaphor is the prime example, and one that Ricoeur 
examined exhaustively in The Rule of Metaphor (RM ibid). The theory of narrative is also 
a synthesis of heterogeneous elements brought together from disparate sources and unified 
into a story. 
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Semantic innovation in a poetic discourse operating thanks to metaphor, and semantic 
innovation in a narrative discourse operating upon the basis of a plot can become a 
symmetrical or asymmetrical configuration of the text. The choice is open. Either way 
semantic innovation reveals the power of opening language further to the world. The very 
act of creating a text expresses a surplus of referentiality. Ricoeur frames his discussion in 
the language of semiotics at this point. His concern is with the relation between signs and 
things. In semiotic theory the sign is an abstraction, as Ricoeur phrases it, ‘exiled’ from 
the world. Yet, he argues, there is no such thing as “a world of signs”. The sign is about 
the world, there is always a reference. 
 
2.8.3 Poesis. 
However there is a difference between descriptive language, as signs, and literary 
language. In literature language is used inventively, poetically. Poetic language is 
language free of prosaic constraints and the most we have available to us in attempting to 
express “the secret of things”, as Ricoeur phrases matters. In this understanding, poetic 
language contributes to the re-description of reality (IA ibid p28-29). There is, however, a 
sense in which the very inventiveness creates a distance between the text and the reference 
because the very act of composition gives to the text an autonomous existence, the power 
to exist independently of author, reader, or institution. Ricoeur quotes Guillame and the 
expression writing “turns language back towards the universe” (HWL2 p15). Prescient 
perhaps, because Ricoeur was writing before the internet had become so deeply ingrained 
in life. Today we would call this “cloud information” held vaguely on the internet. 
The problem for Ricoeur was the question of returning the sign towards the thing at the 
level in discourse and narrative of the metaphorical statement. In this lies the genesis of 
the volume Rule of Metaphor (1978)104 and the three volumes of Time and Narrative 
(1984,1985,1988).105 
 
2.8.4 Metaphor and new meaning. 
The difficulty Ricoeur identifies with semantic innovation seeming to eclipse any 
reference to the world is that the production of new meaning in written language is bound 
to synthetic operations that create new forms of discourse. With metaphor, for example, it 
is the comparison between unlikely semantic fields: “Shall I compare thee to a summer’s 
day, thou art more lovely and more temperate?” (Sonnet 18). Person and day are an 
unlikely comparison and yet we know what Shakespeare means. The beauty of one is 
comparable to and surpasses the beauty of the other. Metaphor is a good example of 
semantic innovation in the use of language. It seemed to Ricoeur to be a “good 
touchstone”, endorsed in Antiquity by being catalogued amongst the figures of style in the 
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framework of rhetoric, Aristotle placing it within both the Poetics and in the Rhetoric (IA 
ibid p27). 
Metaphor brings innovation to language on the level of meaning. It does so in two 
significant ways: 
1. As predication. 
2. As reference. 
3.  
2.8.5 Predication. To explain this Ricoeur felt he had to make a change from the 
semiotics of the word, as in Saussure, to semantics at the level of the sentence, as he found 
in Benveniste. In Aristotelian theory, metaphor is an ornament of rhetoric. Meaning 
consists in denomination and transferring from one thing to another, “thee” transferred to 
“summer’s day”. Ricoeur felt this way of thinking about metaphor had been superceded 
by English-language philosophers who placed the creation of meaning within predication. 
Metaphor thus appeared in a new light, as the “most brilliant illustration of the power of 
language to create meaning by the means of unexpected comparisons” (IA ibid). A new 
semantic relevance has been disclosed through the use of metaphor. 
 
2.8.6 Reference.  
Ricoeur returns to the notion of Reference, which he sees as a difficult and controversial 
topic (HWL2 ibid). In the Rule of Metaphor he proposes a thesis that the descriptive 
function of discourse eclipses a first degree reference to something. This he states is 
nothing more than the other side of the coin in which he sees as “an infinitely more 
remarkable process”, that is the re-description of the world comparable to the role of 
models in scientific knowledge, referred to above. The text builds an indirect reference 
not of reality but of a model for reality. The question now is whether the referencing 
corresponds with the intention of the author, or whether it is a function of language? The 
answer to the perplexity lies in knowing under what conditions someone speaking 
metaphorically about the world chooses to speak metaphorically rather than literally 
(Metaphorical Reference in RM ibid). 
Ricoeur now had at his disposal a three-fold structure for a semantics of language, 
consisting of Word: Sentence: Text. It was not until he examined and analysed Narrative 
that this three fold articulation was fully realised. 
 
2.8.7 Narrative and Plot 
Ricoeur suggests that the theory of the narrative brings a comparable phenomenon to 
light. Narrative has a plot that is constructed of bits and pieces combining intentions, 
causes and accidents that finally are pulled together into a temporal configuration from a 
series of discrete events. 
 Ricoeur suggests that the configuring act of the plot mirrors the unlikely predications 
found in metaphor. In the world of the text metaphor and plot are the counterparts of 
semantic innovation and the foundation stones upon which the world of the text is created. 
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Both implicate a subject in discourse, and both implicate the question of reference which 
is posed by the theory of discourse adopted by Ricoeur (IA ibid). 
 
2.9 Time and Narrative. 
Time. 
Why should we be concerned, why would Ricoeur be concerned about and interested in 
the phenomena of Time? The answer lies in mimesis3, re-figuration. Time, states Ricoeur, 
is the philosophical theme that governs the three volumes of Time and Narrative. 
Narrativity in his eyes, offers a response to the aporias of time. 
The sources for his interest are heterogenous and wide ranging over philosophy and 
theology that he lays out in detail within his Intellectual Autobiography (IA ibid). I am 
selecting from that which he says about the relation of time to the narrative text and the 
narrative function as distinct from that of narrative structure or form. There is, says 
Ricoeur, a relation of mutual conditioning between narrativity and temporality. Ricoeur 
was led to the conclusion that there was a “knot of difficulties” and apparently insoluble 
aporias in the notion we have of time. The biggest of these was an apparent irreducibility 
of the physical, cosmological understanding to the psychological and phenomenological 
understanding of time. The aporia focused around the structure of the present. Ricoeur 
saw this as having two modalities: the pinpoint instant and the living present. The instant 
reduces to a break between a before and an unlimited past. The living present is filled with 
a recent past and an imminent future. As a phenomenological experience lived time 
presented another aporia as the totality of a single time. In relation to this all the lapses of 
time would be no more than parts, in a Kantian schema.  
 
Time appeared to have an inscrutable nature that neither Kant nor Bergson could give a 
satisfactory intuition of. Time and Narrative vol 3 presents an analysis in which 
Augustine, Husserl, Heidegger are brought together to an account that articulates the 
overlapping of the past, as the milieu of memory and of history, the future as the milieu of 
hope, expectation and fear, and the present as the milieu or moment of attention and 
initiative. The question of time and the narrative came together in the borrowing from 
Augustine Book XI of the Confessions of the concept distentio animi - the swelling of the 
soul by creating a conscience through meditation upon social practices, within a sense of 
time governed by the movement of the stars; and the theory of tragic muthos borrowed 
from Aristotle’s poetics. The distention, swelling, of the soul between the past of memory, 
the future of expectation, and the present of intuition, corresponded to the emplotment and 
the sudden changes of fortune of the feigned dramas of tragedy is given in Time and 
Narrative vol 1. The emphasis is placed by Ricoeur on an inverted relation between the 
concordance established by the plot prevailing over discordance about intentional aims, in 
the plane of the experience of time (IA ibid p42-43). 
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In sum, the narrative text finds a notion of time that not only corresponds to everyday 
practices but opens another discourse that engenders our perplexities concerning human 
time. A narrative articulation helps resolve these. One has only to think in cinema and in 
theatrical and television drama of the power of manipulating time these play with. The use 
of flashback, of memory and memory dislocated by other events influencing present 
behaviour and understanding; the use of forward projections laying out projected dreams, 
hopes, fears and expectations that influence the shape of actions taking place in the 
present. In literature time is manipulated in similar ways and the effect enhanced by 
careful use of voice, tense, point of view and other devices. In Time and Narrative vol 2 
Ricoeur explores these further. 
 
In his eyes the aporetics of time in the cosmological sense of Augustine described by 
physics and history, and the everyday phenomenological sense of time that is experienced 
in concrete life, constitutes the major transition between the configuration of text internal 
to its narrative, and the refiguration of action in the mind of the reader brought about by 
the written narrative, an effort of  thought that he examines in great detail in Time and 
Narrative vol 3. It does so because narrative imitates action and offers an articulation to an 
experience of time that would otherwise remain the province of physics, or the province 
of philosophy and endless paradoxes that risk lapsing into sophistry.  
 
Time and Narrative 3 draws out the consequences of metaphorical reference in the 
semantic innovations of language by extending it to narrative statements. Matters become 
complicated if the notion of reference is held too closely to the notion of a material re-
description, or caught up with extensional logic. Ricoeur refers to Heidegger at this point, 
and the post-Heideggerian theory of truth, of its radical critique of the correspondence 
theory of truth, and the appeal of that for a notion of truth as manifestation. Ricoeur 
argues that metaphorical and narrative statements in the sphere of reading, aim at re-
figuring ‘reality’ in two ways:  
 1. By uncovering or disclosing concealed dimensions of human experience.  
 2. By transforming our vision of the world. It is interesting to me that here 
Ricoeur should turn to a visual, ocular, metaphor through which to express his idea.  
The final resolution lies in the act of reading. In asking who or what refers? The answer is 
the reader. The figure who brings about the intersection of the possible world of the 
written narrative and text and the real world of everyday experience and existence is the 
reader. Ricoeur concludes by offering a theory of reading. Reading is where two 
‘strategies’ clash: that of the author riding under th banner of the narrator who attempts to 
persuade, and that of the reader who acts with a willing suspension of disbelief in the 
encounter with the text. The second has the character of a game, even, says Ricoeur “a 
battle” that involves suspicion and rejection that “allows the reader to practice the distance 
of appropriation” (HWL2 ibid p18).  
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2.9.1 Plot and emplotment 
The three volumes of Time and Narrative take up the problem of reference within the 
framework of literary language and its use. The ‘problem’ Ricoeur now sees is the process 
of the movement, the passage he calls it, from the illocutionary configuration of a world 
within the narrative text, to the refiguration of the real world belonging to the reader, 
outside the narrative text (HWL2 ibid p16). The literary device Ricoeur chooses to 
energise this process is the Aristotelian notion of muthos, the plot. In the Poetics Aristotle 
gives a mimetic function to the plot in the praxis of action in the world. It is the dynamic 
of emplotment that provides Ricoeur with the key to opening the relation between 
narrative and time. Three mimetic modes are identified as constituting the mediation 
between the two building from a base of practical experience on the part of the author, 
through the text, to its culmination in the imagination and practical experience of the 
reader. The reader is the ontological site for the operations of meaning and reference, that 
semiology ignores. What finally is described is not just any reality, states Ricoeur, but the 
reality belonging to the world of the reader (IA ibid p29). 
 
Narrative language, as Ricoeur conceives matters, is no longer closed in upon itself (a 
criticism directed towards semiotic systems thinking that refuses to consider language 
open to any extra-linguistic sources). This is so because narrative language refers to 
actions by human beings who are following a relation that has no equivalent. That is the 
relation of mimesis. Mimesis is not as Plato held it to be, a mere deceptive imitation at 
best concerned only to represent the appearance of things, and not reality itself; an 
imitation of an imitation that is not true knowledge or an acquaintance with the beauty of 
forms; something in Russell’s lambent phrase “that rots the brain” (Russell 1946: History 
of Western Philosophy).106 Mimesis according to Ricoeur is a matter of a “re-organisation 
at a higher level of significance and efficacy” of narrative language that he formulates as 
being-as (HWL2 ibid p16-17). 
 
2.9.2 Mimesis 
In Ricoeur’s way of thinking, mimesis assigned to metaphorical utterance and narrative 
language leads to an enrichment of the language of the text because it adds levels of 
multiple mediations and new meanings to the sense of the reference. Mimesis for Ricoeur 
thus ensures the transition from Configuration in the narrative to and between Re-
figuration of the world of praxis. In Time and Narrative vol.1. he outlines a three-fold 
model of mimesis that he names mimesis1,mimesis2,mimesis3. These correspond to three 
stages in the construction a text:  
Pre-figuration (mimesis1) - Configuration (mimesis2) - Re-figuration (mimesis3). 
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Mimesis2 constitutes the pivot and turning point that opens up the world of the plot and in 
so doing, institutes the literariness of the work of literature (1984: Time and Narrative: 
Threefold mimesis. p53).107 Ricoeur notes that hermeneutics is concerned with 
reconstructing the entire arc of operations “by which practical experience provides itself 
with works, authors and readers” (ibid). In this configuration, mimesis2, fulfils a mediating 
function. The task of hermeneutics is to reconstruct the set of operations “by which a work 
lifts itself above the opaque depths of living, acting, and suffering”. This is to be given to 
readers, who receive and thereby enrich their lives and “change their acting” (ibid). 
Semiotics on the other hand is concerned only with the analysis of the syntactic structures 
of the configuration of a work of literature.  
From this analysis of the three-fold structure of mimesis emerges the parallel triad of 
Author (Locution) - World of the Text (Illocution) - Reader (Perlocution). It is the Reader 
who completes the circuit and brings the process to fruition, as we have seen. 
 
2.9.3 Narrative Identity. 
In Time and Narrative vol 2, Ricoeur develops the idea that a literary text and a narrative 
text in particular, projects before itself a possible world, a being-as that is the world of the 
text. The narrative bifurcates into two streams, the fictional and the historical. History 
remodels the past on the basis of traces that have been left behind; approximations of the 
historian on the basis of what is known and on what is absent. The mutual constitution of 
time and narrative provokes the notion of Narrative Identity. This is of great interest to me 
in the frame of photo-documentary narratives, where I propose the idea of photographing 
being a form of writing history, and the products often fulfilling the role of cultural myths; 
touchstones by which people in the present guide their understandings of themselves by 
referring to an historical past in recent memory and outside of memory inscribed in the 
individual photographs, and given form in the photo-narrative. Narrative Identity in 
Ricoeur’s terminology is “the unstable product of the intersection of history and fiction”. 
Ricoeur draws this as the most solid conclusion from the mutual constitution of time and 
narrative.(IA ibid p48). 
Both offer us a world of the imagination, a possible world, but nonetheless a place I, the 
reader, can think of inhabiting, enrich myself by “carrying out there my own-most 
possibilities” (HWL2 ibid p17). The referencing of the narrative now confronts the 
aporias of time from two directions, fictional and historical, which adds to the complexity 
of the problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
107 Ricoeur, P 1984 Time and Narrative. Vol 1. Trans. By K. McCoughlan and D. Pellauer. Chicago. 
Chicago University Press. 
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2.10 Summary. 
Faced in the 1960s with the ontological challenge of the theory of Structuralism and its 
offshoot, semiology, theory that focused analysis on the internal relations of systems of 
relations between signs, modelled on those found in the linguistic analysis of language, 
Ricoeur felt compelled to revise and expand his thesis of a phenomenological 
hermeneutics modelled on symbolism as a structure of language. Ricoeur accepted the 
thesis that Language is central to our grasp of the world, the essential instrument through 
which human beings constitute and articulate their understandings and interpretations of 
their particular worlds they inhabit. Critically Structuralism removed any extra-linguistic 
phenomenon from the frame of reference. This included the human subject and the 
diachrony of history. For Ricoeur this was unacceptable. Hermeneutics is concerned with 
the interpretation of language and meaning, of grasping how we make sense of things. 
Ricoeur argued there could be no meaning if any social analysis was not anchored in the 
subject situated in time and history. 
 
Keeping his allegiance to language and to phenomenology intact, Ricoeur turned to the 
model of the text. Ricoeur now defines hermeneutics “…as the theory of the operations of 
understanding in their relation to the interpretation of texts…”. The key idea will be 
“…the realisation of discourse as a text..” (1991: The Task of Hermeneutics. FTA p53-
74). Ricoeur adopts to his revised and critical hermeneutics, the central paradigm the 
model of the Theory of the Text, the Theory of Action, and the Theory of History. The 
Theory of the Text is the fulcrum upon which these three functions pivot and interweave, 
discourse is the power that energises it. 
 
Unlike semiotics in which language is restricted to the word and restricted meanings, the 
text opens language in use as speech and especially as written into texts to new 
possibilities, the capacity to handle muliple meanings in an expression, and most tellingly 
to new innovations in semantics. Inscription into written text implied an intentional author 
and the work of the text, whether factual, fiction, historical, fantasy or poetry and drama 
implied discourse, a range of inter-subjective interactions greater than those of dialogue 
and face-to-face speech. Inscription follows rules of grammar and procedures that gave 
language a greater range of expression and meaning than speech alone. Notably in the use 
of metaphor, emplotment and narrative. These in turn imply a basis in time. Inscription 
implies the text achieving an independence from the author and was accessible to anyone 
literate in the language in which it was written. Being independent a text develops a 
history of its own. 
The text creates an imaginative and structured world within itself, a world of the text. The 
final part of the equation is the reader. In the reader the text finds its fulfilment. Thus 
hermeneutic discourse is defined as the act of “a someone saying something about 
something to someone”. 
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2.11 Text to Action and Practical Reason. 
The ability to action is a competence of Ricoeur’s ‘capable person’ living in society. It 
returns the self as subject to the central concern of the dialectical discourse of 
hermeneutics. The subject is conceived as a dynamic agency engaged in inter-subjective 
relations with others, and inter-actions within the public sphere of their joint lives, 
meeting and discussing matters of common interest, influencing their thoughts and 
actions, sometimes in co-operation and sometimes in conflict, and where possible 
reaching a common judgement. 
A shift from a hermeneutics of the text towards a hermeneutics of action was confirmed, 
for Ricoeur, by the analysis he made of the narrative function laid out in the three volumes 
of Time and Narrative (IA ibid p38). There he teased out ramifications about the problem 
of inter-subjectivity provoked by textuality and narrative. The theory of Action in the 
philosophy of action could, he saw, raise this to the level of practical reason, in the 
context of the phenomena of conflict and co-operation (IA ibid p37). 
 
By ‘Action’ Ricoeur means that a text, which he considers to have a propositional content 
and a reference, acquires an illocutionary force, it does something through the process of 
referring in making sense of the content. The text becomes detached from its author and 
develops consequences of its own. The text thus moves from the philosophical plane to 
the social dimension of action. The text enters into the wider realm of the public sphere 
and the social imaginary.  
 
Action is the act of someone saying something about something. Actions imply goals 
which commit the agent to activitiy. Actions also refer to motives which expain why 
someone does or has done something in ways that are intelligible and in which one event 
leads to another. Actions have agents who do things for which they can be held 
responsible morally, that may have long term consequences for which they may or may 
not be accountable. Moreover to act is always to act with others. Inter-actions can take the 
form of co-operation or conflict whose contingencies rejoin us to the circumstances of the 
activity occurring (TN 1 ibid p55). 
 
Ricoeur proposes a theory of action as a “semantics of action”. The thesis is based on 
Ricoeur’s underlying assumption of the “ontological vehemence” underlying his 
conception of language. The semantics of action expressed through the  analysis of sense 
and reference that he performs, is based upon the conviction that discourse does not exist 
simply for its own glory, but that discourse is the attempt, in all its forms, to carry 
experience to language and language into the social domains of imagination and practical 
reasoning. It constitutes a manner of inhabiting and being-in-the-world, which both 
precedes it, and demands to be said. 
In turning to an action centred hermeneutics Ricoeur is again showing his willingness to 
extend his philosophical interests into the social sciences and learn from them. Within 
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anthropology contemporary to Ricoeur, for example, there are numbers of attempts to 
move theorising away from a society based structural-functional paradigm towards more 
subjective and action centred procedures. Amongst his contemporaries this can be seen in 
the work of the Norwegian Barth (b.1928) and his theories of ‘transactionalism’ worked 
out in the Afghanistan/Pakistan border regions; and the process centred work of the 
English anthropologists Leach (1910-1989) on kinship in general, and Turner (1920-1980) 
on ritual, symbolism and rites of passage amongst the Ndembu of Zambia, in the 60s and 
70s; the Canadian, Lee (b.1937) and the American, Wilmsen (b.1930s) debating the 
political economy of the !San people of the Kalahari and Botswana; and the Sri Lankan 
Obeyesekere (b.1930s) and the American, Sahlins (b.1930) in the 80s, debating the 
rationality of indigenous peoples and the historical circumstances of the death in February 
1779 of Captain Cook at Kealakekua Bay, Hawaii (Barnard 2000: History and Theory in 
Anthropology).108 Within the sphere of the anthropology of Art, the English visual 
anthropologist, Gell (1945-1997) began to develop ideas about western and non-western 
art as a form of instrumental agency, rather than objects of aesthetic contemplation, or 
symbolic representations of spiritual beliefs. Work that was published posthumously after 
his untimely death (Gell 1998: Art as Agency).109 
 
The figures of Simmel (1858-1918) and Weber (1864-1920) stand out in the history of 
sociology, Simmel who amongst much else, introduced the notion of ‘reciprocity’ based 
on the notion that the social exists when two or more people inter-act with each other and 
the behaviour of one is seen to be a response to the other. Weber, who wrote on a wide 
variety of sociological topics, emphasised that the study of social action through 
interpretive methods should be the central concern of sociology. Weber emphasised the 
Hegelian notion of Spirit, geist, as a driving force, and from Dilthey the notion of 
Understanding, verstehen; from Goethe he borrowed the notion of “elective affinity” with 
which to describe the relations between ideology and practice as integral to the 
methodology for the interpretation of social institutions, based on the thesis of 
understanding the purpose and meaning individuals attach to their actions. The varieties of 
action centred theories, which includes Marxism and neo-Marxist ‘Frankfurt School’ 
critical traditions, are complex perspectives and blendings of ideas, elements of which 
deeply influenced the thought of Ricoeur within his hermeneutics of action. As they have 
those of his contemporary, Habermas, whose studies of the processes of institutions of the 
public sphere of society, and the values and inter-actions informing the social imaginary 
of social groups within it were well known to him (Habermas 1981: The Theory of 
Communicative Action).110 
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In Ricoeur’s hands, “Acting” in terms of a practical philosophy, constitutes the core of an 
Heideggerian and post-Heideggerian ontology of being-in-the-world, or put another way, 
the act of inhabiting the world (IA ibid p38). Action and acting is seen as a form of 
instrumental agency and a means of inter-acting with and influencing the thought and 
actions of others. It is Ricoeur’s claim for hermeneutics that action that is meaningful may 
be rendered objective and ‘fixed’ in ways similar to the fixation that occurs in the 
inscription of writing (1991: The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action considered as a 
Text. In FTA ibid p144-167). This process of objectification is made possible by the 
identification of some inner traits of action that are, in his view, similar to the structure of 
speech and the speech act (Austen ibid).  
 
These structures of doing that is, acting, translate into language as the structures of kinds 
of Utterance. A dialectic within the process of action conceived as transaction opens the 
way to detach the meaning of the action from the event of the action (see Barth ibid).111 A 
semantics of action for a practical philosophy turns attention upon an analysis of the 
conceptual scheme in which are inscribed those notions found in ordinary language that 
apply to human action. Notions, for example, such as intentions, circumstances, motives, 
deliberation, motion, passivity, intended and unintended results, reflection. These operate 
in action as a network of considerations (HWL2 ibid p19). What counts for making sense 
is that they all belong in the same network of considerations. Within the network relations 
of inter-signification govern their meanings. This means that knowing how to make use of 
any one is to know how to make use of the whole network in a meaningful and 
appropriate way.  
 
This, says Ricoeur, amounts to a coherent language game. This is not a simple list of 
constituent parts of the network but the transcendental condition for any discourse about 
action. Network theory in the social sciences places emphasis on the whole network being 
instrumental. An effective way of proceeding is to identify questions that can be posed 
about the subject of any action: who, what, why and how. All are incorporated into the 
network of questions governing their inter-related meanings. Who defines the agent or 
agency that sets the network into motion. Who, I have suggested, asks first the question if 
in establishing the premises from which action can flow. If such and such is the case, then 
this and this, or that and that can follow. An action does not simply happen it is something 
that is made to happen, it is a predicated activity. What happens next is the observation of 
the predication and the making of utterances that in their constitution can be true or false. 
What makes them so is their assertion about a state of affairs. 
The Why of action implies motive. A motive is a motive for or a motive to. Thus it is 
logically implied in the notion of action. Motives are not Humean causes, as such, but 
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better understood as “reasons for doing something”. Extrapolating from Strawson,112 
Ricoeur notes that an action superimposes a certain configuration of physical movements 
upon an accomplishment that can be interpreted in terms of motive and intention. They 
are not juxtaposed but a mixed category that he identifies as that of desire. 
‘Desire’ brings together psychic and physical categories reserved for persons and things. 
‘Desire’ thus has a meaning that can be spoken of in the language of intentions, and as a 
force using the language of physical energy. Ricoeur identifies three typical contexts in 
which motives are experienced as the reason to do something that he poses as questions: 
 1) What led you to do that?  
 2) Why do you habitually do that?  
 3) What made you do that?  
The three questions stand in a relation of reciprocity such that they can brought together 
under a heading of affections or passions. Thus the phenomenon of  desire leads us to say 
that motives for action would not be motives unless they were also causes, but not in the 
Humean sense of a causal antecedent with no logical connection to the result. Motive and 
cause express together a disposition towards action. 
 
2.12 Agency and moral ‘Ascription’. 
Action implies an agent and a relation of dependency, as recognised long ago by Aristotle. 
In the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle points to a kind of wisdom, phronesis, whose 
depths, according to Ricoeur, he was unable to fathom. (HWL2 ibid p24).  
Ricoeur suggests the problem can be resolved (mediated) by the refinement of the theory 
of predication in general and the theory of semantics of action in particular. He proposes 
that the semantics of action leads to giving an agent the power of ascription. By this he 
means an action attributed to an agent differs logically from mere attribution. Ascription is 
a action in the moral and juridical sense, whereas attribution is action in the logical sense 
That is a distinct signification that transforms particular cases into exceptions. He chooses 
to do so because he can see this will lead to the question of the identity of the self, which 
as we have seen is an abiding thread running throughout all is philosophy (ibid). 
 
Strawson observes that physical and mental characteristics belong to the individual 
person. Their owner can dispose of them or not. The question is whether these are 
idiomatic or universal expressions, in terms of the meanings assimilated to the 
transcendental terms for the semantic field of action in question. Ricoeur suggests there 
are good reasons to think they are that can be verified. It is of action that we first say such 
things as “my action”, “your action”, “his/her action”. We do something similar with 
regard to intentions, saying “someone intends to…”. We can understand an intention as an 
intention, but if the author is removed we effectively restore it to the person in question as 
being their own. The significance of this for Ricoeur is that this is what an agent does 
when considering the options open to them, and deliberates on which to follow.  
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According to Aristotle, with whom Ricoeur agrees, “Ascription consists precisely in the 
agent’s reappropriation of their deliberations and preferences…”. Thus to decide, to 
choose and make up one’s mind is to cut off from discussion one’s own other 
contemplated options (HWL2 ibid p25). Motive is thus barely indistinguishable from 
intention, and its belonging to an agent is as much a part of its meaning as is the logical tie 
to the action for which it is the cause. Thus to mention motive is to mention also the agent. 
For Ricoeur there is “something particularly strange, paradoxical, involved here” (ibid). 
The paradox lies in the perplexity of accounting for an author, which is a terminable 
enquiry, and generally the ‘who’ designated by a proper name, and the accounting for 
motives for an action which is indeterminable and lost in a thicket of mixed motivations 
that lose themselves in a fog of internal and external influences. 
 
It is this odd, asymmetrical relation that is part of the definition of ascription. This being 
the case then it becomes a function of the whole network constituting a semantics of 
action that makes sense of the expression agent. Ricoeur concludes from this “mastery of 
the whole network is comparable to learning a language, and that understanding the word 
‘agent’ is learning to how to place it correctly in this network” (ibid). He proposes that 
agency and ascription can be best understood in a style of transcendental argument that 
intends to show the notion of causal efficiency is the condition of possibility of certain 
effective procedures that, in the final analysis, depend upon the agent. 
 
In order to proceed with the argument Ricoeur distinguishes between actions that produce 
immediate changes and actions whose effects are distant in time and place. Any 
attribution now to a specific agent is problematic because the agent is no longer present in 
the long term consequences of their activities. 
Action thus becomes detached from its agent, in much the same way as a text becomes 
detached from its author, and discourse detaches writing in relation to speech. 
 
There are various consequences well known to historians and jurists, for example. The 
question arises are long-term consequences of an action still the work of their agent, or the 
circumstances intended or unintended of other human actors? Another complication is that 
everyone’s actions are not only caught up in the external course of things, but get 
incorporated into the social course of human affairs. This is of great interest when the two 
thesis Case Studies are considered. Both revolve around ethical implications of agency 
and action. 
Case Study 1, Regeneration, Waterside South examines a social circumstance of conflict 
in the present and immediate past with significant consequences for the future. As the 
agent responsible for the photography and book, to what degree am I involved? In Case 
Study 2: Imperium 1326 there are two possible lines of involvement. One relies on the 
scholarship of historians and archaeologists to give meaning to the photography. The 
other is my responsibility to future students, teachers and others using the DVD of the 
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photographs in the belief they accurately describes the forensic pathologies they claim and 
that they can learn to recognise. But first we must consider the process of inscription and 
fixing action. 
 
2.13 The Fixation of Action.   
The composition of a plot within the narrative is grounded in an understanding of the 
world of action, its meaningful structures, its symbolic character, and its temporal 
character. (TN1 ibid p54). The discourse of the written text inscribes and fixes intentional 
actions and activities. We need to look briefly at how that might be achieved.  
Ricoeur proposes that there is a three-way debate to be found between the emplotment of 
lived experience, historical time, and fictional time. There is a noteworthy property of 
discourse in the written narrative, that of “Utterance”. Utterance is given voice in 
discourse. To recap for a moment. Ricoeur initially proposes that Discourse has four 
distinctive traits:  
 First, discourse is always realised temporally and in the present (whereas 
language is virtual and a-temporal).  
 Second, discourse has a subject, a Locutor. It refers back to a speaker, a Who is 
speaking? It has a complex set of indicators that amount to an instance of discourse as 
being self-referential. (Language by contrast does not have a subject).  
 Third, discourse is always about something. It has an Illocutionary reference. It 
refers to a world that it claims to describe, to express or to represent something. In 
discourse the symbolic function of language is realized, made actual. (Language by 
contrast lacks “a world” as it also lacks subjectivity and temporality. Signs within a 
language refer only to other signs and their syntactical relations within the same system). 
 Fourth, in discourse all messages are exchanged. Discourse alone has a world 
that includes another person or persons, an Interlocutor to whom the discourse is 
addressed. (Language on the other hand, presents only the condition of possibility for 
communication, for which it provides the necessary codes) (1991: The Model of the Text 
in FTA ibid p144-167). 
 
To this must be added the final and defining goal of discourse, the reader. The notion of 
the reader introduces a further dimension to discourse and the notion of utterance, that of 
Perlocution. Perlocution implies a world inhabited by the reader, a public sphere and 
social imaginary whose concerns and values will shape and modify the illocutionary 
references of the discourse of the text. 
The fixation of the ascriptions of an agency parallels the inscription of speech in writing 
and surpassing it. Within the field of documentary photographing, fixation of action is 
clearly similar to the same fleeting reality when all the faculties converge into, what for 
Cartier-Bresson, is “…that moment that mastering an image becomes a great physical 
and intellectual joy…”(Cartier-Bresson 1999 ibid p16). 
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Drawing upon the speech act theories of Austen 113 and Searle,114 Utterance we find has a 
three fold structure: 
 1). The Propositional or Locutionary: the act of saying and doing something. 
Searle attributes to this the notion that someone performs the action. 
 2). The Illocutionary act: the saying about something, that is the inscribing of 
action and ascribing the intentions motivating it into an intelligible, rule governed and 
ordered creation that is the metaphorical, emploted narrative of the world of the text. 
Searle attributes to this the ethical dimension that by acting we mean what we do and say. 
 3) The Perlocutionary: the what we do by saying and acting, as above addressed 
to an audience and the responses of the reader. Searle attributes to this the notion that 
utterance addresses an audience, in speech within the vicinity, in writing distant and apart. 
Unwrapping these categories Ricoeur reveals their implications. The Locutionary act is 
fixed in the sentence. The sentence becomes a propositional utterance that has meaning, 
that because of its sign structure can be identified and re-identified in language. I place the 
single photographic image into this category. The Illocutionary act dwells on the 
expressive aspects of prosody in speech, and literary devices such as metaphor and 
emplotment, voice, mood etc in the poetics of the written text. In physical actions this 
calls into play motive, intention, character, inter-subjective relations within the public 
sphere. It articulates what is known expressively, is the realm of semantic innovations and 
the unravelling of multiple levels of meaning. The Perlocutionary act draws together the 
illocutionary contained in the world of the text and the actions that lie behind that, and the 
realm of the reader in imagination and active response. The Perlocutionary is the realm of 
discourse as stimulus. It is the least inscribable and the least predictable because it acts 
upon the emotions, the intellect, the imagination and the affective dispositions of people 
that are complex and variable. 
Conceived in this way, discourse brings together in its varieties of utterance text and 
action. Text and Action is a Heideggerian project of discourse as projecting-a-world, a 
becoming that is disclosed, which Ricoeur argues, is its justification as a social action 
wrought in Language, to establish a certain relation of man to the world. It is the task of 
hermeneutics to interpret and make that intelligible (1991 ibid). 
 
2.14 Summary 
“Only man has a world..” writes Ricoeur. A text has only a situation within it. The text 
has sense and it has reference that we might call ostensive. Readers have an ensemble of 
reference that are imaginatively opened up by the text. To understand a written text in this 
way is, says Ricoeur, to understand ourselves and at the same time, to understand a new 
dimension to being-in-the-world and be enriched. 
                                                           
113 Austen, J. L 1962: How to do things with Words. The William James Lectures delivered in 
Harvard University in 1955. 2nd edition, edited by J.O.Urmson and Marina Sbisa. The Clarendon 
Press. Oxford University Press. 
114 Searle, J. R 1969: Speech Acts. An essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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Ricoeur’s hermeneutic is not only one of amplifying the possibilities of language, it is also 
a hermeneutics of emancipation of the social person. By this I mean not only is the 
hermeneutic open to innovations in language and semantics in generating new forms of 
interpretation, meaning and understanding, it is also open to anybody who wishes to 
participate. Ricoeur’s hermeneutic of the text is a public sphere where subjects participate 
as equals, that is open, inclusive, where equality and freedom of expression are welcomed 
as part of a rational discussion in the common good. Hermeneutics in Ricoeur’s hands 
also reflects his deep concern for the conscious Subject in self-realisation and individual 
freedom.  
His later work extended hermeneutics into what he calls a “little ethics”, and the realm of 
practical, pragmatic reason. This has much to do with an ideal of democratic politics, in 
the sense of examining through a hermeneutic of practical reasoning the grounds of moral 
and epistemic values, such as jurisprudence, liberty, rationality and truth, and their 
depredations by external forces. Ricoeur’s ‘capable person’ is both a social and 
autonomous individual embedded in history that can be understood in something like 
Kant’s sense of Mundigkeit. Sometimes translated as ‘maturity’ what this means for 
Ricoeur is the capacity to use one’s own reason and to think for oneself. His thinking here 
bears close resemblance to elements in the thought of Habermas for whom emancipation 
means not only the freedom of the autonomous individual to think for themselves and act 
accordingly (within social, moral and legal norms), but the identification and fostering of 
social institutions that create the conditions of possibility for that (Finlayson, J.G 2005: 
Habermas).115  
I think it is where Ricoeur’s lifelong commitment to philosophy and to Protestant 
theology merge. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
File: Ch2 BROWN PhD JUNE 2014 HB.doc 
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Chapter 3 
 
On social documentary photography. 
 
Themes and variations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 3.1: Salmon fishing using off-shore drift nets. Gardenstown. Moray Firth. 1980. 
 
"…I can think of no more exciting challenge than having to go out, day after day, 
with a camera to record the contemporary scene, helping to make a small 
contribution towards an understanding of our complex, and frequently, 
exasperating, society…"  Grace Robertson 1989 (Grace Robertson: Picture Post 
Photographer).1 
 
Introduction. 
Themes. 
Social documentary photography is, to my mind, one of the great gifts of photography. 
Creativity and imagination are central to us all with music, perhaps, the greatest, deepest 
and most profound of all the arts. But I can neither compose nor perform, only, in the 
words of Rostropovich, eavesdrop from the audience and be content with what I can do, 
make photographs. Social documentary is one of two fields where I practice 
professionally the other being studio lighting and still life, another form of documentary.2 
I contextualise my documentary interest primarily within the social and historical 
sciences. The focus is with the lives and traditions of others, and with the literary form of 
the narrative visualising essay and short story book. That is where I am educated and is 
the context for this thesis.  
                                                      
1 Robertson, G 1989: Grace Robertson, Picture Post Photographer: Photojournalist of the 50s.  
London. Virago.  
2 Both interests are reflected and made full use of in the two photography Case Studies I have made 
for this thesis. 
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I start from a three-fold structure of: Photography - the science and technology; The 
Photograph - the single image; and Photographing - the intentional action of making 
photographs. In this thesis I am placing the emphasis upon Photographing. That is with 
the process of putting photography to pragmatic use and with questioning what it does. 
Ricoeur’s formula, borrowed from von Wright, of intentional interventions in the world is 
an apt description, combining as it does motivation with cause, explanation with 
understanding, in a hermeneutic about something in the world inscribed visually in a form 
with the characteristics of a written text (Ricoeur 2013: Hermeneutics. p98).3 In Ricoeur’s 
formula for hermeneutics:  the act of someone saying something about something to 
someone (ibid). 
 
Ricoeur came to call his style of philosophy a philosophical anthropology centred in 
language. I think of social documentary photography as a photographic anthropology 
centred in the visual that uses photography as a means to document human society. There 
is to my mind a close and natural affinity between the two perspectives. Both are 
predicated as intentional interventions in the world that have a semantic and 
epistemological duality of the human subject : object that determines action and gives 
meaning in the world. Central to both the epistemology of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and the 
epistemology of social documentary interpretations there is a common single dilemma. 
That is: how to combine the perspective of a particular subject, an agent living within the 
world, with an objective view, whether factual or fictional, of that same world, in ways 
that include both subjective and objective viewpoints in the single narrative? Mediating 
between them is the dilemma of Interpretation. What does it mean? How do we achieve 
it? Is there a way to distinguish between different qualities of interpretation? Who is 
interpreting? There are many questions and the answers are not, it seems to me, always 
obvious or easy. 
 
My intention in this chapter is to map where I stand philosophically to the theory and 
practice of a humane social documentary photography. I shall refer to the two 
photographic Case Studies that I have made for this thesis, and to a selective choice of 
documentaries made by others under the general heading of “the concerned photographer” 
that exemplify the kind of work that I wish to discuss. I shall also bring into the discussion 
Weber’s sociological construct of an “elective affinity” as a term of mediation in the 
dialogue between what we might call the ideology of Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics and 
the interests of the pragmatic social actions of making social documentary narratives, in 
the logic of the inter-relationships of networks of meanings and of possible actions. 
 
Both a social documentary photography and Ricoeur’s hermeneutic perspectives are 
predicated as ‘ground up’ views and ways of working, whose methodologies enable the 
                                                      
3 Ricoeur P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. 
 80 
flow of work to adapt and be modified reflexively to the intention and circumstances in 
which it is being made. Ricoeur refers to this as the endless capacity for ‘semantic 
innovation’ when speaking of language, of finding within language the capacity for new 
multiple meanings and the resources with which authors are able to say things afresh, 
notably the use of metaphor and metaphorical utterances.  
Something very similar can be said for the practices of documentary photography and the 
individual photographer and the toolkit of photographic expressive and descriptive skills 
they have for visual semantic innovation and the generation of multiple meanings within 
the photography, when tasked with saying something worthwhile about this group of 
people, this particular village, district, event or circumstances of life.   
 
Not least about when tasked with creating a visual dialogue with present interests and 
historical events, such as those mapped by Harper for dairy farmers in upstate New York, 
whose structure of work and the organisation of their lives is being transformed by 
technology (Harper 2001: Changing Works).4 A task that can go deeper into history, as I 
have with Case Study 2: Imperium. In this I am documenting with innovative 
photography, current interests in forensic science, anthropology and archaeology that link 
with a unique archaeological specimen skeleton and the political events surrounding it, 
dated to the early C14th, and quite possibly to a named individual, Hugh Despenser, 
Chamberlain to the Plantagenet King Edward II. Despenser was executed in November 
1326 by being hung, drawn and quartered, and the skeleton osteology shows clearly the 
peri-mortem trauma associated with that. 
 
What changes is not simply a set of prior beliefs and values, but attitudes, ways of 
responding to the world, ways that are always being challenged. Perhaps by new 
technologies creating new priorities and/or new ways of working, so for the photographer 
in the field it is no longer enough to be equipped with three or four cameras and a 
selection of lenses, but now must also carry a laptop and GPS satellite ‘phone through 
which to upload their pictures back to base. Or perhaps social attitudes have changed as 
economic and political cultures change, in for example, agricultural practices, the conduct 
of war, the representation of women, and a myriad of other ways familiar to us. There are, 
as Midgley suggests, “…a whole crowd of influences (that) affects everything we 
do…they all do different work. And they all contribute to a whole that grows from the soil 
of common sense, to which they are therefore still ultimately answerable…practical 
patterns of thinking that are appropriate to understanding questions of value (in a Platonic 
sense)…that are quite closely allied to our emotional nature. We use them when we are 
puzzled, as we often are, to see how to act…to see which…is more important or more 
serious…to see which of them we ought to attend to…”(Midgley 2014: Are you an 
Illusion? p152).5 
                                                      
4 Harper, D 2001: Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture. Chicago. Chicago University 
Press. 
5 Midgley, M 2014: Are You an Illusion? Durham. Acumen Publishing. 
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Stott in asking the question, “What Documentary Treats” summed up the documentary 
proposition as “…it treats at first hand of actual experience…an attempt…to treat - with 
honesty and intelligence - a problem that is at once immediate and yet all but 
unimaginable…in short, the still unimagined…” (Stott 1973/1986: Documentary 
Expression and Thirties America. p46-47).6 
 
Our ways of imagining the world determine the directions of our thoughts, and our 
thoughts in turn feed new ideas into our imaginations in a constant dialectical flow. 
Imagination is where apparent oppositions are mediated. By bringing them together 
imaginatively they can be seen often enough to be the necessary sides of the same coin. 
Each needs the other, and neither alone is sufficient. Social documentary photography is 
one way we can directly shape our thoughts and vision of the world. The spoken and 
written word is another way. Our actions in the world is another again, less direct perhaps; 
and there are many others from which we can choose, including scientific, political, 
economic, artistic and more.7). Social documentary photography is both descriptive and 
aesthetic, it has to be because each are two sides of the same coin, a matter of reasoning 
and problem solving and emotion and feeling that complement each other into the making 
of a satisfying and meaningful whole. 
 
A philosophical and a photographic anthropology. 
Ricoeur came to call his style of philosophy a philosophical anthropology. By this he 
meant a philosophy and anthropology of the capable but fallible human being. His 
philosophical purpose was to return consciousness and the self-conscious subject back to 
the centre of philosophy, from which it had been increasingly marginalised by 
developments in twentieth-century philosophies of mind, matter and a concentration upon 
language and theoretical models based upon linguistic structuralism. Extended into the 
humanities and social sciences these reductive theoretical analytics sought to give an 
account of structures of synchronic relations between signs as objects. Objects that were 
themselves further reduced to being material manifestations of unconscious neurological 
structures of the brain. Significantly for Ricoeur, these were objects that had no subject 
and no history. Any notion of subjectivity was banished as irrelevant. 
 
In calling his style of philosophy ‘a philosophical anthropology’ Ricoeur sought to 
highlight the return of the subject as necessary and central to proper philosophical 
understandings. By this he meant a philosophy and anthropology of the capable but 
fallible human being. Refusing the historical Cartesian dualism of mind vs. matter that 
arose in Enlightenment thinking, his aim was to return consciousness and the self-
conscious subject back to the centre of philosophy in a unity of understanding and 
interpretation by combining Husserlian phenomenology with a hermeneutic epistemology. 
                                                      
6 Stott, W 1973/1986: Documentary Expression and Thirties America. With a new afterword. 
London. University of Chicago Press. 
7 Midgley, M 2002: Science and Poetry. London. Routledge. 
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His chosen model to achieve this is the theory of the text, the theory of action, and the 
theory of the narrative; a three-fold structure of thought and practice for creating rule 
bound, and therefore literate and intelligible “ordered creations”.  
Borrowing from the Finnish philosopher and logician, G.H von Wright, Ricoeur called 
written texts intentional interventions into the world, a duality of semantics and 
epistemology whose discourse provides the conditions of possibility under which action is 
‘inserted’ into the world by reformulating a dialectic of explanation and understanding in 
a Kantian structure of sufficient reasons (Ricoeur 2013: Hermeneutics. p98).8  Von Wright 
argued that human action could not be explained causally by ‘natural’ or scientific laws, 
but had to be understood intentionally, a concept he connected with wants and beliefs in a 
social context (Von Wright 2004: Explanation and Understanding).9  
 
This structure of text and action in the diachrony of history would, Ricoeur thought, 
provide a stable foundation for a robust account of the capabilities and vulnerabilities of 
human beings, their behaviours and activities in making sense of their worlds and of 
themselves and their place within it. It also creates the conditions for semantic innovations 
in language and the capacity of language to generate multiple levels of meaning through 
the use of various literary devices, the most significant of which he identified metaphor 
for its capacity to open new and unexpected horizons of meaning in the discourse of 
narrative texts (Ricoeur 1995: Intellectual Autobiography. pp3-53).10  
 
Working at a different level of enquiry, I think of social documentary photography as a 
photographic anthropology whose intended interventions also have a semantic and 
epistemological duality that predicates action in the world, that is photographing, within 
the conditions of possibilities for a reasoned dialectic of explanation and understanding 
observed phenomena, in ways that necessarily combines subjective and objective 
viewpoints. The visualising narratives that it produces when the photographs are properly 
sequenced take the form of a literary text. The single photographs I regard as an 
equivalence to Ricoeur’s use of the sentence. The sentence is the basic unit of 
hermeneutic understanding, he says, not the word. A single photograph is a composite of 
forms that carry meaning, like a sentence is a composite of words. Using literary 
principles those photographs can be grouped sequentially as we would group sentences, to 
symbolically structure the social world in meaningful ways. Thus in hermeneutic terms, 
the sequenced photographs construct an autonomous reality and persist over time, 
affecting later judgements and influencing how individuals as viewers/readers interpret 
and re-interpret the events inscribed in various ways. That is why I refer to them as 
                                                      
8 Ricoeur P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. 
9 von Wright, G.H 2004: Explanation and Understanding. Cornell University Press. 
10 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: Intellectual Autobiography in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. 
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cultural myths, in the anthropological sense of myth (i.e. not as falsehoods) as something 
necessary that endures in a liminal dimension of space and time.  
The sequenced narratives say something, tell a story, and do something, look closely and 
analytically at aspects of life and the people living through them. That of necessity implies 
a moral viewpoint and judgements about who, what, where and how to make the 
photographs. They also raise challenging questions: Who speaks? For what purpose? To 
whom do they speak? The questions can seem difficult and endless, but cannot be ignored, 
for they place the photography at an inter-section of social history, hermeneutics, 
philosophy, visual social sciences, discourse theory, textual criticism, and journalism. 
Similar questions have been raised in recent decades within academic anthropology about writing, 
filming and photographing the ethnographies of culture, and continue to be so. (See: 
Clifford, J and Marcus, G: 1986: Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of 
Ethnography. 11 Ruby 1995: The Moral Burden of Authorship in Ethnographic Film.12 
Ruby, J and Banks, M 2011: Made to be seen: Perspectives on the history of Visual 
Anthropology.13 Baetens, J 2009: Theorising Photography as a Social and Artistic 
Practice.14). 
 
The photographic sequence when complete, could well stand alone, or with the addition of 
minimal  captions to provide some context, as in a gallery exhibition. Or they could well 
be combined with an extensive written text that provides a greater depth of context. These 
forms are more often published as books, admirable and lasting testimonies to their 
authors and to their subjects. Exemplifying this is the book La France de Profil with 
photographs by Paul Strand and text written by Claude Roy, 15 and  others that I 
particularly admire and will discuss further, below; by Strand: Tir a’Mhurain, with an 
essay by the historian Basil Davidson,16  James Ravilious: An English Eye with an essay 
by Peter Hamilton, 17 and Jorma Puranen: Imaginary Homecomings.18 
 
Central to both is an emancipating figure given to us by Ricoeur of  “the capable person”; 
a conception with close affinities to the Weberian concept of an “ideal type”. In Ricoeur’s 
thought this is a conscious and self-conscious agent who is active in the world. A 
Heideggerian ontological subject who is a fully conscious and self-conscious person, a 
                                                      
11 Clifford, J and Marcus, G: 1986: Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography. 
Berkeley. University of California Press. 
12 Ruby, J 1995: The Moral Burden of Authorship in Ethnographic Film. Visual Anthropology 
Review 11 (2): pp83-93. 
13 Ruby, J & Banks, M (eds) 2011: Made to be seen: Perspectives on the History of Visual 
Anthropology. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
14 Baetens. J 2009: 'Theorising Photography as a Social and Artistic Practice' Visual Studies 2009 
24 (2) p93-96. Taylor & Francis. 
15 Strand, P & Roy, C 1952/2001: La France de Profil. 2001 edition. Photographs by & Text by 
Claude Roy. New York. Aperture Foundation. 
16 Strand, P & Davidson, B 1962: Tir a'Mhurain. Photographs by Paul Strand & Text by Basil 
Davidson. London. MacGibbon & Kee. 
17 Ravilious, J 2007: An English Eye: The Photographs of James Ravilious. 2nd edition. Alan 
Bennett, Peter Hamilton & James Ravilious. Oxford. The Bardwell Press. 
18 Puranen, Jorma 1999: Imaginary Homecomings. Pohjoinen. Oulu. Finland. 
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being-in-the-world interpreting life, possessed with freedom of will, who is at once, 
embodied and knowledgeable, socially and technically skilled, who possesses the 
capability of thoughtful co-operation, foresight and reflection, and yet who is fallible and 
suffering, quite capable of conflict and making mistakes, yet learning from them to 
produce new inter-actions, ideas and variations on them. All of this at the same time as 
having, Ricoeur writes, “… the power of placing objects of desire at a distance…in short a 
subject who is master of himself and the servant of necessity…”. In short, a recognisably 
social and sociable human being (Ricoeur ibid p12-13)19.  
 
In this shared philosophical and moral universe, Subjectivity is not an irrelevance but the 
basic stuff and background of experience. Midgley, for example, writes, “…it is an 
objective fact in the world that our own experiences - the subjective sources of thought - 
are every bit as necessary for it as the objective ones such as brain cells…” (Midgley 
2014: Are you an Illusion? p54).20 
Ricoeur refuses the Cartesian claim of a self that is immediately transparent to or fully 
master of itself. That kind of self knowledge comes, he says, only through the agency of 
our relations to the world and life lived with and amongst others in that world. That is, as 
a self who is embodied, made possible and constituted by its material and cultural 
situation, a self who has a personal identity yet is open to other and different descriptions. 
Ricoeur gave a subtle dual identity to this understanding of the Self borrowing the 
distinction in identity given in Latin between idem and ipse.21 
 
In Ricoeur’s thinking, idem-identity is that inner self which gives the self its sense of 
sameness, the physical and material individual who the self and others recognise as being 
such-and-such a named person. Ipse-identity is the self as agent, a social persona and that 
part of an individual identity that has the unique ability to inaugurate something new, that 
can be tied to a subject self, whether oneself or another human being. Thus in Ricoeur’s 
conception a subject (a Self) is a composite that has a dual aspect of both idem and ipse 
identities. These he holds to be two irreducible orders of causality: the physical and the 
intentional. A comprehensive account of social action must show, he argues, how it is 
related to both of these orders (Ricoeur 1992: Oneself as Another).22 This is to be 
achieved through attestation rather than empirical verification, an assurance based upon 
                                                      
19 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: Intellectual Autobiography in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. 
20 Midgley, M 2014: Are you an Illusion? Durham. Acumen Publishing. 
21 The distinction appears in Petronius ‘Satyricon’, late 1st century AD and described in Tacitus 
‘Annals’: “as Consul he showed himself (idem) an energetic and capable administrator…as himself 
a man who idled into fame, a finished artist in extravagance (ipse)..”. The epigraph and dedication 
to T.S.Eliot “The Waste Land” carries the quotation from Petronius: “Nan Sibyllam guidem Cumis 
ego ipse oculis meis vidi in ampulla pendere”, translated as: “ For I myself saw the Cumaean Sybil 
with my own eyes, hanging in a cruet”. 
22 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University 
Press. 
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credence or trust rather than a logical certitude and is a concept that is crucial for 
Ricoeur’s entire anthropology (Dauenhauer 2011: Paul Ricoeur).23 
 
The conceptual perspectives of documentary photography and of Ricoeur’s philosophical 
hermeneutics are, we can see, distinctively different from other post-modern theories and 
practices, such as psychology, semiotics or economic materialism. These propose that 
attention should be focused upon structures of relations and set values conceived as being 
objects, to be analysed through theoretical perspectives that are to be applied ‘top down’ 
to the analysis and deconstruction of society and cultural works. Valuable as these are for 
their insights they cannot by their nature give an account of the individual subject as agent 
or actor enmeshed in daily life. The problem is that in their schema there is no Subject. 
Subjectivity is regarded as non-admissible. Nor are structural/linguistic theories, in my 
experience, of much use to the photographer in the field tasked with making sense of and 
photographing the everyday flow, continuities and dissonances of social life. However, it 
is not my intention to enter into a debate in this thesis about a Ricoeurian hermeneutic 
perspective placed into an opposition to structuralist thought but to mark the difference, 
nor placed in opposition to the pros and cons of modernist and post-modern photography 
theory in general. That must remain for another time and another place. 
 
In the warp and weft of affinity between them, social documentary photography as 
anthropology and a social action of agency can be seen to be, I think, as a typology of 
Ricoeur’s conception of a capable and self-conscious agency that utilises both idem and 
ipse identities rationally and emotionally. Ontologically this is an Heideggerian condition 
of being-in-the-world; an agency whose observations and interpretations are concerned to 
explain different types of existential social activities, the matrix of meanings actors 
impute to them and the web of social relations in which they are bound, along with the 
larger processes of historical social and cultural change in which they are embedded, and 
represent those visually. The desired method for photographing is predicated upon taking 
a ground upwards viewpoint and working from an insider’s perspective and 
understanding. This can be achieved through repetitions of socially participating 
observations and, over time, forming interpretations through their dialectic inter-play of 
performances to arrive in due course at plausible levels of understanding and the making 
of photographs. Stott writes about the photography of Walker Evans for the Roosevelt 
Government Farm Security Administration in the 1930s America. “Evans” he writes, 
“does not ‘expose’ the reality he treats, he reveals it - or better, he lets it reveal itself…he 
does not seek out the spectacular, the odd, the piteous, the unseemly…he records people 
when they are most themselves…he seeks normal human realities…”(Stott 1973/1986 
ibid p268-269). To do so calls upon the resources of both the inner and outer, social, self 
of the observing photographer. 
                                                      
23 Dauenhauer, Bernard and Pellauer, David 2011: "Paul Ricoeur". The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Edward N. Zalta (ed)  <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/ricoeur/> 
 86 
It can be seen this is quite different from a method predicated upon undertaking a search 
for empirical ‘facts’ in a positivist sense about some form of external reality as object, 
recording them and imposing upon them an impersonal pre-determined theoretical 
framework. There is a fundamental dilemma to this: how to combine the perspective of a 
particular self-conscious subject living in the world (i.e the photographer) with an 
objective view of that same world lived by others that inevitably includes both viewpoints, 
as Nagel astutely points out (Nagel 1986: The View from Nowhere).24  
 
I take a pragmatists view that I have learned from my practical experience as a studio and 
documentary photographer, and from the philosophy of Dewey, that seems to me natural. 
Subjectivity is the basic stuff of experience and experience is where we start from and 
return to. Thought is part of a “…a huge network that is continuous with the vast world 
that is its subject matter…an organic element of life, an activity as natural to us as seeing 
and eating…” writes Midgley and I must agree (MIdgley 2014: Are you an Illusion?).25 In 
Dewey’s hands social enquiry is seen as being a self-correcting process in epistemology 
that is conducted in a specific historical and social circumstance. It requires no foundation 
in certainty but is fallible, and knowledge accrued is what is warranted through the 
enquiry (Dewey 1999).26 In short, the photography is a tool, the emphasis is on 
photographing - rational actions operating within a system of rational, ethical and legal 
authority, using that tool to do a job.  
 
An Elective Affinity? 
In Chapter 1, I suggested a three-fold structure to the universal notion ‘Photography’. To 
remind ourselves I proposed dividing Photography into three elements: Photography - The 
Photograph - Photographing. The internal relationship between the three is a constant 
dialectic. My emphasis throughout the thesis is with Photographing. That is, with the act 
of someone doing and using photography with intention to say something about 
something to someone. 
This is brought out more clearly when we consider that, like other intellectual and 
practical disciplines, social documentary photography is a disciplinary sub-culture of 
Photography and found widespread within the arts, sciences and humanities, sitting 
comfortably alongside non-academic everyday life. Social documentary 
photography/photographing is not a fixed formula, comparable to say a particular science, 
but, to borrow a useful metaphor from information theory, more like a web of cultural 
intelligence, that has spread across continents and across diverse cultural and social 
landscapes in space and time since 1839 (Dyson 2013: Darwin among the Machines).27 
To which has been added ever since a cultural history with a breadth and depth of 
                                                      
24 Nagel, Thomas 1986: The View From Nowhere. Oxford & New York. Oxford University Press. 
25 Midgley, M 2014: Are You an Illusion? Durham. Acumen Publishing. 
26 Dewey, J., 1999. The Essential Dewey. Vol 1. (two volumes edited by Hickman, L. and  
Alexander, T.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999. 
27 Dyson, G 1998/2013: Darwin among the Machines. London. Penguin Books. 
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evolution and development by professional and amateur photographers with diverse 
motivations that continues to evolve and to inform current fashions and concerns (Marien 
2006: Photography: A Cultural History).28  
Or perhaps a more fruitful way to think of it, (and to risk mixing metaphors), is through 
Midgley’s cheerful metaphorical conception of the philosophical universe and views of 
life that have built up over aons of time, as being, “…a great stretch of mental countryside 
full of different kinds of vegetation - life forms that keep developing to suit what is going 
on around them…” (Midgley 2014: ibid).29  I like that. 
 
Dilemmas. 
The first dilemma to be questioned is: how to bring the conceptual perspective and 
reasoning of Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics of text and action into dialogue with 
the thought and practice of social documentary photography, given their different 
underlying assumptions? 
For Ricoeur language is the ground from which he developed his body of thought in 
hermeneutics, whilst documentary photography is grounded in the visual. The impetus for 
essaying a dialogue between them is because I have found there to be an affinity between 
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics and social documentary photography that I find 
natural and compelling. An affinity that begins from the simple observation that both 
hermeneutics and the photography in thought and practice question and seek justifiable 
answers to the tricky issue of interpretation and how we come to terms with it.  
 
The second and related question deriving from the first is: how to reconcile the tension 
between internal subjective and external objective perspectives? In both the domain of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of text and action, and in the domain of the praxis of social 
documentary photography, there is the immediate and fundamental dilemma Nagel points 
towards: how to combine the perspective of a particular, self-conscious subject living 
inside in the world, (our ‘capable person’), with an objective, reasoned and ethical view of 
that same world lived by others, that inevitably includes the subject actor and his or her 
viewpoint?  
 
The dilemma has many aspects to it that bring into question ideas about affinity, morality, 
knowledge, freedom and free will, the self, and the relation of the mind in thought to the 
physical world, and about relations of agency, action, reasoning and behaviour inter-
acting with others in the world, as Nagel remarks (Nagel 1986: ibid). 
 
Weber. 
It has been suggested to me, and I accept, that an effective way to bridge the dialogue 
between the theory and practice of social documentary photography and the philosophical 
                                                      
28 Marien, Mary Warner 2006: Photography: a Cultural History. 2nd Edition. London.  
Laurence King Publishing. 
29 Midgley, M 2014: Are You an Illusion? Durham. Acumen Publishing. 
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hermeneutics of Ricoeur, would be to use selectively Weber’s sociological notion of an 
“elective affinity”. I see this as a concept mediating between the two. 
Weber was concerned to understand more clearly the forces of social action driving 
historical social change and the meanings social actors gave to them. He devised a 
typology of forms of social action through which to grasp the connections between 
traditional and the modern industrial social formations of his time, and the shift he 
conceived away from traditional ways of thinking (the’order of nature’) and acting within 
them, to modern ways (the ‘moral and social orders’). The new modern ways he thought 
of as being rational actions by individuals acting within a system of rational legal 
authority and economy, namely that of the capitalist economic industrial system. There is, 
however, no simple connection, or ‘pre-established harmony’ between ideas and material 
interests, but “…an elective affinity may arise between the two…” (Coser 1977: Masters 
of Sociological Thought).30 
 
Deriving from the literature of Goethe, who in turn derived the notion of elective affinity 
from Renaissance chemistry, Weber used the term widely in his writings and in different 
contexts, but nowhere gave a clear definition of it. It is, therefore, not a precise concept in 
his thought, but one used by him flexibly as an idea, in the Kantian sense, structuring his 
thought when dealing with varieties of ways of analysing complex sociological 
relationships of ideas to rational socio-economic interests and actions. Weber worked 
within a Kantian system of pure reason and the unity of apperceptions, where ‘affinity’ is 
held to be the objective ground of all associations of appearance, noumenal and 
phenomenal. In Kant the doctrine of ‘affinity’ is meant to explain how the act of synthesis 
between these two levels of perception is possible; and, furthermore, to explain why 
empirical objects (i.e. “appearances”) satisfy the conditions of human sensibility and 
understanding. Kant proposed the answer that because all appearances are representations, 
it is therefore a’priori true that all appearances must satisfy the conditions of sensibility 
and understanding. It must be so because they have a transcendental affinity.  
 
“Elective affinity” in Weber’s thought, Howe states, “…stands out as a source through 
which the order of Weber’s discourse becomes just visible within his own work, as the 
latent structure of his thought…” (Howe 1978: Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology 
Within the Bounds of Pure Reason).31 How he used the notion in practice is most notably 
shown in his linkage of German Protestant Christianity and rational economic social 
action in an industrialised economy. Weber argued that the rationalisation by people of 
their economic activity can only be fully realised when notions about prices or wages are 
put aside. In their place he posits that there stands a positive moral sanction for individual 
economic acquisitive behaviour that aims to maximise the self interest of the actor. Such a 
                                                      
30 Coser Lewis, A 1977: Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context. 
2nd edition 2003. Waveland Press Inc. 
31 Howe, Richard H 1978: Max Weber’s Elective Affinities: Sociology Within the Bounds of Pure 
Reason). American Journal of Sociology. Vol 84. No2 (Sept 1978) pp.366-385. 
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moral sanction was to be found, he argued, in the Protestant ethic that fostered a spirit of 
rigorous self-discipline in the conduct of life and relations. Protestant Calvinism promoted 
a sense of personal responsibility and a work ethic that encouraged believers to apply 
themselves rationally and methodically to the roles and tasks they were asked to perform 
in the capitalist, industrialised, occupational world. Weber called upon the notion of 
elective affinity to clarify how religious belief affected the development of the material 
culture, as much as was possible. The notion is “elective” because the identification and 
linkage is a matter of choice, not causal, based upon a wider understanding of the social 
background. It is not a causal determination as in Marxist thought (Weber 1905: Die 
Protestantische Ethik und der ‘Geist’ des Kapitalismus. 1958: The Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons). 
 
The point being, as Howe argues: “….Within the chaos that the social scientist confronts 
there is an order; this order exists not only for himself but also for the actors in history 
and largely affects history’s course. The logic of history would be the logic of the elective 
affinities…” (Howe ibid p368). 
 
An affinity of hermeneutics and social documentary photography. 
Howe, by placing the notion as ‘latent’ in Weber’s thought may well be right. In my view 
it suggests too passive and even negative a view. I see the notion as one of a positive 
means of mediation between two apparently separate states of affairs. It is a conceptual 
tool. Seen as such it becomes easier to understand how the notion can be used to mediate 
between Ricoeur’s hermeneutics and the documentary photography, where we could place 
the hermeneutics as a form of ideology and the photography as a form of practice and 
pragmatic utility. I shall come back to this below where I discuss selected examples of 
documentary photography taken from the canon. 
Seeking meaningful order in the complications of existential life, in the praxis of 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic thought, concepts and practical reasoning, and in the praxis of 
social documentary photography, there is a deliberate effort to unify the internal, 
subjective view with the external objective viewpoint. We can hope to achieve in their 
inter-actions a dialectic between the two finite perspectives of an hermeneutic 
understanding and a photographic representation. In their dialogue, that Weber allows us 
to see as one of an elective affinity, there lies deep within it the recognition that Ricoeur 
clearly saw, of the finite but boundless nature of a hermeneutics of the text and action 
grounded in language, that is mirrored in the similar finite but boundless nature of 
documentary photographing and visual representations of life, and the tension to be found 
there of the essential incompleteness of both. 
 
I find it natural to think of life and the world in this way: as a constant dialectical process 
of interpretation and re-interpretation of a world that is finite in its themes, but boundless 
in its variations. A tension that brings clarity along with perplexity, co-operation along 
 90 
with conflict, harmony along with schism in their solutions. Their recognition amounts to 
an imaginative conception of the world, our attitudes, values and behaviours towards it, 
towards others, and to close the circle, finally to ourselves. 
 
The Documentary Case Studies: a summary. 
Both of the conceptions of the philosophical hermeneutic and the photographic 
anthropologies of subjective agency and the Weberian affinity I perceive between them, 
are represented in the logic of the two thesis Case Studies. Both have an objective view in 
mind, to visualise an external object, and both subscribe to the view that there can be no 
object without a subject. Who else is there? I have photographed, written and published 
the two Case Studies to accompany this thesis as examples of what I consider to be a 
natural continuum and developing dialectic of social documentary praxis: from studio still 
life to observational fieldwork. Both combine similar photographic and research skills, 
practical descriptive and aesthetic judgements, but in different proportions and degrees, 
adjusted to suit their purpose. They are discussed more fully in Chapter 4.  
 
To summarise: Case Study 1: “Regeneration Waterside South” is an ethnographic study 
for an Arts Council West Midlands Community Arts Project: Space, Place & Identity 1, 
whose purpose was to document and describe a community of people living through a 
period of rapid social changes in their lives, homes, and communal identity. The study 
was conducted through a 6 month period of extended participant observation and with the 
full co-operation of the people concerned. The community studied was suffering social 
and economic change and their historical identity eclipsed because of the ideology of a 
Government policy labelled “Pathfinder” that was being imposed upon them. The policy 
was directed towards the laudable aim of stimulating the rapid economic regeneration of 
their district of Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire in the years 2005-2011.  
Things soon began to go wrong. The residents objected, the policy administered through 
an agency, RENEW North Staffordshire, has resulted in many C19th and C20th houses, 
shops, clubs and amenities being demolished and their owners and inhabitants resettled 
elsewhere, to make way for new, modern housing intended for a different, young and 
professional, social demographic. But few new houses have been built to replace them. 
The webs of diverse familial, work and social connections that had bound the people 
together into the fabric of an identifiable and shared historical community for over 100 
years was being shredded in the process at the time of the photography in autumn 2007. 
The photography was exhibited in the district Community Centre, and a local church, in 
2008 with the help of the residents and was well received by them (Brown, R.G 2008 
(c));32 and later published (Brown, R.G 2008 (d)).33 
 
                                                      
32 Brown, R.G 2008 (c): 'Waterside South'. The Arts Council West Midlands / RENEW North 
Staffordshire / BArts / 'Place, Space & Identity 1' Community Arts Commission. (EXHIBITION). 
33 Brown, R.G 2008 (d): 'Waterside South'  in Lock. E and Henner. M (eds) 2008: 'The Art of Beauty 
and the Earth'  Newcastle-u-Lyme. BArts Publishing.  
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Case Study 2: “Imperium: 1326 and the death of a tyrant?” is a studio still life and 
lighting study that documents a unique archaeological skeleton of a medieval adult male, 
radio-carbon dated to the early quarter of the C14th. The study takes the use of 
documentary from current concerns in forensic science deep into medieval history. The 
skeleton was dismembered and the evidence suggests the individual suffered a Royal State 
execution by being drawn, hung and quartered. The skeleton osteology carries evidence of 
numerous and crude bone cutting, bone sectioning and soft tissue severing incisions that 
have been interpreted as the marks left by the severe peri-mortem trauma suffered from 
blows struck by axes, swords and daggers. Evidence that forensic science, archaeology 
and anthropology can interpret. We can see here again an interplay between a State 
ideology and the reasoned practice of juridical authority, where non-conformity to the law 
by a person is punishable by death. 
The photographs give a detailed macroscopic description of the skeletal osteology and are 
available as hard copy prints and a teaching and learning inter-active DVD. The DVD 
enables students to identify and diagnose the varieties of trauma and their possible causes, 
whether made by dagger, axe or sword, without the need to handle the delicate and friable 
original bones. The work was photographed at the Department of Archaeology, Reading 
University in July 2008 and exhibited alongside the original skeleton in 2012 at the new 
Science Centre, Staffordshire University (Brown R.G: 2012 (a)).34 
 
The Case Studies are published in the form of a hard back book of each, with the 
photography and a written text that provides a social and historical context for them. A 
PDF file of each is included in the Appendices (Brown R.G 2012 (b);35 Brown R.G 2012 
(c) 36). Both Case Studies have been conferenced (please see Bibliography) and published 
within an article that draws from this thesis in a new textbook of methods for visual social 
scientists (Brown R.G 2011(a): 'Photography as process, documentary photographing as 
discourse').37 A copy is included in the Appendices. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
34 Brown, R.G 2012(a): 'Hanged, Drawn, Quartered: CSI 1326 a.d'. The Science Centre. 
Staffordshire University, UK. (EXHIBITION). 
35 Brown, R.G 2012(b): Regeneration: Waterside South. Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-publishing. 
Blurb Inc. on-line <www.blurb.co.uk>. 
36 Brown, R.G 2012(c): Imperium. 1326 and a Tyrant’s Death? Hulton Abbey and an 
Archaeological Mystery.. Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-publishing. Blurb Inc. on-line 
<www.blurb.co.uk>.  
37 Brown, R.G 2011 (a): 'Photography as process, documentary photographing as discourse' in 
Spencer. S 2011: 'Visual Research Methods in the Social Sciences, Awakening Visions' London and 
New York. Routledge.  
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Variations: 
The Concerned Photographer: humanist documentary 
photography. 
 
“…At our best and most fortunate we make pictures because of what stands in 
front of the camera, to honor what is greater and more interesting than we are…”(Robert 
Adams)38 
 
Social documentary photography is, as I mentioned earlier, to my mind one of the great 
gifts of photography. It never ceases to astonish with the power it has to examine life, both 
inner and outer, and to express visually the full gamut of human reasoning and emotions. 
The photography has, for example, the power to amuse (Elliot Erwitt 1998: DogsDogs39; 
Cartier-Bresson 1955: The Europeans40); to delight and surprise (Doisneau 1990: Les 
Auvergnats41; Kubota 2004: Japan42); to inform and move (Strand 1962: Tir a’Mhurain43; 
Ravilious 2007: An English Eye44; Gaumy 2002: Men at Sea45); to surprise and horrify 
(Meiselas 2005: Pandora’s Box46; Rodger 1999: Humanity and Inhumanity47); to bring a 
thoughtful contemplation and dialogue with history (Puranen 1999: Imaginary 
Homecoming48; Harper 2001: Changing Works49); Brown 2012(c): Imperium50 (my Case 
Study 2); to closely observe external political events in the world that are affecting others 
for good or ill, and subjecting them to a critical examination (Abbas 1994: Alla O Akbar51; 
Hetherington 2010: Infidels52; Salgado 2000: Migrations53; Eugene-Smith 1975: 
Minamata54; Brown 2012(b): Regeneration Waterside South55 (my Case Study 1); a 
photography that time and again finds cause to celebrate not only people and their culture 
(Hook 2010: The Africa Project 56); but their land, and to take us, on the one hand, on a 
                                                      
38 Adams, R 2004: Why People Photograph: selected essays and reviews. New York. Aperture. 
39 Erwitt, Elliot 1998: DogsDogs. New York. W.W.Norton & Co. 
40 Cartier-Bresson, Henri 1955: The Europeans. New York. Simon & Schuster. 
41 Doisneau, Robert 1990: Les Auvergnats. Paris. Nathan Images.  
42 Kubota, Hiroji 2004: Japan. New York. W.W.Norton & Co.  
43 Strand, P & Davidson, B 1962: Tir a'Mhurain. Photographs by Paul Strand & Text by Basil 
Davidson. London. MacGibbon & Kee. 
44 Ravilious, J 2007: An English Eye: The Photographs of James Ravilious. 2nd edition. Alan 
Bennett, Peter Hamilton & James Ravilious. Oxford. The Bardwell Press. 
45 Gaumy, Jean 2002: Men at Sea. New York. Harry N. Abrams. 
46 Meiselas, S 2005: Pandora’s Box. New York. 
47 Rodger, George 1999: Humanity and Inhumanity: Photographic Journey of George Rodger. B. 
Bernard & P. Marlow (eds). Introduction by Henri Cartier-Bresson. London. Phaidon Press. 
48 Puranen, Jorma 1999: Imaginary Homecomings. Pohjoinen. Oulu. Finland. 
49 Harper, D 2001: Changing Works: Visions of a Lost Agriculture. Chicago & London. Chicago 
University Press. 
50 Brown, R.G 2012(c): Imperium. 1326 and a Tyrant’s Death? Hulton Abbey and an 
Archaeological Mystery.. Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-publishing. Blurb Inc. on-line 
<www.blurb.co.uk>.  
51 Abbas 1994: Allah O Akbar: A Journey Through Militant Islam. London. Phaidon Press. 
52 Hetherington, Tim 2010: Infidel. London. Chris Boot Publishing. 
53 Salgado, Sebastio 2000: Migrations: humanity in transition. New York. Aperture. 
54 Smith, W. Eugene & Smith, Aileen. M 1975: Minamata. London. Chatto & Windus. 
55 Brown, R.G 2012(b): Regeneration: Waterside South. Newcastle-u-Lyme. rgbphoto-publishing. 
Blurb Inc. on-line <www.blurb.co.uk>. 
56 Hook, Harry 2010: The Africa Project. Albert Studios Gallery, London. 
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journey into one man’s inner landscape (Joshua-Cooper 1988: Dreaming the Gokstad57); 
and on the other on a journey through one woman’s experience of her natural landscape 
(Chafee 1994: Natural Connections58); to take a tiny sample. To return for a moment to 
Midgley’s metaphor of, “…a great stretch of mental countryside full of different kinds of 
vegetation, life forms that keep developing to suit what is going on around them…” 
(Midgley 2014: ibid).  
The tree of social documentary has grown over the years, from a C19th concern to 
visualise the often desperate living conditions and poverty of the poor compelled to live in 
the burgeoning industrialised cities of London and the north of England, so eloquently 
written about by de Tocqueville, Disraeli, Dickens, and Engels (Newsome 1997: The 
Victorian World Picture).59 It has since developed many branches and dropped many 
seeds into a fertile background soil, and is now a veritable forest that continues to spread 
and evolve new ‘clumps of vegetation’. So what I am writing here is not a history but a 
map of a sub-culture of photography. Excellent and extensive histories of photography 
have been written elsewhere, amongst the most accomplished being that by Marien 
(Marien 2006: Photography: A Cultural History).60 
 
Humanist documentary is a category of photography that developed rapidly in the 1930s 
and the 1940, and had evolved into a maturity by the middle years of the twentieth 
century, a condition marked by the influential 1955 exhibition of photography 'The 
Family of Man' organised by Edward Steichen at the Museum of Modern Art, New York 
(Steichen 1955: The Family of Man). 61 It is a photography that is often called one of 
"concern", so named after the exhibition 'The Concerned Photographer ' of 1967, 
organised by Robert Capa, (co-founder in 1947 of the Magnum photo-agency) also held in 
New York. The phrase was used by Capa to describe the work of himself and his fellow 
founders of the Magnum co-operative photo-agency in 1948 and of those who joined in 
subsequent years (Miller 1997).62 (Capa 1972: The Concerned Photographer 2).63  
                                                      
57 Cooper, Thomas Joshua 1988: Dreaming the Gokstadt. With Graeme Murray and Catriona Grant  
(eds).Edinburgh. Graeme Murray. 
58 Chafee, Paula 1994: Natural Connections: Photographs by Paula Chafee. Essay by Estelle 
Jussim. Revere. Pennsylvania. Lodima Press. 
59 Newsome, David 1997: The Victorian World Picture: Perceptions and Introspections in an Age of 
Change. London. John Murray. 
60 Marien, Mary Warner 2006: Photography: a Cultural History. 2nd Edition. London. Laurence  
King Publishing. 
61 Steichen, E 1955: The Family of Man. New York. Jan 24th-May 8th 1955 at The Museum of  
Modern Art. The exhibition is on permanent public display in Clervaux, National Audio-Visual 
Centre, Luxembourg, and is the most seen exhibition of documentary photographs of all time. 
62 (Miller, R 1997: Magnum: Fifty Years at the Frontline of History. London. Secker & 
Warburg).The exhibition featured the work of Capa, Werner Bischof, David 'Chim' Seymour, 
Leonard Freed, Andre Kertesz and Dan Weiner. The effect was profound and Miller records that 
'concerned' citizens groups sprang up in New York barely a month after the exhibition. A year 
earlier in 1966 Capa was instrumental in establishing The International Fund for Concerned 
Photography in New York. In 1974 this became the International Centre for Concerned 
Photography. Capa said the aim was to 'encourage and assist photographers of all ages and 
nationalities who are vitally concerned with their world and times'. It has since then offered over 
500 exhibitions to more that 3,000 photographers along with teaching classes and seminars. The 
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The choice of name and the moral connotations it carries is deliberate. Following on from 
WWII this was the period of the Cold War that carried with it the threat of nuclear 
catastrophe, of humanity apparently relentlessly divided against itself by ideological, 
political and cultural differences. The exhibition and the ethos of the members of Magnum 
lay in emphasising what we have in common over and above parochial differences, and 
that being our universal common humanity. The ethos carries echoes of the moral 
philosophy of Levinas, when he writes that a person has to respond to one's own right to 
be in a responsibility for the Other, “…a fraternity and responsibility for my neighbour, 
whose face summons me and calls 'me' into question…" (Levinas 1994: Ethics as First 
Philosophy. pp82-84).64  
 
The photographer is involved and yet stands at a distance from his subjects, the people 
and their lives being photographed. He or she must because morally they are trying to give 
honour and dignity to them in truth. Ethics is integral to humanist photographing in 
another, Aristotelian sense: that of the responsibility of being, given to us as "…the active 
exercise of the soul's faculties (i.e. rational activity), in conformity with virtue or moral 
excellence…", that is found in Aristotle's ethics of character and virtue, eudaimonia, 
meaning 'flourishing' or 'well being' (Aristotle: Eudemian Ethics; Nicomachean Ethics).65 
At its' best, the photography is marked with a guiding concern of care and compassion for 
the people being photographed and a desire to ensure them their human dignity, no matter 
what their actual circumstances. There are many examples but the work of Paul Strand 
(Strand 1962: Tir a’Mhurain 66 &  ibid) and W.Eugene Smith (W.Eugene Smith 1975),67 
more recently in the work of Sebastio Salgado (Salgado 1997: Workers: An Archaeology 
of the Industrial Age) 68  of Olivia Arthur (Arthur 2012: Jeddah Diary),69  and the late Tim 
Hetherington (Hetherington 2010: Infidels) 70, both of the Magnum Co-operative Photo 
Agency, are exemplary. Indeed the work of the Farm Security Administration in the USA 
during the 1930’s, and that of the membership of Magnum since the 1940’s have been the 
tap root of the tree of a humane social documentary praxis. But their influence reaches far 
beyond their confines and pops up everywhere. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
exhibition transferred to London in 1969 for the opening of the then new Photographer's Gallery', 
the first in the UK to be dedicated to showing photography.  
63 Capa. C 1972: The Concerned Photographer 2. London. Thames and Hudson.  
64 Levinas, E 1994: The Levinas Reader: Ethics as first philosophy. Edited by Sean Hand. Oxford. 
Blackwell Publishers. 
65 Aristotle (1976) The Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. J. A. K. Thomson, London: Penguin.  
66 Strand, P & Davidson, B 1962: Tir a'Mhurain. London. MacGibbon & Kee. 
67 Smith, W. Eugene & Smith, Aileen. M 1975: Minamata. London. Chatto & Windus. 
68 Salgado, Sebastio 1997: Workers, an Archaeology of the Industrial Age. Oxford. Phaidon. 
69 Arthur, Olivia 2012: Jeddah Diary. London. Fishbar Publishing. 
70 Hetherington, Tim 2010: Infidel. London. Chris Boot Publishing. 
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The moral concern of the Victorians for social reform can be seen in the work by Thomas 
Annan in Glasgow (Annan 1877: The Old Closes and Streets of Glasgow)71 and of John 
Thompson in London (Thompson 1876: Street Life in London);72 and in the early years of 
the C20th in work typified in the USA by Lewis Hine and concern with problems around 
immigration and child labour in factories, and through the 1930s by the Roosevelt 
Government agency, The Farm Security Administration, concerned with the economic 
plight of agriculture and farmers in the Great Plains regions of central America who were 
suffering drought, crop failures, and consequently poverty (Marien 2006: Photography: A 
Cultural History).73  
 
Within the Victorian amateur photography world, the impulse is rooted in a different 
place: in the sheer joy, exuberance and pleasure Fox Talbot found in photographing things 
around that mattered. The pleasure in being able to make good pictures of the things that 
people valued in everyday life: their families, friends and other people, places, things, 
events. A simple pleasure given a powerful impetus by George Eastman and his invention 
of the very affordable Kodak box camera that removed the need to master tricky technical 
issues (Ford & Steinorth 1988: You Press the Button, We Do The Rest).74 and often 
dangerous chemical processes (Jay 1991: Cyanide and Spirits).75 For others with higher 
incomes their pleasure came in mastering a difficult medium and making and sharing 
what they cared about, their histories, travels and memories. Often women found it 
possible to follow the hobby (Taylor 2007: Impressed by Light: British Photographs from 
Paper Negatives 1840-1860),76 (Williams and Bright 2007: How We Are: Photographing 
Britain from the 1840's to the Present).77  
Others such as the MP, Sir Benjamin Stone, had in mind wider social concerns about the 
effects of industrialisation on older traditions and customs, echoing those expressed by 
William Morris and followers of the Arts and Crafts movement apprehensive about the 
loss of traditional hand making skills to industrial mass production processes. In 1897, 
Benjamin organised a national photographic survey of English contemporary life using 
amateur and camera club photographers from across the country, keenly aware of the pace 
of change and the passing of traditional ways of living (Edwards, James & Barnes 2006: A 
Record of England 1897-1910).78  
                                                      
71 Annan, T 1877: Photographs of the old Streets and Closes of Glasgow. Glasgow. 
72 Thompson, John 1876: Street Life in London. With pen portraits by Adolphe Smith. London.  
Sampson Low, Marston Searle & Rivington Publishers. 
73 Marien, Mary Warner 2006: Photography: a Cultural History. 2nd Edition. London. Laurence  
King Publishing. 
74 Ford, C & Steinorth, K (eds) 1988: You Press the Button, We do the Rest: the birth of snapshot 
photography. The National Museum of Film and Photography. Dirk Nishen Publishing. 
75 Jay, Bill 1991: Cyanide and Spirits: an Inside-Out View of Early Photography. Munich. Nazraeli 
Press. 
76 Taylor, Roger 2007: Impressed by Light: British Photographs from Paper Negatives 1840-1860. 
New York, The Metropolitan Museum of Art; New Haven and London, YaleUniversity Press. 
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Present. London. Tate Publishing. 
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It is a timeless feeling this and is surely that same exuberance felt by otherwise sober 
monastic illustrators of medieval manuscripts, such as the C14th Luttrell Psalter, moved to 
decorate the margins of their pages with comical illustrations of scenes of everyday life. 
Today it is estimated that some 380 billion photographs are being made annually, and 
people are in the same vein glad to fill photography social websites such as Flickr , 
Facebook, YouTube et al with their photographs that are meaningful to them and for 
others to see. 
 
A short history. 
I am making no attempt here to give a detailed history of documentary photography. 
There are a number of fine histories already in existence (for example: Marien 2006: ibid). 
I am sketching in some of the basic contours of what seem to me some of the most 
significant events informing contemporary understandings of documentary practice from 
within that history. 
Within professional photography the tradition of outward looking concern and interest 
with others came to maturity in the 1950's, across a broad front ranging from journalism 
to the evolving social sciences of visual anthropology and visual sociology. In the social 
sciences interest developed along different paths, with British social anthropology more 
involved in film (Henley 2010: The Adventure of the Real).79 whilst American visual 
sociology developed a deeper involvement in stills photography, (Harper 1998: An 
Argument for Visual Sociology).80 An interest stimulated by the work of John Collier at 
one time attached to the Farm Security Administration and now a practising sociologist, 
who with his son published in the late 1960s one of the first ‘guides’ to using photography 
as a research method, later revised in the 1980s (Collier & Collier 1986: Visual 
Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method).81 
 
The use of photography was seen as enriching the social sciences. Chaplin, for example, 
writes of this interest: “…when experienced social scientists who are also skilled 
photographers aim to produce images which have both documentary reach and aesthetic 
quality, these can - in combination with verbal text - generate a type of social science 
understanding which is very rich…” (Chaplin 1994: Sociology and Visual Representation. 
p222).82 The International Visual Sociology Association was established in 1981 to 
encourage academic interest and ran the journal International Journal of Visual Sociology 
until 1986 to promote the research and publication of peer reviewed articles, when under 
the new editorship of Douglas Harper, the journal was re-titled Visual Sociology. It is now 
published as Visual Studies and continues to drive forward developments in the use of 
                                                      
79 Henley, P 2010: The Adventure of the Real: Jean Rouch and the Craft of Ethnographic Cinema. 
Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
80 Harper, D 1998: An Argument for Visual Sociology. In Jon Prosser (ed) 1998: Image-Based 
Research. London. Falmer Press. 
81 Collier, J Jnr & Collier, M 1986: Visual Anthropology: Photography as a Research Method (rev.  
ed). Albuquerque. University of New Mexico Press. 
82 Chaplin, E 1994: Sociology and Visual Representation. London. Routledge. 
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photography across all social sciences (Knowles and Sweetman 2004: Picturing the Social 
Landscape.).83 Themes and variations of ideas, approaches and methods recently re-
examined and developed in an excellent handbook by Spencer 2011: (Spencer, S: 2011: 
Visual Research Methods in the Social Sciences:Awakening Visions).84  
 
The modern genesis of a humanist documentary in journalism lies in Germany from about 
1928, with the publication of popular news magazines copiously illustrated with 
photographs 'from life', such as Berliner Illustrirte Zeitung and Munchen Illustrierte 
Presse. (This is not to forget the work of Hine in America on Italian immigrant 
communities in New York and child labour there and elsewhere in the USA that he made 
from the turn of the century until the 1930’s).  
Within industry and the arts over the same period of post-WW1 political and economic 
turmoil there arose in Germany the movement known as ‘Neue Sachlichkeit’, or 'New 
Objectivity'. Essentially this was a pragmatic way of thinking focused on business and 
commerce whose central dogma was rationality and logic. Adherents of the movement 
argued for a practical engagement with the world through rational institutions of industry 
and government. It manifested itself also in the arts in, for example, the Bauhaus 
movement founded in Weimar in 1919, with the goal of a new understanding for art’s 
purpose and relationship to society. This was to be formed by uniting art with functional 
industrial design, the machine, technology and rational organisation if they aspired to 
precision. Similar ways of thinking flowed into the humanities as a vision of empirical 
'hard facts' that emerged within photography as a phenomenology free of a philosophical 
objectivity and a rejection of the romantic idealism to be seen in Edwardian Pictorialist 
'Art' photography. In Germany the new modernist thinking manifested itself not only in 
the teachings and work of the Bauhaus but, notably, in the music of Hindemith, the theatre 
of Brecht and in the photography of Renger-Patzsch (1928: Die Welt ist Schon-The World 
is Beautiful)85 and August Sander (1929: Antlitz der Zeit-Face of our Time).86  
 
In America a similar emphasis on rational thinking and a rejection of romantic symbolism 
and idealism emerged in the later 1920's and 1930's with a photography of aesthetic 
Formalism and rejection of the late C19th manipulations and symbolism of Pictorial art 
photography. Most influentially amongst a small group of photographers in the California 
West Coast who formed themselves into a collective they called f64, with members that 
included Weston, Adams and Cunningham. The group used large format cameras (10”x8” 
or larger negative size), and small lens apertures to maximise the depth of field, to 
photograph landscape and natural forms, with an aesthetic ethos of being as objective as 
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possible by defining their photography as "straight", that is true to the medium and 
scrupulous in its technical control of exposure, film and print development (Heyman 
1992: Seeing Straight: The f64 Revolution in Photography).87 As indeed Emerson had in 
England during the 1880’s working in Norfolk and the Fens. This was as close to a pure 
phenomenology as could be imagined. The camera-as-consciousness of something 
divested of preconceptions and evaluative associations. "…The camera…" said Edward 
Weston, "…should be used for a recording of life, for rendering the very substance and 
quintessence of the thing itself…to create aesthetic order out of chaos…the photograph 
should celebrate rather than disguise the medium's unrivalled capacity to present the 
world 'as it is'…" (Weston 1973: The Day Books of Edward Weston vols 1&2).88  
 
Both the new German and the American emphasis on an objective, phenomenological 
photography became hugely influential and their ideas and practices continue to 
reverberate today. In Germany especially, it has influenced the art photography of 
architectural 'typologies' of the Becher's, and the work of their pupils, Gursky, Ruff, 
Struth, and their many imitators (for example: Hentschel 2008: Andreas Gursky: Works 
80-08).89 In France we see the influence in the work of Doisneau and Ronis (for example: 
Hamilton 1995: Robert Doisneau: A Photographer’s Life).90  and in England in the work 
of Hurn, Ray-Jones, Ravilious and many others (for example: Hurn 1979: David Hurn).91 
 
In America the influence has been seminal. It can be seen in the work of their 
contemporaries, Evans and Strand, in the work of Penn (Penn 2009: Small Trades), 92 and 
Avedon (Avedon 1964: Nothing Personal),93 and in the documentary work of many of the 
following generations such as that of Rappaport (Rappaport 2005: Messages from a small 
town: Photographs inside Pawlet, Vermont).94 It informs the approach to documentary 
landscape in the work of the 'New Topographic' landscape photographers, who emerged in 
the 1970’s, taking their name from the 1975 exhibition The New Topographics that 
showed new work by Baltz, Shore, Robert Adams, and others (William Jenkins 1975: The 
New Topographics: Photographs of man-altered landscape).95 These photographers took 
their cue from Pop Art. The emphasis shifted from landscape work as a celebration of 
Nature and of natural forms as with Ansel Adams and Weston, to a celebration of finding 
beauty in the banal, the ordinary and everyday and the man-made, sentiments that we also 
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find echoed in the documentary photography of Shore, for example (Shore 2004: 
Uncommon Places: The Complete Collection).96 
 
A window on the world. 
The rational and formalist ideas of the possibility of an objectivity in looking, and a truth 
to medium of photography in making photographs, came to deeply influence the 
understanding and making of humanist documentary in the years immediately preceding 
and especially following WWII. Many of German magazine editors and photographers, 
such as Lorant, Hutton, Gidal and Mann, came to England and to the USA, fleeing from 
Hitler and the National Socialist Nazi Government that came to power in 1933 in 
Germany. There they brought their expertise and ideas to the creation and content of  
news and feature magazines illustrated with photography such as 'Life' (1935) in the USA, 
and 'Picture Post' (1938) in England. The content of the magazines was marked by high 
quality photography and high quality written journalism that was felt to open a window 
onto the world and brought to ordinary people news and understanding of events in the 
world not otherwise easily obtained.97 For a time documentary photography and news 
magazine photo-journalism seemed to be the future. In their pages humanist 
photojournalism rapidly passed through a phase of ‘adolescence’, with photographers 
learning on the job their trade of how to be a photographer-journalist and storyteller in 
pictures. 
 
In the USA 'Life' magazine was produced with big budgets and high production values on 
glossy paper for a massive circulation numbered in millions across America. Over time it 
gained enormous prestige as a self proclaimed "window on the world" with an editorial 
agenda for social and political change some called 'crusading'. 'Picture Post', by contrast 
was British, a magazine produced on a small budget and after WWII printed on poor 
quality paper stock. Nonetheless, as Robertson affirms, within its much smaller UK 
circulation it too gained enormous prestige. Their photographers underwent a tough and 
demanding apprenticeship, learning by doing and honing their craft of making strongly 
narrative photo-essays on a diverse range of social and political topics of the time under 
encouraging and sometimes ruthless editorial control. A distinction grew between 'news' 
photography of the daily newspapers and 'photojournalism ('reportage' in France) of the 
weekly magazines. News was immediate, of the day. Photojournalism on the other hand, 
was more considered, produced over an extended period of time. The emphasis was on 
narrative, and with telling a story (Loengard 1998: Life Photographers: What They Saw 98. 
Robertson 1989 ibid). 
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Within the social sciences, the development towards a mature form of documentary 
photography during the 1930’s and 1940’s was paralleled in England within the 
anthropology inspired work of the Mass Observation Unit. This was a research group led 
by the Malinowski trained anthropologist, Tom Harrison, set up in 1937 in the aftermath 
of the abdication of Edward VII, with the aim of studying working class life in England 
(Hubble 2006: Mass Observation and Everyday Life.99 Madge & Jennings 1937: May the 
Twelfth…100 Spender 1982: Worktown People.101)  
 
In America the development in journalism flowed through not only the news magazines 
such as ‘Life’ and its imitators but also as a result of Government policy and the 
sociologically directed political work of the Roosevelt Government "New Deal" Farm 
Security Agency, and photographers such as Lange, Evans, Lee, Walcott & Mydans. 
Working under the tutelage of the agency’s Director, Roy Stryker, the agency 
photographers were given lessons in sociology, and charged with documenting in a 
sociological manner the effects that agricultural economic depression was having on 
people and their communities in the mid-West farming states, and the success, or 
otherwise, of Government measures to combat rural poverty there  (Brown, R.G 2005(a): 
Michael Lesy, a Photographic Portrait of America 1935-43).102 (See below). Following 
WWII, and boosted by the formation of the Magnum co-operative photo-agency owned 
by its members in 1947 and their enthusiasms, the tradition reached a level of mature 
confidence and expression in the 1950's and '60's. A confidence that was marked in 1955 
by the Family of Man (Steichen 1955 ibid) and in 1967 by The Concerned Photographer 
exhibitions at the Museum of Modern Art, New York (Capa 1967/1972 ibid). A maturity 
of expression that continued to influence professional journalism, popular amateur idioms, 
and the social science disciplines of anthropology and sociology through the same period, 
and continues to reverberate today although savagely criticised by theorists in the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
 
Framing and the Decisive Moment. 
New technologies in turn brought new picture making possibilities. The lightweight 
German Leica camera and its imitators from the 1920s, and later the Japanese 35mm 
single lens reflex cameras inaugurated by the introduction of the Nikon 'F' in 1959, 
became the cameras of choice for photojournalists and offered new freedoms in the 
making of pictures. Both systems offered accurate viewfinders which enabled the 
photographer to carefully frame and compose and expose their picture in camera, 
expressed by Cartier-Bresson as "The Decisive Moment", safe in the knowledge that what 
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could be seen in the viewfinder would record on the film. "…To me photography is the 
simultaneous recognition in a fraction of a second, of the significance of an event as well 
as of a precise organisation of forms which gave that event its proper expression..," wrote 
Cartier-Bresson (Cartier-Bresson 1952: The Decisive Moment).103 Later in conversation he 
expanded on his thought.104 "…Photography…" he said, "…is not like painting. There is a 
creative fraction of a second when you are taking a picture. Your eye must see a 
composition or an expression, that life itself offers you, and you must know with intuition 
when to click the camera. That is the moment the photographer is creative…" (Cartier-
Bresson 1957: The Washington Post) 
 
Thus there arose amongst documentarians a fetish for the picture frame and for carefully 
composing the photograph in the camera within that frame (rather than later in the 
darkroom whilst printing the negative); and for publishing the full frame image in the 
magazines with a black line border, uncropped by a page layout designer. The thinking 
was that only then would the full intentions of the photographer be visible. This was 
important, not a mere whimsy. In the first place it was an attempt to secure the integrity of 
the image, and the integrity of the photographer making it. They worked with a 
philosophy of truth to their subjects, and truth to their materials. The picture frame 
effectively constructs reality for the viewer. The frame works symbolically to structure the 
social world depicted in ways that are meaningful to both the photographer and the 
viewer. Framing principles are socially shared, even if not always consciously recognised 
by the viewer. The conscious use of the frame focuses attention on particular forms or 
aspects of events being depicted. In doing so they include some things and cut out from 
view other things and so construct a visualisation of reality. That visualisation is 
meaningful and can persist over time. Its lingering can affect later judgements and 
influence opinions and how individuals interpret events in various ways. The matter is 
raised as an aesthetic consideration by John Szarkowski (Szarkowski 1965/2007: The 
Photographer’s Eye),105  and discussed at length by Michael J. Carter (Carter 2013: The 
Hermeneutics of Frame and Framing).106 
 
The black border served to show that the photograph was not later interfered with or 
cropped, but was authentic and reproduced exactly in accordance with the photographer's 
intentions, thus securing the authority of the photograph. Secondly, always in the back of 
the photographer's mind is the story, and pictures would be made with a sense of that 
narrative of sequenced images. Each picture, ideally, would be carefully considered in 
relation to it-self and in relation to the whole story. True, this is not always possible in the 
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field and with following the speed of passing events. It could well be an editorial decision 
made later in the darkroom selecting from contact sheets which negative to print, and 
afterwards with prints laid out along a wall or along the floor to see the whole and 
establish the best sequence in order to say what needs to be said. Nonetheless the care 
with framing and composition of each picture mattered and was paramount for most 
photographers. 
 
Legacy. 
The tradition of a compassionate documentary photography bearing witness to the world 
continues to flourish and evolve in the popular spheres of journalism and reportage, and in 
the academic world as qualitative visual anthropology and visual sociology (Light 
2000),107 (Lardinois 2009),108 (Banks & Ruby 2011).109 In the case of visual sociology 
especially as a viable research methodology through the work of a small group of 
sociologist-photographers that emerged in the so-called 'second' Chicago School of 
Sociologists who flourished through the teachings of Becker and the work of his pupils 
such as Harper and Suchar and the International Visual Sociology Association. Work 
whose impetus and sociological style was grounded, initially, in the work of a former FSA 
staff photographer, John Collier.110  
Mass circulation magazines such as 'Life' have steadily declined, losing their readership, 
revenues and authority. 'Picture Post' ceased publication as early as 1957 with declining 
sales and revenues. 'Life' ceased publication in 1972, and stumbled along with monthly 
and 'special' issues until 2000. But its power and prestige had gone, and with it went one 
of the most influential forcing houses in which photographers could learn their craft, hone 
their skills in searching for, constructing and telling stories about the human condition in 
the knowledge they also had a ready audience (Loengard 1998 ibid). A new generation of 
photographers began to deliberately use Colour negative film stock, partly to distance the 
new work from the 'old fashioned style of black and white photography', and partly to 
establish a documentary 'style' of their own. The poor colour reproduction was now seen 
as a strength.  
Their place is taken increasingly by on-line websites such as Life Force Magazine 
(<www.lifeforcemagazine.com>). 
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From hermeneutics to social documentary photography. 
My wager in bringing social documentary photography into dialogue with Ricoeur’s 
hermeneutics is that the affinity between them that I find there will help resolve the 
subject : object dilemma, and do so in ways that show us that the discourses of the visual 
and of spoken and especially written language are complementary aspects of our need to 
give meaning and understanding to human life. That the word can bring the visual to life 
with added subtleties of depth and meaning as, conversely, the visual can bring the dry 
word on the page to vivid and recognisable life adding depth and meaning, each can exist 
independently yet each gain added power when taken together, is a familiar, even old 
idea. Yet it has somehow become disjointed, even opposed in recent thinking, particularly 
in certain areas of philosophy where the ‘ocular’ is regarded with suspicion, as Jay has 
laid out (Jay 1993: Downcast Eyes).111 
 
Examples 
In this section I am going to briefly look at some examples of social documentary that I 
admire, and ask how and where the dialogue with Ricoeur’s hermeneutics might be 
applied to them using Weber’s notion of elective affinity. I have no intention of writing in 
great detail about them but simply to sketch their basic contours and to indicate where 
Ricoeur’s hermeneutics can bring a depth of understanding, and where Weber’s notion of 
an elective affinity can serve as a useful tool of mediation between them They are: Paul 
Strand: Tir a’Mhurain. James Ravilious: An English Eye. The Farm Security 
Administration of 1930’s America. Jorma Puranen: Imaginary Homecomings. 
 
A summary of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics of the Text: Key Points. 
First I think it would be useful to recap on some points Ricoeur made about hermeneutics 
and the theory of the text from Chapter 2. 
 1. Hermeneutics: This is defined as the theory of the operations of understanding 
in their  relation to the interpretation of texts. 
 2. The key idea to this is: The realisation of Discourse as a text. 
 3. A written text open language to new and original resources for Discourse. It 
allows for  semantic innovations and multiple meanings to enter and realise it’s 
own-most possibilities for  becoming text 
 4. Writing allows language a semantic autonomy with a 3-fold structure: 
a) The Speakers Intentions  
b) The Cultural & Social Economic circumstances of its 
production. 
c) The Reception of its’ original audience, and of other audiences 
later 
5. The task of hermeneutics is now 2-fold: 
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        i)    To examine the internal dynamic of the structure of the text. 
       ii)    To examine the power of the work to project itself outside of  
  itself. 
6. To create an accessible and intelligible World of it’s own: A World of the 
Text. 
7. The World of the Text is “truly” the thing referred to by the text. 
8. Discourse: This is defined as the act of someone saying something about 
something to someone. 
9. Discourse implies the recognition of another speaker. This raises the problem 
of inter-subjectivity and communication. 
10. Discourse creates a distinction between Sense and Reference. Discourse is 
opened to the World, it says something about the World. 
11. Saying something about the world demonstrates the Intentionality of Saying. 
It is an act of Affirmation. 
12. Discourse involves 3 ‘moments of interpretation in the explanation and 
understanding of the narrative of texts. 
 Figuration - Configuration - Refiguration  
13. Discourse articulates 3 events: 
  A Locutor - a subject of discourse. 
 Illocution - an act of discourse, involving a meta-linguistic code, 
perlocution and extra-linguistic references. 
 An Interlocutor: the ultimate destination of discourse - a reader. 
14. Interpretation is the endless subtle dialectic between explanation and 
understanding along a unique hermeneutic arc. 
15. A hermeneutics of the text extends interpretation to all phenomena and 
inscription having a readable, textual nature. 
16. Hermeneutics transcends disciplinary boundaries. Operating as a general 
theory hermeneutics mediates between disciplines. 
17. The notion of the text is a means-end rationality: 
 Text implies Discourse.  
 Text is language inscribed and rendered permanent, thus becoming 
bound in history. 
 Text goes beyond the inscription of speech. 
18. Text generates new semantic innovations and a semantic micro-universe. 
19. Writing generates a new instrument of thinking. 
20 Writing calls for Reading. 
21. The World of the Text creates a double eclipse of the Author and the Reader. 
22. This eclipse generates Ambiguity:  
 between the author’s intentions. 
 Between different readers reception and understandings. 
23. Written text implies matters of Texture; Voice; Composition; Mood. 
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24. Text provokes a new conception of Cause. Cause is now a matter of Intention 
and Motivation synonymous with the initiative of an agent. 
 
This is a long list. It could be further extended in detail. In summary Ricoeur states that 
hermeneutics is concerned with the interpretation of language and meaning. There can be 
no meaning if any social analysis is not anchored in the subject located in time and 
history. 
 
1. The Farm Security Administration 1935-1944. 
Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected President of the United States in 1933, representing the 
Democratic Party. The country was suffering a severe economic depression that extended 
worldwide. In 1933 25% of the workforce were unemployed; Agricultural prices had 
dropped by 60%; Industrial production was down by 50%; 2 million people were 
homeless, and 48 Federal States had closed their banks. The Roosevelt government 
instituted a programme of projects designed to bring economic relief to people, generate 
economic recovery for the nation, and reform the banks and financial institutions held  
 
Fig 3.2: Dorothea Lange. 
        13 year old farm boy.  
     Alabama 1936 
 
culpable for the country’s economic depression. The programme gained the name The 
New Deal. One programme was called the Resettlement Administration with a subsection 
called the Historical Section of the Information Division. In 1937 the programme was 
renamed the Farm Security Administration, (the FSA). The head of the programme was an 
economist Roy E. Stryker. He inaugurated a photography project on behalf of the 
Government to report and document the conditions of poor farmers in the Great Plains 
region of America, centring on Oklahoma, the Texas panhandle, Kansas, Colorado and 
New Mexico. Here a combination of light soils, high winds, little rainfall resulted in a lack 
of grass to root the soil. In consequence the winds stripped away the fertile top soil, 
earning the region the nickname ‘The Dust Bowl’ and the farmers crops failed. The 
Government needed the support of urban populations to provide the funds for programmes 
of financial and other aid to bring relief to the tenant cotton farmers and migrant farm 
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workers. Stryker initially hired eleven photographers to go to the affected States and 
photograph the people and conditions they were enduring. 
 
Stryker and the FSA have been extensively recorded, discussed and written about, from a 
spectrum of perspectives ranging from the supportive to the brutally critical. I have no 
intention of entering these debates but have published a review article that touches upon 
them (Brown, R.G 2005(a): Long Time Coming).112  
Stryker ensured the photographers were well briefed before going, encouraging them to 
acquire some knowledge of the sociology of the day, providing them with shooting scripts 
of suggested things, topics and themes to photograph, and were well financed. In selecting 
the photographers Stryker is quoted as saying that he sought “…those who possessed an 
insatiable curiousity, the kind that can get to the core of an assignment…who can 
comprehend what a truck driver, or a farmer, or a driller, or a housewife thinks and feels, 
and translate those thoughts and feelings into pictures that can be comprehended by 
anyone…” (Doud 1963-1965: Oral History Interview with Roy Emerson Stryker 1963-
1965).113  
Stott has written eloquently upon the work of the FSA and the role Franklin Roosevelt 
played in the direction it took when formed and the photographers were set to work. 
Roosevelt was endlessly inquisitive for information about the state of America and the 
conditions of the population. It was in part a human concern, in part political caution, and 
in part boastful about being more closely in touch with public opinion than others (Stott 
ibid p94). Stott writes that the documentary approach was characteristic of thirties 
America, and Roosevelt possessed a documentary imagination. He wanted information “in 
human terms”, not in vast academic economic schemas. His ‘economic man’ was a flesh 
and blood individual farmer suffering. He broadcast frequently on the radio and his 
listeners felt that somehow he was talking personally to them, not from a remote 
Government office. His ‘Fireside Chats’were addressed in the concrete, in plain language 
that made things “clear as crystal”. He made the great national issues localised to those of 
a small town. To get his point across Roosevelt would use a story, a personal anecdote, 
inhabited by people that might have been real or might have been imaginary, but felt real 
nonetheless. Stott writes,”To Roosevelt, people appear to have counted more than ideas” 
(p95-97 ibid). 
 
This ethos infected the work of the FSA photographers. Stryker instructed them to use the 
camera as a tool to document society, to give the abstractions of economic stress and 
political policy a human face. Stryker, it is said, taught that “a picture could be beautiful 
and still possess a social conscience”.  
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Fig 3.3: Walker Evans, Bud Field and family 
Tenant cotton sharecroppers. 
Alabama 1936. 
 
When asked how he judged the photographs returned he replied, “…we never evaluated 
them in terms of set values (i.e ‘rules of composition’). We looked at them in terms of 
what did they have to say about this little group of people, this particular village, this 
particular dust area…I think they (i.e. the photographers) were intelligent people reporting 
things they felt and saw, based upon past experience, based upon a good deal of 
investigation. And, above all else, particularly as regards the human side of things, a 
sincere…respect for people…at no time did we have rules or criteria…” (Doud ibid).  
 
The photographers provided those for themselves, especially Walker Evans. The FSA had 
an obviously political agenda, to promote, win and maintain support for the New Deal 
programmes. The photographs were were distributed widely to the media of the time free 
of charge. Photographers are people too with opinions, and although the photography 
overall was well intentioned, Walker Evans, and his collaborator James Agee, anguished 
over the morality of their work nonetheless. They were troubled at “spying” on the 
tenants; Agee wrote “…by what right, and for what purpose, and to what good end, or 
none…” they were witnesses and communicators of the lives of, “…an undefended and 
appallingly damaged group of human beings…” (Agee & Evans 1941: Let Us Now Praise 
Famous Men.114 Quoted in Stott, ibid, p272). He worried too at the right of his audience to 
view Evans photographs and to read his words, “…by what right do you qualify to…” 
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(ibid). Other photographers in the group were perhaps less anguished but alive 
nonetheless to the tangle of political and moral issues that enveloped their work. 
 
The FSA project is interesting on many counts and has been immensely influential in the 
evolution of the thought and practice of social documentary photography. In the terms we 
are considering it here in this thesis there is a clear value in making use of Weber’s 
concept of elective affinity in mediating between the ideology of the Roosevelt New Deal 
programmes, on one side, and the practical interests of people on the other. Not only the 
farmers depicted but also for the photographers, because one agenda of the programme 
was to generate employment, and the photographers found paid employment working for 
the agency. In fact there is a double layer of mediation (at the least) with the attitude of 
Roosevelt himself towards the people affected by the New Deal programmes. Others most 
certainly took a different political view.  
 
Hermeneutics. 
In terms of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic, standing back and seeing things as wholes, first, we 
can clearly see the New Deal programme and the FSA response to it, taken as whole body 
of work, ‘ticks’ all the boxes I have enumerated above.  
 Points 1-5:_The photography as a whole we can regard as a Text, informed 
through the theory and practice of Action, and the theory and practice of History. The 
hermeneutics operates as understanding in relation to their text. The photography is 
realised as Discourse. That discourse opened new and original resources for multiple 
levels of meaning and semantic innovations in the photography. The discourse has a clear 
3-fold structure of Intention, notice of the cultural and economic circumstances of its 
production, and the reception to it of the original audiences. By breaking the whole 
photography programme into parts that equate to each individual photographer, we can 
examine the internal structures of the whole photographic Text, and those of the parts. We 
can clearly examine the power of the work, in parts and whole, to project itself outside of 
itself.  
 Points 6-24: The photographic text creates an intelligible World of the Text. The 
Discourse is an act of  Affirmation that demonstrates the intentionality of saying. The 
discourse involves moments of Figuration : Configuration : Refiguration and those of 
Locutor : Illocution : Interlocutor. Interpretation is open ended, a subtle and endless 
dialectic between Explanation and Understanding. The text transcends disciplinary 
boundaries in which the content is rendered permanent and bound into history. The 
photographic text generates a new instrument of thinking (and often fraught debate!). The 
photographic text generates Ambiguity between authorial intention and reader reception. 
The photography ‘speaks’ with many varieties of texture, mood and voice. Finally the text 
clearly redefines cause with motivation. 
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2. Jorma Puranen: Imaginary Homecoming. 
 
Fig 3.4 Jorma Puranen 
Imaginary Homecoming 1999. 
 
Puranen is a Finnish photographer. North Finland gives way to Lapland. In that arctic and sub-arctic 
region live a people called the Sami. Historically they are nomadic reindeer herders who follow 
their herds as the seasons progress. National boundaries are a nuisance to such a population creating 
awkward barriers to their passage. Because of their remoteness and their style of life the Sami have, 
in the recent past, been thought ‘backward’ even ‘primitive’ by people living further south in settled 
rural and urban communities. The Sami have a close physical and spiritual allegiance to their lands. 
Puranen set out to photograph them and find a way in which to represent their material and spiritual 
culture. 
 
In 1884 a French ethnographic expedition, under Prince Roland Bonaparte, went to 
Lapland and took with them a photographer, G. Roche. Roche photographed the Sami 
producing many portraits using the glass plates and the wet collodion process of the time. 
In total he produced some 250 portraits and 400 negatives. They are collected and stored 
at the Musee de L’Homme, Paris. Copious notes were kept that included the names of the 
people in the pictures. Puranen first saw the photographs in 1988 visiting a friend in 
Finnish Lapland, who told him about the French archive. “It was obvious to me that these 
exceptionally beautiful pictures were taken by a skilled portraitist” sates Puranen. He felt 
he wanted to make something of them. He has done so in a unique way by reproducing the 
original images, developing them on graphic film, and mounting onto clear acrylic boards. 
The resulting project he called Imaginary Homecoming because the present in the 
geographic location of the fells in the province of Finnmarken in Norway,  was juxtaposed 
with the year 1884 and a museum in Paris. 
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The project, Puranen writes, is an attempt to create a dialogue between the past and the 
present, between two historical moments and two landscapes, and between two different 
cultures. Thus the project is also about spatial and temporal distance, and about 
ethnographic identity. 
To mediate the historical and geographic distance Puranen attempted to metaphorically 
return the original photograph back to the place of their original making. This he did so by 
reprinting them as described. Working in the years between 1991 and 1997 Puranen took 
the mounted reprints back into their original landscape and inserted them into the snowy 
ground. The physical landscape became for him also a mental landscape. Many of the 
pictures have been reconstructed in the northern heights of Ruija, a barren region of the 
province of Finnmarken. For centuries the fells have been the migration routes of the 
reindeer herding Sami. Whilst it proved not possible to revisit all the original sites those 
he did provided him with a symbol of homecoming. The fells chosen ranged through 
northern Sweden and northern Norway. 
 
Puranen writes that for him there is no absolute landscape but a site onto which we project 
different ideas, fantasies and perspectives. Thus he likens the landscape to a theatre and a 
stage, creating in the process an division between the outer stage and inner stage of the 
viewer’s mind and perceptions. Imaginary Homecoming suggest, he says, a counter-
memory: an alternative way of looking at the landscape  and pondering upon things past 
and those present. 
 
Fig 3.5 Jorma Puranen 
Imaginary Homecoming 1999. 
 
The northern landscape has changed since the original photographs were taken, and the 
project also questions that. The Sami themselves continue but much reduced with only 
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about 2,800 people, some 10% of the total population, still living full time in their 
traditional ways (Puranen 1999: Faces From the Past).115 
 
3. Paul Strand: Tir a’Mhurain 
 
Fig 3.5 Paul Strand Tir a’Mhurain 1954 
 
During the 1950s and 1960s Paul Strand produced a series of books in collaboration with 
accomplished writers on a number of different countries: France, Italy, Egypt and 
Scotland, the Outer Hebrides. The book he made in collaboration with the historian of 
African cultures, Basil Davidson, about the Outer Hebrides, Tir a’Mhurain - the Land of 
Bent Grass,  is in my opinion one of his finest. 
Strand and his wife Helen lived on the Outer Hebridean island of South Uist for three 
months in 1954. 
The first three weeks or so they spent wandering across Uist and its neighbour, Eriksay. 
He felt he wanted to get to know the place and the people much better than he did before 
beginning to make his photographs. “It is through the factual world that we express life” 
Strand said in 1946. The camera he felt gives us access to things as they are, and with a 
trust for the medium and respect for its intrinsic properties, express both things to be said 
about the subject, and express “the artist’s sense of life”. Strand accepted the modernist 
doctrine about ‘straight’ photography. That by its nature photography allows the world to 
show or utter itself directly to the viewer. His is a photography of as pure a 
phenomenology as can be imagined. Strand is quoted as saying that “…I have aesthetic  
means at my disposal, which are necessary to me to be able to say what I want to say 
about the things I see. And the thing I see is outside of myself - always. I’m not trying to 
describe an inner sate of being…” (Trachtenberg 1990: Paul Strand: Essays on his life 
and work).116 
                                                      
115 Puranen, J 1999: Faces from the Past: Imaginary Homecoming. Accessed at 
<www.finlit.fi/booksfromfinland/bff/199/puranen.htm>. 
116 Trachtenberg, A 1990: Introduction. In Stange, M (ed) 1990: Paul Strand: Essays on his Life and  
Work. New York. Aperture. 
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When Davidson asked Strand why he had chosen to go to the Hebrides, he replied that 
partly because of a BBC radio programme which featured 5 women singers from the 
island, and because the programme producer spoke “glowingly of his experience there”. 
But there was another reason and that was because of the remoteness. Here was an ideal 
subject for him of small places with scattered inhabitants who represented a distinct 
historical culture as well as themselves (Davidson 1990: Working with Strand).117 
 
Davidson and Strand discussed at length what the text of the book should do. In 1957 he 
wrote him, “So to sum up, here are a fine people born of a rich culture hundreds of years 
old, tenacious in the face of all hardships, rooted in their island…How can they make this 
island and their lives part of the world as it develops? Can we not ask the question not 
only of their culture but of their very existence, if we establish through their history, and 
their struggles of past and present, the fine basic character of these folk?...” (Davidson 
ibid p216). Given their jointly agreed objectives the great requirement became to see not 
only the most effective prints, but “what these photographs do to each other”. This 
attention to the sequencing of the photographs alongside the text of the book was 
something new to Davidson. Once decided upon the book was put together. However they 
ran into difficulty with the publisher. Strand wanted high quality photo-gravure printing. 
That was difficult to find in Europe at the time, but a publisher was eventually found, 
Kunst Verlag in Dresden and Leipzig, in the then communist state of East Germany. The 
publisher chose to ignore Davidson’s text and use another by an unknown French writer 
much to Srand’s anger. He refused. Davidson’s text was integral to the integrity of the 
completed work. (ibid p217-218). 
 
Davidson writes that underpinning Strand’s work is an insistent but pragmatic humanism. 
The central theme of the book was, Strand suggested, “…the people themselves: their 
dignity and sturdiness and the tenacity with which they hold on to their barren wind swept 
isles”. In this he saw they possessed the potentials for a more viable and useful culture in 
the future. This, suggest Davidson, is the humanism that made it necessary for Strand to 
wait long weeks before beginning the photography. Once working he would wait again 
until people became entirely familiar with his presence and the large 10”x8” plate camera 
that he worked with. His subjects are comfortable to be photographed, there are no 
snatched pictures. The subjects look you straight in the eye through the lens of the camera. 
Strand’s viewpoint is respectful, always positioned a fraction lower than a direct eye-to-
eye contact. In other words he does not seek to dominate the subject but treat them with 
respect and dignity as equals. 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
117 Davidson, B 1990: Working with Strand. In Stange, M (ed) ibid. 
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Fig 3.6. Paul Strand:  Mrs Marion MacLellan 
 
4. James Ravilious: An English Eye. 
Ravilious and his wife moved to the village of Dolton in North Devon in 1972. In the 
nearby village of Beaford there was an Arts Centre and the then director, John Lane, 
offered him a commission as artist in residence to further a photography project he had 
running for the past twelve months. Lane wanted to use “the power of the (photographic) 
image…as a means of communicating with local people.  
 
Fig 3.7 Farmer Alf Pugsley returning a lamb to its mother. Langham. Dolton. 1982. 
 
Ravilious began to create a photographic archive of the land and people of North Devon 
that would continue for the next twenty or so years. Lane let Ravilious work out for 
himself how to develop the commission and the documentary photography. Ravilious 
worked in close co-operation with the peope of the area, visible and involved in their 
lives, regularly presenting slideshows to the community of the work he was making.  
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In James Ravilious’ I see something different from the other documentaries discussed so 
far. His work  is lyrical, the stuff of the poetry of Edward Thomas, beautiful to look at 
with a profound sense of the people, land and animals that bound together their lives. 
They are frequently shot against the light that glows through the misty air, backlighting 
their subjects, yet with shadows that firmly anchor their subjects into the earth of their 
land. His are humorous yet gentle and quiet photographs, peaceful with nothing 
pretentious or bombastic about them, yet carefully framed and constructed. 
Over the years of the project Ravilious has produced some 80,000 photographs and an 
archive of a distinctive way of life in North Devon that is rare because made over so long 
a period of time, with so close an involvement and understanding of the people, their 
lives, land, village communities and rural ceremonies. There is, as Hamilton says in his 
thoughtful and closely observed text, some quality about the photography that is 
“quintessentially English”. Perhaps that is why I like them so much! 
    Fig 3.8 Pigs dozing. Parsonage Farm. Iddesleigh. Devon. 1976. 
 
Summary. 
In these four examples of different types of social documentary photography all can be 
found to have a close affinity to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. In the case of the FSA 
photographs I have pointed this out in some detail, but the same could be said for 
Puranen’s, Strand’s and especially James Ravilious’ work. That I haven’t done so is 
simply to avoid needless repetition. All create understanding through the discourse of the 
world they create and represent. All open that discourse to new ways of seeing and new 
ways of saying that are meaningful, literate, and intelligible, in forms that are permanent. 
In short, all four achieve the hermeneutic purpose of understanding more and 
understanding more richly through: the act of someone saying something about something 
to someone. 
 
FILE: Ch3 BROWN PhD JUNE 2014.doc 
 115 
Chapter 4 
 
Photographing fieldwork: 
Case Studies 
 
 
 
Introduction. 
I have produced two documentary case studies using digital photography for this thesis. 
They form a continuum of practice in a unity of description and aesthetics. Both are 
concerned with questions of historical identity in a continuum of practice running from 
visual ethnography to forensic science, archaeology and anthropology. The photography 
follows a continuum of descriptive document and expressive aesthetics that unifies both in 
different proportions to suit the intentions and purpose of their making. Both Case Studies 
are the result of commissioned work. 
The Case Studies are presented as hard back books together with the written thesis in the 
complete PhD submission.. A PDF file of each can be found in the Appendix. 
The original studies are in colour. 
 
Case Study 1: Regeneration Waterside South. This is a study in the visual ethnography 
of a sub-district of Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent, North Staffordshire. The subject is a 
residential and industrial district undergoing social and economic regeneration. 
 
Case Study 2: Imperium1326: The Death of a Tyrant? Hulton Abbey and an 
archaeological mystery. This is a study in Forensic science, Archaeology and 
Anthropology. The subject is a male skeleton excavated from Hulton Abbey, North 
Staffordshire that bears the marks of the male individual being executed by hanging, 
drawing and quartering. The skeleton is believed to be unique in the archaeological record 
of the United Kingdom. 
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Case Study 1: Regeneration: Waterside South. 
This is a study in the practice of applied ethnographic, digital, documentary photography. 
The photographs are of the people, their sense of identity and community and their built 
environment in a suburban district of Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent named Wellington in 
Victorian Times, and Waterside South today. The photography results from a commission 
awarded me by the Arts Council West Midlands and RENEW North Staffordshire for a 
community arts project they called, ‘Place, Space & Identity 1’. The purpose was to 
document the people, district and the work being done there by the housing development 
agency, RENEW. The principle documentary photography was made in the autumn and 
winter months of 2007-2008. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4:1 New 
Waterside 
housing 
alongside the 
Caldon Canal. 
 
The people and the district are undergoing radical social, cultural and economic change as 
a result of Government policy. The 2003 Labour Government designated the district part 
of a larger Pathfinder Housing Market Renewal Programme (HMR) economic and 
development zone. A new agency, RENEW North Staffordshire was formed from within 
Stoke City Council in 2005, to administer the scheme as a partnership between the local 
authorities, public and private sector stakeholders prepared to invest financially in the 
development and regeneration of the zone. Development finance is sourced from the 
European Union, central Government, local authorities and from the private sector.2 
Waterside South and East is part of a larger re-development project called City Centre 
South, described by the RENEW agency as ‘The ‘Jewel in the Crown’ of their 
regeneration projects. The overall project is centred on Hanley and spreads over a wider 
geographic area, embracing parts of the Borough of Newcastle-u-Lyme to the west, and 
parts of the Staffordshire Moorlands to the east and Hanley to the north. 
 
Outcomes. 
The work has been publicly exhibited under the original title, ‘Waterside South’, March-
May 2008 in the Dresden Street Community Centre, and in St Luke’s Church Hall, 
Wellington, Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent.  
                                                           
1 I accepted the commission on the understanding that the work would also form a case study for 
this thesis. Both the Arts Council and RENEW are agreeable to this. 
2  The Agency website is: <www.renewnorthstaffs.gov.uk>. 
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When the exhibition closed I donated the prints displayed to the Community Centre 
Resident’s Association as an historical record for them of the people and place as I 
documented it, to use as they wished. The work has been published as Brown, R.G 2008: 
Waterside South in Locke and Henner (eds) 2008: The Art of Beauty and the Earth.3 I 
featured the work in a conference paper in 2009 to the annual conference of the 
International Visual Sociology Association (Brown, R.G 2009 (b): "Photography, 
ongoing moments and the active presence of absent things"). 4  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.2: 
Eagle Street 
under 
demolition. 
 
Waterside South & East is a district of some 67 hectares of land, roughly triangular in 
shape, lying on southward sloping ground to the south-east of Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent. It 
is an area of residential housing and industry. To the south the boundary for Waterside 
South lies along the length of the Caldon Canal, to the west by Lichfield Street. The 
slightly larger zone called South & East is bounded and to the east and north by Leek 
Road and Bucknall New Road. The Ordinance Survey map for 1890 shows few houses. 
The area was then almost wholly industrial with brick works and brick fields, coal mining, 
with a major company, the Eagle Pottery at a spot called Ivy House, Meakins pottery and 
other tile making works, and an important paper mill, Brittains, set along the canal side. 
The housing was largely built after 1890 to 1914, for the expanding workforce serving 
these industries.  
They were constructed by a mixture of the industrial company’s themselves and 
speculative private developers. As many as four generations of the same families have 
since been born and lived in many of the houses, some continuously in the same property. 
Many families saw their children and grandchildren continue to live in the district nearby, 
going to the same schools, attending the same churches, shopping in the same shops, 
going to war, some to return, and building their lives there. This continuity of history and 
                                                           
3 Locke, E & Henner, M (eds) 2008: The Art of Beauty and the Earth. Newcastle-u-Lyme. BArts 
Publishing. 
4 Brown, R.G 2009 (b): "Photography, ongoing moments and the active presence of absent things" 
International Visual Sociology Association Annual Conference. University of Cumbria, Carlisle, 
UK. 
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memory gives the district a distinctive feel and appeal to the residents that they closely 
identify with. 
The housing was built in terraces typical of the period along roads running roughly north-
south down the slope of the land. An east-west road, Waterloo Road, ran along the centre 
forming a spine with terraces radiating south and north on either side, with another cross 
route, Seymour Street at the northern end and another cross route, Commercial Road 
running across the southern boundary parallel to the canal. Corner shops and pubs were 
built at the road junctions with Waterloo Road. One shop remained unique at the time of 
the photography. This is ‘The Hole-in-the-wall’ oatcake shop selling traditional 
Staffordshire oatcakes from a downstairs kitchen through what would normally be the 
front window of a domestic house to customers in the street outside. It was the last of its 
kind in Stoke-on-Trent and came to symbolise the frustrations and anger of many 
residents who became increasingly upset to find their homes declared unfit for purpose 
and, what seemed to them, the high-handed attitude of the RENEW Agency, including 
petitions to Westminster and the Prime Minister, then Gordon Brown. Scheduled by the 
agency for demolition The Hole-in-the-Wall finally closed in March 2011. 
 
 
Fig 4.3: Mrs Lottie Hughes, 88 years, third generation resident of Eagle Street. 
 
All the terraces are built to a similar ground plan with two downstairs rooms plus a rear 
scullery and two or three bedrooms upstairs. They front directly onto their roads with a 
minimal garden space or none at all at the front, and at the rear they all have small 
backyards that were built originally with an outside toilet. Indoor bathrooms were added 
much later with first floor extensions over the scullery. The rear yards give access to 
alleyways that lace the lengths of the terraces. The house fronts are in a variety of 
decorative architectural styles, with some having plain fronts and others varieties of 
canopied bay windows.  
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In the twentieth century a small number of higher status semi-detached houses were built 
near to the Eagle pottery and Brittains paper mill, their door and window surrounds 
decorated in the fashionable Egyptian ‘Odeon’ style, perhaps to appeal more to a salaried 
managerial class working in the mill and potbanks. During WWII the area suffered some 
bomb damage. Where the older houses were demolished new housing replaced them built, 
typically, in a 1950’s style of functional terraces and semi-detached properties. A number 
of tower blocks of flats were built close to Hanley in the 1960’s. With the decline of the 
Stoke-on-Trent coal mining, steel making and pottery industries the character of the area 
has also changed. People have moved away, new people have moved in to houses on 
short-term rentals, and there is a sizeable population of temporary immigrant asylum 
seekers awaiting Home Office permission to residency.  
 
RENEW North Staffordshire was charged with the responsibility for carrying out the 
Labour Government Housing Market Renewal Programme (HMR) by instigating and 
overseeing large scale new housing projects and urban environmental improvements. The 
RENEW Pathfinder partnership  was given the Aim:  
“To ensure that all the essential requirements of sustainable communities are addressed, 
especially good quality, customer focused public services and a pride in the Community 
and cohesion within it.”.   
To achieve this the Agency was set 6 Objectives: 
1) To retain and attract population. 
2) To balance the supply and demand for housing. 
3) To transform the urban form and local environment. 
4) To facilitate housing choice and the provision of quality housing stock. 
5) To promote social cohesion and social mobility. 
6) To achieve sustainable communities. 
(Audit Commission Performance Review 2009 RENEW North Staffordshire, March 
2010). 5 
Ten Pathfinder status geographic zones were established across England and Wales by the 
Labour Government in areas of perceived greatest need. The zones cut across local 
authority boundaries, the idea being to remove Pathfinder projects away from local 
authority planning priorities and restrictions and vesting them in an agency with greater 
powers. RENEW management envisaged a ten to fifteen year period in which to plan, 
implement and achieve their HMR aims and objectives. The Agency actively promoted 
community involvement in their planning with the establishment of resident’s 
                                                           
5 The Audit Commission 2010: HMR Performance Review 2009: RENEW North Staffordshire. 
March 2010. Available On-line: 
<www:renewnorthstaffs.gov.uk/assets/resource_library/hmrperformancereview2009renew1/http>. 
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associations, the financing of community centres and varieties of social activities 
throughout the year, building on what was already in situ or beginning from scratch.  
The Case Study photography commission from the Arts Council West Midlands/RENEW 
can be seen to fall within objectives 1,5 & 6. 
 
RENEW wished to demolish substantial parts of the area and rebuild with new modern 
housing. They argued that most of the housing in the Waterside South development area is 
too old, suffers from mining and geological subsidence in places, and no longer the type 
of housing ‘young professional people’ today wish to buy. The sub-text is an anxiety to 
improve the economic skills base within North Staffordshire and Stoke-on-Trent by 
retaining and attracting in an educated and qualified young generation of people with 
attractive new housing, schools and urban environmental improvements.   
The latest Audit Commission Review shows that in the five year period 2003-2008 the 
RENEW Pathfinder partnership received £97.10 million in HMR Government funding. In 
the period 2008-2009 about £84.5 million of aligned private sector investment was made 
within the total City Centre Pathfinder Zone. A further £45.5 million private sector 
funding, £40.0 million from RENEW and other local authorities, and a further £18.0 
million private sector funding directly into HMR projects was invested. The projected 
spend for 2009-10 was estimated at some £38.0 million, and for 2010-2011 the projected 
spend was estimated at £36.0 million.  
In 2004 RENEW pledged to demolish some 14,000 old housing stock considered unfit or 
beyond refurbishment to modern standards. By 2024 the Agency planned to have built 
12,000 new homes and apartments across the City Centre zone. It planned to refurbish a 
further 10,000 private properties and 20,000 council or housing association properties. In 
the five year period 2005-2010 RENEW spent some £98.0 million buying 1,661 houses, 
and some £120.0 million overall buying homes and business sites across the whole 
Pathfinder development zone.  
Fig 4.4 (left) & Fig 4.5 (right): Mr & Mrs John Tatton with their first marital home 
behind them in Tintern Street. Brittains paper mill where they both worked is the factory 
building in the background, 2007. Mrs Tatton was born and raised in a house by her left 
shoulder visible in Fig 13. The house was demolished as unfit in 2008. 
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Within the Waterside South/City Waterside development that this photography focused 
upon, RENEW acquired 902 houses of which 700 have been demolished. More than 
2,500 new homes were planned for the area. As of December 2012 only some 400 have 
been built so far, and 650 existing homes have been re-furbished. Streets within the 
Waterside South development where homes have been demolished include Waterloo 
Street, Balfour Street, Wellington Road, Dresden Street, Lincoln Street, Ludlow Street, 
Tintern Street and Bucknall New Road. Some £2.5 million has been spent improving 
older properties and a new Waterside Primary School has been built. 
In 2010 the new Conservative/Liberal-Democrat coalition Government decided to 
withdraw Pathfinder HMR development funding. The RENEW North Staffordshire HMR 
Pathfinder partnership ceased to exist. The task of housing and economic redevelopment 
has been absorbed back into Stoke City Council and other local authorities. 
 
Case Study 2: Imperium 1326: The Death of a Tyrant. Hulton Abbey and an 
archaeological mystery. 
 
This is a study in the practice of applied scientific forensic, digital, documentary 
photography. The photographs are of a medieval male skeleton, labelled HA16, whose 
skeletal osteology shows abundant evidence of severe peri-mortem trauma typically 
associated with the individual having been executed by being drawn, hanged, 
emasculated, eviscerated, beheaded and quartered. A form of State execution imposed for 
crimes of high treason and tyranny in medieval England. The skeleton was first 
discovered during excavations of the site of Hulton Abbey, Stoke-on-Trent, North 
Staffordshire, during archaeological excavations in the period 1972-1983 (Klemperer & 
Boothroyd 2004: Excavations at Hulton Abbey 1987-1994).6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig 4.6. Skeleton 
HA 16, Cervical 
verterba C3 
showing 
evidence of 
beheading. 
 
 
The photographs are the product of an inter-disciplinary, team based, research project in 
forensic led by Professor J.P.Cassella, Department of Forensic Science, Staffordshire 
                                                           
6 Klemperer, W.D & Boothroyd, N 2004: Excavations at Hulton Abbey, Staffordshire, 1987-1994. 
Leeds. The Society for Medieval Archaeology. Monograph 21. Maney Publishing. 
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University, UK.7 The research project is called: HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton 
Digitisation Project and has been funded by the Higher Education Academy (HEA) 
Physical Sciences Centre, and the Joint Information Systems Committee (JISC) 
Distributed e-Learning (DeL) Programme II. I am the team member responsible for the 
digital photography and protocols.  
My task has been to devise methods and procedures to light and photograph the skeleton 
parts using digital technologies. The requirement is for photographs that describe with 
great clarity and in macroscopic detail the pathologies of traumatic wounding carried by 
the bones. The photographs could then be archived and translated into an inter-active 
teaching and learning DVD for use by others. This I achieved by using an aesthetic of 
advertising standards of contre-jour lighting with careful attention to the quality of the 
light and the contrast range between highlights and shadows. The photographs were made 
using a dedicated macro-photography lens, in high resolution RAW format and daylight 
balanced colour at 5,5000K. So successful was this that the forensic archaeologist Dr 
Mary Lewis with whom I was working, frequently commented that the photographs 
revealed forensic details hitherto un-noticed.  
 
 
Fig 4.7: The Hulton Abbey Skeletal Digitisation Project inter-active teaching and 
learning DVD. 
 
The Project recognises that specimens of archaeological bone matter are friable and 
deteriorate with handling. Educational access to the artefacts is often limited to the 
institution in which they are held. The Research Project proposes a solution to both 
problems lies in developing a digitised photographic archive of high quality, high 
resolution images, and making these available as a teaching and learning aid to a wide 
variety of audiences via an inter-active DVD. The DVD has been made in multi-platform 
                                                           
7 The Project Team are: Professor J.P Cassella, Department of Forensic Science, Staffordshire 
University; Dr Paul Chin, Physical Sciences Centre, University of Hull; Mr Roger Brown, Senior 
Lecturer Photography, Faculty of Arts, Media & Design, Staffordshire University; Mr Paul Lucking, 
Senior Lecturer in Entertainment Technology, Staffordshire University; Dr Mary E. Lewis, Senior 
Lecturer in Biological Anthropology, Department of Archaeology, University of Reading. 
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formats and is available on-line free of charge through the HEA/JISC at 
<www.heacademy.ac.uk/physsci/home/projects/digitisationproject/> (Fig 4.10). 
The skeleton is unique within the archaeological record for the wide spread peri-mortem 
trauma that it displays. The original forensic examination suggested these were results of 
blows inflicted by sword, axe and other weapons (Browne, S 1985: Report on the human 
bones in Wise, P 1985: Hulton Abbey: A Century of Excavations).8 Dr Mary Lewis of 
Reading University, Department of Archaeology, a Forensic Anthropologist, has re-
examined the bones and come to a conclusion that the skeleton shows peri-mortem trauma 
associated with the form of execution by being drawn, hanged and quartered. Further that 
the skeleton may, plausibly be the remains of Hugh Despenser the Younger, Chamberlain 
and favourite courtier to King Edward II (Lewis 2008: A Traitor’s Death? The identity of 
a drawn, hanged and quartered man from Hulton Abbey, Staffordshire.).9   
 
A little bit of medieval history: Hugh Despenser the Younger. 
Despenser was brother-in-law to Sir Hugh Audley in whose lands Hulton Abbey stood 
from its foundation in 1223. Despenser was executed in 1326 and his wife, Eleanor de 
Clare, later petitioned the future king Edward III for the return of his remains, so they may 
be buried in sanctified ground and his soul escape eternal purgatory. This Edward granted 
but it is not known for certain where such remains as there were are conclusively buried. 
Hulton Abbey is a possibility because of the connection through marriage and family 
(Lewis 2008: ibid). 
Edward II and Despenser ruled England unopposed in the years 1322-1326 in what the 
historian Fryde has called a reign of Tyranny (Fryde 2004: The Tyranny and fall of 
Edward II, 1321-1326).10 It was a period of constitutional crisis in medieval English 
history. The northern and Welsh baronage challenged the authority of Edward II in 1321-
22 over his excessive favouritism of Despenser, and abhorrence of Despenser’s own greed 
and exploitation of his position to seize lands and wealth from them unchecked. In 1322 
the Barons under Thomas, Earl of Lancaster went to war against their king, Edward II. 
Edward defeated them at the Battle of Boroughbridge, near York, in March 1322. Thomas 
and many other barons were executed for treason, their widows, children and dependents 
impoverished, even cast out. In 1326 Edward’s Queen, Isabella and his son the future 
Edward III were in Paris. So too was the Welsh Marcher Baron Roger Mortimer of 
Wigmore who had fought against Edward in 1322 and imprisoned in the Tower of 
London. Mortimer engineered his escape from the Tower and left England for France. 
                                                           
8 Wise, P.J.1985: Hulton Abbey: a century of excavations. Staffordshire Archaeological Studies 2. 
Stoke-on-Trent City Museum. 
9 Lewis, Mary E 2008: A Traitor's Death? The identity of a drawn, hanged and quartered man from 
Hulton Abbey, Staffordshire. Antiquity 82/135 (2008) p113-124. 
10 Fryde, N. 2004: The Tyranny and Fall of Edward II 1321-1326. Cambridge. Cambridge 
University Press. 
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There he formed an alliance with Isabella and together they raised an army of mercenary 
infantry from the palatinate of Hainault, in modern north Belgium, and in September 1326 
invaded England.  
Their declared intention was to rid the kingdom of Despenser, and his father also called 
Hugh. Edward tried and failed to raise an army to oppose them. The Baronage, Clergy and 
Country turned against him and especially Despenser. Edward, Despenser and a small 
retinue fled from London to south Wales and Despenser fortress of Caerphilly Castle. The 
household servants there also turned against them, and Despenser and Edward fled 
attempting to reach Ireland and safety. They were captured. The king was taken first to 
Kenilworth Castle in Warwickshire. Despenser was taken to Hereford. There in 
November 1326 he was put on trial for treason, adjudged guilty and executed by being 
drawn behind four horses through the streets of the city and raised on a fifty foot high 
gallows where he hung by the neck semi-conscious. A fire was lit at his feet. The 
Chronicle of Froissart records that a man climbed a ladder beside him, emasculated him 
and threw his genitals into the fire, eviscerated his stomach and threw his bowels also into 
the fire. His heart was cut out and burned. The cadaver was lowered onto a table and 
quartered, the head being sent to London Bridge, the quarters to the four corners of the 
kingdom. 
 
Fig 4.8: Queen Isabella at the gates of Hereford, November 1326. The body of Hugh 
Despenser can be seen highlighted in the middle distance lying prone on a table being 
quartered. (The British Museum) 
 
In 1327 Edward II was deposed as the anointed King of England by Queen Isabella, 
Mortimer, the Baronage, Clergy and Parliament. It was a moment of constitutional crisis. 
Edward II was removed to Berkeley Castle in Gloucestershire, where it was rumoured he 
was subsequently killed. Isabella and Mortimer reigned for a further three years as Regent 
to Edward III, who was crowned in 1327 aged fourteen. In 1329 aged seventeen he 
overthrew and executed Mortimer and ruled in his own right thereafter (Mortimer 2003: 
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The Greatest Traitor the life of Sir Roger Mortimer, 1st Earl of March, Ruler of England 
1327-1330).11 
The skeleton known as HA16 is one of more than 90 discovered during the excavations 
and are in the care of the Department of Archaeology, University of Reading, UK. 
 
Outcomes. 
The outcomes of the photography, to date, are the photography Protocols that I have 
written and are included in the Research Final Report by Professor J.P Cassella (Cassella 
J.P 2009: HASDiP, the Hulton Abbey Skeletal Digitisation Project Final Report),12 an 
inter-active DVD that I have co-authored Fig 4.7, (Brown, R & Lucking, P 2008: The 
Hulton Abbey Skeletal Digitisation DVD),13 a book of photographs with a written essay by 
me (Brown, R 2012: 1326: Hulton Abbey & a Tyrant’s Death),14  a .pdf file of the book, 
all of which accompany this thesis. There has also been recently a public exhibition, 
‘Hanged, Drawn Quartered: CSi 1326’, October 14th-November 14th, The Science Centre, 
Staffordshire University (Brown, R 2012(a).15 and international conference papers to the 
Visualisation in Archaeology/English Heritage/Southampton University Research Group 
(Brown, R 2009: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Photography.16 Brown, R 
2011(b): Photography, Agency and Hermeneutic Understanding). 17 
_________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FILE: Ch4 BROWN PhD JUNE 2014.doc 
                                                           
11 Mortimer, Ian 2003: The Greatest Traitor: the life of Sir Roger Mortimer, 1st Earl of March, 
Ruler of England 1327-1330. London. Jonathan Cape. 
12 Cassella, J.P 2009: Final Report HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeletal Digitisation Project. 
Available online  
<www.heacademy.ac.uk/assets/ps/documents/projects/digitisation_project_report.pdf>.  
13 Brown, R.G 2008 (b): 'HASDiP: the Inter-active DVD' in association with Cassella. J; Lewis, 
Mary E. ; Lucking, P 2008: 'The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Project Teaching & Learning 
DVD.  Staffordshire University / HEA Physical Sciences Centre / JISC Academy Distributed e-
Learning (DeL) Programme II. Available for PC and MAC platforms. 
14  Brown, R.G 2012(b): 1326: Hulton Abbey & a Tyrant’s Death. Blurb on-line publishing. 
<www.blurb.co.uk>. 
15  Brown, R.G, J.P.Cassella, S.Lawton, D. Mullany & S.Deakin 2012 (a): 'Hanged, Drawn, 
Quartered: CSI 1326 a.d'. The Science Centre. Staffordshire University, UK. 
16 Brown, R.G 2009 (c): The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Photography. Visualisation in 
Archaeology Workshop. English Heritage. Southampton University. 
17 Brown, R.G 2011 (b): Photography, Agency and Hermeneutic Understanding. International 
Visualisation in Archaeology Conference 2011. English Heritage/Southampton University. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion. 
 
Paul Ricoeur and a critical, philosophical hermeneutics. 
 
It is frequently said that Ricoeur’s greatest contribution to philosophy has been a 
distinctive development of philosophical hermeneutics, one entirely his own in which he 
elaborated an interweaving set of enquiries into the ontology of what he thought a critical 
property of language: semantic innovation. He asks, “How does new meaning come to be, 
and, in doing so, reconfigure the meanings of (the present and) the past?” (my 
modification in parenthesis, of Kearney 2004: Paul Ricoeur: The Owl of Minerva. p1).1 
Ricoeur’s philosophy is also empiric in that it shares an important assumption within the 
traditional French concern for the Subject, and within the parallel German hermeneutics 
of emancipation. That is, that philosophy must find its place and be linked with everyday 
life by a concern for meaning and intelligibility in understanding and communication, 
thought and action, that is directed to the social imaginary and to making a difference to 
the lives and experience of people in the actual world. From beginning to end, Ricoeur’s 
is a philosophy in the service of a concrete human being and something constructive, 
positive and of practical value (Agis Villaverde 2012 ibid p193). 
 
His questioning has often been profound, and his hermeneutic of the text, and by 
extension, text-analogues (in which I include photo-documentary narrative) has moved 
our understanding onto a new plane. He made no attempt to build a grand all-embracing 
philosophical system but to participate forcefully in a conversation. Ricoeur’s work has, 
overall, the character of a philosophy under construction, a conversation that had already 
begun which he joined and contributed to and invites us to enter into as well; and a quest 
that was still being pursued wherein separate problems are laid out and examined, 
piecemeal, until his death. 
 
I am isolating and examining one part of Paul Ricoeur’s philosophy, albeit a major and 
comprehensive fraction: what he thought and wrote on a critical and emancipating 
philosophical hermeneutics that grew from and surpasses Husserl’s Phenomenology, 
referred to by Ricoeur as an ‘amplifying’ Hermeneutics.2 I am not in any sense attempting 
to write a study of all Ricoeur’s philosophy. What I am always doing is looking for 
correlations and mediations between Ricoeur’s amplifying philosophical hermeneutics of 
this period and the pragmatic business of thinking about and making social documentary 
                                                           
1 Kearney. R 2004: ibid 
2 Ricoeur. P 1995/6: ‘Intellectual Autobiography’ in Hahn. L (ed) 1996: The Philosophy of Paul 
Ricoeur. Library of Living Philosophers vol XXii. Chicago. Open Court. pp 3-53. 
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photography and piecing together their interpretive visuals into well ordered and 
intelligible narratives.  
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics is ‘critical’ because it is reflexive and analytical of 
its own operations. ‘Emancipating’ because it returns the subject to the centre of 
philosophical concern as an active agency and allows him or her freedom to think and 
reason for themselves, and ‘amplifying’ because it is determined to keep language open to 
semantic innovations. This is a hermeneutics of Language, structured on the model of the 
theory of the Text, the theory of Action and the theory of History, in which the theory of 
the Text is pivotal. It is a hermeneutics that Ricoeur steadily developed over a thirty year 
period from the 1960’s, in an attempt to unify phenomenology and hermeneutics, and to 
counter the challenges of Freudian psycho-analysis and post-Saussurrean linguistic 
Structuralism (Ricoeur 1991: On Interpretation).3 Freudian psycho-analysis he found to 
be a reductive archaeology of interpretation, whilst Structuralism and semiotics he found 
to be hypothetical abstractions about systems of thought modelled upon supposed 
neurological structures of the human brain, that he considered without anchorage in 
history and the conscious and self-realising Subject (Ricoeur 1992: Oneself as Another),4 
(Ricoeur 2013: Hermeneutics).5 I am also attentive to his later work in practical 
philosophy and a hermeneutics of action within the realm of the social imaginary (Ricoeur 
1991: Ideology, Utopia and Politics).6  
 
Central to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics is the question of meaning, of interpreting and making 
sense of life and of being human. The basic hermeneutic proposition is that Life interprets 
Life, and that human life is a constant process of interpretation. Ricoeur argues that the 
meaning of being human is always mediated through an endless process of interpretations 
that are manifest in all areas of social, cultural, arts and science life. We make sense of 
things in ways that matter to us through these intermediary processes. We also make sense 
of things through introspection and intuition, and our reality is that we do both using our 
minds and our bodies. Ricoeur gives primacy to the notion of the conscious Self being 
fully realised in the journey from self to self through the other, to which he gives the 
expression, self-as-another. Ricoeur proposes that we discover what is meaningful to us in 
and through linguistic mediations of signs and symbols, stories and ideologies that are 
given us by our cultural tradition in “Great Works” (and I think, in the myriad small and 
inconsequential matters-of-factness of everyday life). 
 
 
 
                                                           
3 Ricoeur, P 1991: On Interpretation. In Ricoeur, P. 1991: From Text to Action: Essays in 
Hermeneutics II. trans. Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson. 2nd Edition 2007: with new 
Forward by Richard Kearney. Evanston. NorthWestern University Press. pp1-20. Hereafter referred 
to as FTA 
4 Ricoeur, P. 1992: Oneself as Another. trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
5 Ricoeur P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. 
6 Ricoeur, P 1991:  Part 3: Ideology, Utopia, Politics in FTA ibid pp235-337. 
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Ricoeur argues the hermeneutic process of making sense of life occurs through what he 
calls “the long detour” of these diverse cultural mediations. By journeying through the 
language of others the self, that we are, returns to itself enriched in experience and 
enlarged in potentials and possibilities. He thus challenges Heidegger’s view that 
understanding human Being is accessible to us through a “short route” of human 
existence, that he calls dasein, which understands itself through introspection and its own 
existential possibilities. He also challenges the Cartesian doctrine of the self as being 
transparent to the self through thought alone. By taking the position that we interpret life, 
and hence ourselves, through diverse cultural practices in which life is made objective, in 
the sense of being put at a distance from us.  Ricoeur accepts that meaning is not intrinsic 
within language or inherent within objects but is found outside of ourselves mediated in 
cultural artefacts and institutions, a “treasury of symbols” transmitted by the cultures from 
which we are sprung, in both existence and in language. Meaning comes indirectly to us 
from how we rationalise in thought and feeling and interpret whatever is experienced 
through these mediations. Thus Ricoeur formulates a basic definition of hermeneutics as 
“the art of deciphering indirect meaning”. 
 
The task of hermeneutics is to show how existence arrives at expression, then reflection 
through the endless exploration of significances that emerge from symbolic works of 
culture. For Ricoeur this centres within Language and the model of the Text. The written 
text, or inscriptions that can be ‘read’ like a text (i.e photographs) he differentiates from 
spoken language. Writing opens language to rendering multiple layers of meaning and 
original semantic innovations in their expression. It is thanks to writing there are the 
resources for discourse. Inscription makes discourse accessible and open to examination 
and new interpretations. In Ricoeur’s reasoning, discourse acquires a semantic autonomy 
having a three-fold structure of the author’s intention, the matter and circumstances of the 
thing written about, and its reception by an audience. 
 
Photographing is where the science of photography enters the field of action, put crudely 
“doing photography”. A praxis whose logos in terms of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic, is when 
action and documentary photography are together defined as the quest for its own 
understanding and own-most possibilities. There is a distinction here between thinking 
under the category of action, and thinking under the category of principles of production 
and the ways in which ‘facts’ are subsumed under those principles. Ricoeur states that the 
representative character of the model (i.e. the photographing) and the domain it models 
(i.e. the subject matter being photographed), remains “a puzzle”. This is so because, he 
states, it is not possible to consider as identical the representation of nature (the empiric 
world of the subject matter) and the self understanding of the agent in his or her action. 
This holds true for photography as for writing. 
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Once the intelligibility of their production is distinguished, then it is possible to ask about 
the meaning. Ricoeur would go so far as to say that one cannot understand the sense of the 
activity without doing it. It is in relation to its’ project that the activity has to be analysed 
and the question posed, “why do you want to understand nature” and answers are found in 
the gradual unfolding of the project and its meaning is gradually discovered and available 
to interpretation (Ricoeur 1998: Critique and Conviction).7 Matters that, after Aristotle, I 
venture to call those of praxis and phronesis (Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics).8 
 
A paradox of absence: room for innovation. 
Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics is a philosophy of meaningful interpretive activity 
articulated through the medium of Language. It mediates Phenomenology and Language 
with a detailed examination of the poetics of narrative and time in relation to history and 
reality. Ricoeur moves beyond the traditional hermeneutics of what language says and the 
double meaning of symbols, to be found in the interpretation of traditional biblical and 
scriptural exegesis, myths and symbols, to a hermeneutics of what language does and is 
used for, pragmatically and poetically, in the figurations, configurations and re-figurations 
of a poetics of narrative and the aporias of time in their relation to pragmatic reality. It is a 
critical hermeneutics because it is inherently self-aware and analytical about its 
operations. It is at the same time an emancipating hermeneutics that keeps language open 
to new semantic innovations, and it is dialectical, imbued with a conception of knowledge 
as a dynamic ongoing historical process, in which the way the world is and the way in 
which we view and shape that world, reciprocally determine each other through an endless 
process of interpretation and synthesis of alternative interpretations that might well be 
conflicting.  
 
Ricoeur adopts the model of the text and theories of the text, of action and of history to 
give voice to his philosophical hermeneutic as a tool of meaning and understanding, that 
he formulates as discourse and, “…the act of someone saying something about something 
to someone…”. He contends there is a triadic structure to a hermeneutic of the text whose 
process involves a speaker (author) and their figuration of things mimesis1, a subject and 
the configuration of a world of the text mimesis2, and realisation in the re-figurations 
made of the text by a listener (a reader) mimesis3. I think the same can be said for the 
phronesis of an applied, humanist, documentary photography praxis. 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
7 Ricoeur, P 1998: Critique and Conviction, Conversations with Francois Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. European Perspectives, a series in Social Thought and 
Cultural Criticism. Lawrence D. Kritzman, editor. New York. Columbia University Press. pp74-75. 
8 Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. T. Irwin. 2nd edition. Hackett Publishing. Reprinted 2011. 
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Paradoxically there appear to be few published attempts to unify the two fields of 
documentary photography and Ricoeur’s philosophical hermeneutics within the literature 
of contemporary photography theory, (Elkins 2007: ibid); nor contemporary philosophy 
(Costello and Iversen 2010: Photography after Conceptual Art),9 creating a perplexing 
aporia in understanding. The state of relations between philosophy and photography has 
been recently highlighted by the photography critic Coleman who finds it wanting, 
commenting that “philosophy’s gift to photography awaits its unveiling” (Coleman 2010: 
Counting the Teeth: Photography for Philosophers).10 I do not agree. It is more a matter 
of philosophers looking in another direction, another part of the landscape, towards 
photography as an art medium with different questions in mind, and with that an over-
riding concern for the aesthetics of the art images. A perspective that over the past thirty 
years or more has been a fruitful and productive contribution to the philosophy of art 
historical scholarship and discourse. 
 
Ricoeur wrote about the opposition of Language and the Visual (Ricoeur 1991: 
Imagination in Discourse and Action)11 and commented extensively on Aesthetics, in 
conversation, but his concerns with aesthetics were centred in language and the poetics of 
language constructions (Ricoeur 1998: Aesthetic Experience).12 Nor do there appear to be 
studies published within the literature of Ricoeurian hermeneutic philosophy, made in the 
years following his death in 2005, that so far recognise and address this perplexing 
aporetic. This is notwithstanding the efforts to extend the inter-dsciplinary scope of his 
hermeneutics that is being actively pursued by the Ricoeur archive and research centre, 
‘Fonds Ricoeur’, Paris,13 the Society for Ricoeur Studies.14, and through the on-line peer 
reviewed journal Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies.15 The work of Ihde, however, 
expanding a general hermeneutics into the visualisation of science is an interesting 
exception.16 A publication of the International Institute of Hermeneutics, Toronto,17 
carries an engaging discussion by a number of authors on hermeneutics and the work of 
                                                           
9 Costello, D (ed) & Iversen, M (ed) 2010: Photography after Conceptual Art (Art History Special 
Issues). Wiley-Blackwell. 
10 Coleman, A.D 2010: Counting the Teeth: Photography for Philosophers. Ag: The International 
Journal of Photographic Art & Practice. C.Dickie (ed.). No 61. Autumn 2010. pp70-79. 
11 Ricoeur, P 1991: Imagination in Discourse and Action. In Ricoeur, P 1991: From Text to Action. 
(ibid) pp168-187. 
12 Ricoeur, P 1998: Critique and Conviction, Conversations with Francois Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay. Translated by Kathleen Blamey. European Perspectives, a series in Social Thought and 
Cultural Criticism. Lawrence D. Kritzman, editor. New York. Columbia University Press. Ch.8 pp 
171-186. (Hereafter referred to as CC). 
13 See: <www.fondsricoeur.fr>. 
14 See: <www.ricoeursociety.org>. 
15 See: <http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index/php/ricoeur> 
16 Ihde, D 1998: Expanding hermeneutics: Visualism in Science. Evanston. Northwestern University  
Press. 
17 The International Institute of Hermeneutics. University of Toronto. <www.chass.utoronto.ca/iih/> 
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art, but this turns upon Gadamer’s ontological hermeneutic and aesthetic and does not 
reference photography (Wiercinski, A 2005 ed: Hermeneutics and the Work of Art).18  
 
Documentary photography and a Hermeneutical Logic? 
 
"…it might seem…that we know plenty about that much described matter, 
human conduct. So we might, if we had always asked the right questions 
and had not been more anxious to deceive ourselves than to learn the truth. 
But we can always do with new questions…"   
(Mary Midgley 1995 p13) 19 
 
In his essay Hermeneutical Logic? Ricoeur poses the question, “…Can we speak of a 
hermeneutical logic…”.20 He examines the question of the claim of hermeneutics to 
universality and the effort of hermeneutic philosophy to reflect upon its epistemological 
status. He examines Heidegger’s radicalisation of hermeneutics as a universal ontology 
and Gadamer’s reflections upon the ontological condition of hermeneutics by reference to 
tradition, the response from Habermas and Apel, before moving to his own response. The 
essay became available in an English translation only in early 2013. It seems to me 
important to our understanding of Ricoeur’s philosophical and critical hermeneutics of the 
Text and Action and his achievement, and how bridges might be built spanning his 
hermeneutics and social documentary photography. I shall summarise Ricoeur’s analysis 
chronologically, and interweave with his text observations of my own where appropriate. 
 
Heidegger. 
Ricoeur begins with the radicalisation of the ontology of hermeneutics by Heidegger. He 
states that Heidegger sought to overcome Husserl’s difficulty with language in 
phenomenology in three ways. First, by taking hermeneutics as a question of ontology.21 
In Being and Time Heidegger’s question is, “what being are we, we who ask ourselves the 
question of being?”22 The question of Meaning is the question of the Meaning of Being. 
The being we ourselves are, Dasein, is, for Heidegger, the privileged site for this 
fundamental question. Second is the question of Understanding, implied in the first 
question about the meaning of being. ‘Understanding” is a distinctive feature of the being 
we are. It is a property of Dasein as “being-in-the-world”. Interpretation is therefore 
simply the development of understanding. To understand something as something is 
                                                           
18 Wiercinski, A (ed) 2005: Hermeneutics and the work of Art. Chapter IX in In Symposia Vol 4: 
Between Description and Interpretation: the Hermeneutic turn in Phenomenology. The International 
Institute of Hermeneutics, The University of Toronto.Toronto. The Hermeneutic Press. 
19 Midgley, M 1995: Beast and Man: The Roots of Human Nature. Revised edition. Abingdon & 
New York. Routledge. 
20 Ricoeur, P 1978: Hermeneutical Logic? Newly translated by D. Pellauer and published in 
Ricoeur, P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds 
Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. pp 66-110. Hereafter referred to as HL? 
21 Ricoeur HL? (ibid) p67. 
22 Heidegger, M 1927/2001: Being & Time. trans Macquarrie & Robinson. Oxford. Blackwell. 
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already to interpret it. Interpretation is articulated in a discourse that makes explicit the 
elements of a situation, as an ‘event’, and an understanding of elements that were initially 
bound to a more fundamental level. The first setting for any such articulation is being-in-
the-world itself. It is the correlation between situation-understanding-interpretation-
discourse that underlies investigation at a propositional level. Third, what the analytic of 
Dasein reveals is not a Kantian epistemological subject, a subject of knowledge, but a 
‘thrown-projecting-being’. Thus in Heidegger before the cognitive correlation of object-
subject, ‘understanding’ is implied in a deeper level of the pre-condition of the ontological 
structure of future-facing ‘thrown-being’ and anticipation. Heidegger suggests this mode 
of being is better designated as “care” than as knowledge, of being and care as a kind of 
ontological pre-understanding.23 
 
The notion of a “pre-ontological understanding” is hypothetical, logically deduced from 
Heidegger’s method, and for myself, I have difficulty understanding it. Is this an appeal to 
the neurological structure of the brain, foreshadowing Structuralism; or to a kind of 
Platonic ideal form; or is it simply an unverifiable assertion, an hypothesis rooted in 
intuition and mysticism? After all, in Mysticism and Logic, Russell the greatest rationalist 
of all wrote that “…the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both 
of science and of mysticism: the attempt to harmonise the two was what made their life, 
and what always must, for all its arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a 
greater thing than either science or religion…”.24 
 
Heidegger sought to overcome Husserl’s difficulty with value-laden language by coining 
a new language and expressions. For this he turned to an existential form of expression 
and substituted a new sense to each stage of analysis. Heidegger’s ontological being was 
and always is a being-in-the-world. Thus what is “Intentionality” in Husserl becomes 
“Being-in-the-World” in Heidegger; “Ego” in Husserl becomes “Dasein” in Heidegger, 
with the specific connotation and sense of “Being-there”. In this way for Heidegger the 
relation between Dasein and the World is no longer one of epistemology, of knowledge, 
but linguistically a matter of structured existential dimensions and inter-relations. Thus a 
tool is never defined by its empirical characteristics but as an existentiale ‘tool-to-hand’. 
The existential is something to be ontologically interpreted.25 
 
Ricoeur calls into question Heidegger’s anti-epistemological and anti-logical 
radicalisation of hermeneutics in Being and Time. His writing is technical in examination. 
Thus, where Heidegger writes that ‘hermeneutics is a kind of phenomenology’, Ricoeur 
responds by saying, whoever says ‘phenomenology’ also says logos (the cosmic principle 
that gives order and rationality to the world) of what shows itself. What must be done, 
                                                           
23 Ricoeur  HL? (passim) p68. 
24 Russell, Berrand 1917/1963: Mysticism and Logic. London. Unwin Books. George Allen & 
Unwin. p9. 
25 Heidegger, M 1927/2001: (ibid). 
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says Ricoeur, is situate the premiss of the hermeneutic logos in relation to the 
propositional (apophantic) logos. If this Aristotelian categorical proposition is articulated, 
first of all, in the hermeneutic proposition that ‘says something about something’, Ricoeur 
asks, what relation exists between this apophantic “about” and the hermeneutic “about”? 
In Heidegger, he says, this is presented propositionally ‘as’, an event that constitutes the 
moment of interpretation. On the principle of one concept giving rise to a further concept, 
this event ‘as’ in turn develops and articulates the moment of understanding, and so a new 
concept of truth is called for. This new concept cannot be defined by the characteristics of 
the proposition but by the capacity for ‘unveiling’, (which I take Ricoeur to mean 
‘disclosing’) which is implied in the relation between situation and understanding.26 Yet 
and at the same time, hermeneutic philosophy also makes a truth claim, and that also has 
to be measured against the apophantic truth claim. 
 
Ricoeur continues with another question, about the way in which hermeneutic philosophy 
must, necessarily, (‘has to’) ask an epistemological question of itself. This is the question 
of a type of discourse called an existential analytic that Dasein brings into play. Ricoeur 
states that two things are implied by this expression. First, it is sometimes said that 
hermenetic philosophy is a return to the ineffable and the irrational. Ricoeur says that this 
is a mistake, in fact “…hermeneutic philosophy is an analytic that proceeds by making 
distinctions, determinations, and finding relationships…”. So we find Heidegger uses the 
term ‘structure’ frequently to express this within Being and Time. Second, a hermeneutic 
analytic is an existential one that articulates ‘quasi-categories’, namely, being-in-the-
world; situation; understanding; and so on. Ricoeur states these categories are to Dasein 
what categories in analytic philosophy are to things. The distinction between 
“existentials” and categories is based on an ontological distinction between different 
modes of being: the being-we-are, Dasein, “which alone exists”, and being-there, ‘things’ 
which are ‘present to hand’ or ‘ready to hand’.  
The distinction between modes of being comes to language and discourse, says Ricoeur, 
“precisely as a categorical difference”. Thus, he continues, “In this sense, hermeneutics 
cannot avoid the Kantian question of the conditions of possibility of its own discourse”.27 
 
Then there is a third question posed by Ricoeur. No matter how radical is Heidegger’s 
hermeneutical interrogation, it cannot eliminate the fact “that hermeneutics is born out of 
a problematic that comes from the human sciences”. Heidegger’s thought is a 
radicalisation of that problematic. So the confrontation with Dilthey’s hermeneutics, with 
its claim to legitimate the human sciences as interpretive, is an integral part of the 
hermeneutical enterprise and an epistemological component of hermeneutic discourse. 
(This helps to explain why Ricoeur takes up Dilthey’s separation between Explanation 
and Understanding, which he regards as ‘disastrous’, and seeks to unify them as the 
                                                           
26 Ricoeur HL? (ibid) p68-69. 
27 (passim). 
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necessary first step in the development of his hermeneutics of the Text and Action, as we 
have seen 28).  
The question of hermeneutics standing in relation to the human sciences comes to the fore 
again in Ricoeur’s objection to the way in which Heidgger deals with the historical 
sciences and the problematic of historicity. In Being and Time this is originally oriented 
towards the future, but turns to the past through the mediation of what Heidegger calls 
‘repetition’. However the process of temporalisation implicit in the dialectic of situation 
and understanding has no categories for its conceptual construction. We are given only a 
hypothetical allegation of the ontological priority of historicity and material determination 
in relation to the discipline that studies history. The intermediate steps are missing 
between the foundation and the epistemology of the human and the historical sciences. So 
is this also an appeal to mysticism on the part of Heidegger? (My question, not Ricoeur’s). 
 
Ricoeur then raises another important question, to which Being and Time does makes an 
important contribution, he says. That is the textual status of the human sciences, and 
question of the ‘hermeneutic circle’. A criticism of hermeneutics has been that the 
interpreter’s anticipations of meaning are an integral part of the meaning to be interpreted. 
To understand a text it must already in some sense have been pre-understood. In a word, 
the interpreter finds what the interpreter is looking for. From an epistemological point of 
view the implication of the interpreter in the thing interpreted must appear a weakness, a 
subjective flaw when compared to the dispassionate objectivity that the scientific ideal 
requires. Heidegger, however, squared the circle by showing this apparent epistemological 
weakness to be an ontological strength. He does so by arguing for an originary circle that 
exists in each case between pre-understanding and the worldly situation to be interpreted. 
This is not a vicious circle but constitutes the positive condition of the most original kind 
of knowledge, according to Heidegger. 
 
However, Ricoeur states that as Heidegger gives this, it is not at all clear (he says “we do 
not see”) how to return from this foundational ground to the epistemological difficulties 
encountered in the interpretation of texts. In particular we are denied a choice between 
different ways of relating to (“comporting ourselves”) a text by the subordination of the 
epistemological to the ontological circle. Must we, asks Ricoeur, deny the psychologism 
of Dilthey? Must we abandon every claim to measure the meaning of a text in terms of the 
author’s intentions? Must we stop trying to understand the author better than he or she 
understood themselves? Or, again and perhaps most significantly, must we, asks Ricoeur, 
abandon any idea of ourselves as readers reaching the intended meaning of a text and of 
making ourselves contemporary with it (by which I understand Ricoeur to mean, are we 
not to enter imaginatively the world of the text and, in our consciousness making it our 
own?). Whether this be with the meaning of the text or the author’s intended meanings? 
                                                           
28 Ricoeur, P 2013: Hermeneutics and Symbolism. In Ricoeur, P 2013: Hermeneutics. Writings and 
Lectures, Volume 2. Trans. David Pellauer. Fonds Ricoeur Paris & Cambridge. Polity Press. pp 66-
110. (Hereafter referred to a HWL) 
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Must we stop defining hermeneutics as “the struggle against misunderstanding through 
appropriation of what is alien to us and distant in time and space, as the reproduction of an 
originary production”? (I suspect there is some difficulty here with the translation from 
Ricoeur’s French to an idiom of English in the text, which is why I have placed this 
sentence in quotation marks. Nonetheless, if I understand correctly, these are all questions 
highly pertinent to the question of the hermeneutic of documentary photography 
narrative). 
In short, Ricoeur criticised Heidegger because he thought his method “too direct” to 
achieve a full hermeneutic understanding. Heidegger’s new language cut off debate with 
classical philosophical issues. The return to foundations in Heidegger’s Being and Time is 
so radical that important derived questions such as these are lost to sight, or dismissed as 
irrelevant and inessential. Yet these are the questions that form the basis upon which 
philosophical hermeneutics was traditionally based, by biblical exegesis, by classical 
philology, by jurispridence, and are still posed by literary hermeneutics. It is, Ricoeur. 
says, through its capacity to return to these questions “…that the claim of hermeneutics to 
be a fundamental discipline, in the proper sense of the term, is to be measured…”.29 
 
Gadamer. 
In his essay Man and Language Gadamer recalls that Aristotle established the classical 
definition of the nature of man. Man, as distinct from animals, is the living being who has 
logos, rendered from the Greek as ‘reason or thought’. Gadamer, however, writes that, in 
truth, the primary meaning of the word is Language. To men alone is given logos so they 
may “…make manifest to each other what is useful and harmful, and therefore also what 
is right and wrong…” and so through superiority over what is present, his sense of desire 
for the sake of something not yet given, manifest as his sense of the future.30 Thus 
Gadamer accepts that Language is central to philosophical hermeneutics. 
Ricoeur writes that Gadamer’s major work Truth and Method forms the second link 
between Dilthey and the hermeneutics of the human sciences and his, Ricoeur’s, enquiry 
into the epistemological condition of hermeneutics.31 Gadamer is much admired by 
Ricoeur whom he calls “…a great figure of the hermeneutic current…”.32 Ricoeur is, 
nonetheless, concerned that Gadamer downplays method in the interpretation of the 
human sciences, and his attenuation of an objective distance, distanciation, in his critique. 
This compression of an objective distance is countered by Gadamer through his concept 
of a “fusion of horizons between the conscious self and tradition, in an incessant 
movement of dialogues between them, conceived as being …the very moment of 
thought…”. Ricoeur sets out to mediate these apparent dislocations and discusses 
Gadamer with respect, at length and with great care. 
                                                           
29 Ricoeur (passim) p71. 
30 Gadamer, H-G 1966: Man and Language. In Gadamer, H-G 1977 (ibid) p59. 
31 Gadamer, H-G 2004: Truth and Method. 2nd revised edition. Trans. Weinsheimer, J & Marshal, 
Donald G. London. Continuum. 
32 Ricoeur, P [1995]/1998: CC p33. 
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Ricoeur begins by noting the ambiguity of the title of Gadamer’s major work, which can 
be read either as “Truth and Method”, and alternatively as “Truth or Method”. The 
problem Gadamer addresses is the distance between the human observing subject and the 
people being studied, that is thought to be the methodologically correct procedure to 
follow in the human sciences.33 Setting things at a distance is held to be the ontological 
pre-requisite of objective research. Gadamer on the other hand, holds that this is a kind of 
alienation, that is destructive of the primordial human relation of “belonging to” - 
zugehorigkeit-. Without this no relation to an object would exist, he says. 
 
Gadamer explores his discussion of, for him, the notion of an alienating ‘objective’ 
distance within three hermeneutic spheres of experience: Aesthetic, Historical and 
Linguistic. In the Aesthetic sphere, he states that it is the experience of being ‘grasped’, 
stirred imaginatively and intellectually, by a work of art that always precedes and makes 
possible a critical exercise of judgement. It is a move Kant explored in the 3rd Critique in 
terms of the judgement of taste.34 In the Historical sphere, Gadamer holds that it is the 
consciousness of being born into and borne along by cultural traditions that makes 
possible an historical methodology. In the sphere of Language, Gadamer points to the 
things said by the great users of language within a culture, the speakers, writers of all 
kinds including philosophy, dramatists, orators and commentators, who together create a 
vast cultural discourse in their works and in the things talked about. These all belong 
together, precede and make possible every social and cultural use of language. Ricoeur 
speaks here of “…every instrumental reduction of language, and every claim to dominate 
the structures of the text of our culture technically…”. It is clear that this same idea of a 
cultural discourse over time, runs through the artistic and historical spheres, and in this 
sense a single thesis runs through the three parts of Gadamer’s Truth and Method. 
 
The argument about the methodology of the human sciences conducted by Gadamer, does 
not constitute the sole ‘anchorage’ for philosophical hermeneutics, in Ricoeur’s view. He 
writes that Gadamer’s path into hermeneutics through aesthetics is ‘irreplaceable’. 
Interestingly it is not a domain Ricoeur himself wrote about, although speaks of 
eloquently in conversation, in Aesthetic Experience, Chapter 8 of his Critique and 
Conviction.35 This is curious that he did not examine aesthetics in terms of art or 
architecture in his writings, because writing in praise of Gadamer, Ricoeur says that the 
problematic of aesthetics “…is where hermeneutics finds in common consciousness, its 
best handhold for shattering the claim by judging consciousness to set itself up as the 
                                                           
33 In my studies for a Degree in Social Anthropology, which I read at Christ’s College, Cambridge 
University, this lack of distance between subject and object was always the reason given for an 
absence of Social Anthropological studies of contemporary society and culture in the United 
Kingdom, happily a state of affairs long since refuted. See: Rapport, N (ed) 2002: British Subjects: 
an Anthropology of Britain. Oxford. Berg. 
34 Burnham, H.D. 2000:  An Introduction to Kant’s Critique of Judgement. Edinburgh. Edinburgh  
University Press. 
35 Ricoeur 1995/1998 CC (ibid). 
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arbiter of taste and master of meaning…”.36 Kearney comments, however, that Ricoeur 
did write about the aesthetics of language and the literary devices poetics, metaphor, 
emplotment and narrative 
 
It is, he writes, that thanks to this first breakthrough, hermeneutics can bring about a 
second, at the level of historical experience, and so return to its chronological starting 
point of biblical and scriptural exegesis. It is in this way, Ricoeur writes, that the claim of 
hermeneutics to being a universal requires multiple anchoring points in experience. 
However Ricoeur criticises Gadamer at this point for putting aside as something less 
important, a reflection he makes on the notion of “being-towards-the-text”. This Gadamer 
identifies as a danger of the reduction of hermeneutic experience to a matter of translation. 
In technical terms, as a reduction to the linguistic model of human behaviour in regard to 
the world. 
 
In Part 2 of Truth and Method are three points where the rejection of methodology is 
clearest. These are a) the re-habilitation of Prejudice, of Tradition, and of Authority; b) the 
notion of History as having an effect; and c) the notion of the ‘Fusion of Horizons’. 
Ricoeur notes that these are the points in Gadamer’s thesis that his critics have most dwelt 
upon. Ricoeur however sees them differently. The same three points are, for Ricoeur, 
where it is possible to give a less anti-methodology reading of Gadamer and a less 
disjunctive interpretation. 
 
Prejudice in Gadamer has a different meaning to a common-sense idea of a narrow, 
blinkered, even bigoted, view upon things. True, Kant wrote that prejudice as a category 
of Enlightenment thinking must be got rid of in order “to dare to think”. Ricoeur 
comments that such a negative view of prejudice is so unequivocal for a critical 
philosophy of judgement. What makes it so is a type of philosophy that makes objectivity 
a measure of knowledge, on the ideal model of the natural sciences. By contrast, Ricoeur 
follows here Heidegger in putting forward the notion that subject of knowledge reaches a 
domain of knowledge, not unless it has first projected a pre-understanding onto this 
domain that assures a familiarity with it. Here again I am not sure I understand what 
Ricoeur is saying here, unless it goes something like this. To understand a subject let us 
say, sociologically, we must first project onto that subject a pre-understanding of what 
sociology is. But perhaps not, because Ricoeur then goes on to say that such a pre-
understanding is not ‘entirely transparent to reflection’. Something apparently remains 
hidden, because “no transcendental subject ever attains perfect mastery of it”.37  
Ricoeur however supplies some clarification when he continues that “…prejudice is 
merely the projection on the plane of judgement a fundamental hermeneutical category: 
tradition…”. Thus, “…human beings discover their finitude in the fact that they first find 
                                                           
36 Ricoeur 2013 HL? (ibid) p72. 
37 Ricoeur 2013 HL? p73 (ibid). 
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themselves amid traditions…”.(ibid). I take this to mean that we are who we are and 
understand ourselves consciously as such, because of the historical time, place, 
circumstances, and culture into which we are born, or in which we live out our lives 
(Heidegger’s condition of being-thrown). Thus Ricoeur states the matter as, “…Tradition 
is positively the expression of the finite historical character of self-understanding for 
human beings…”(ibid). 
 
The third term, Authority, of the trilogy tradition-prejudice-authority makes explicit the 
role of tradition efficient. However this hermeneutic use tends to be obscured by the sense 
of authority as synonymous with domination and blind obedience. For the methodology of 
the human sciences, the consequence is that they are built upon a prior ground of the 
transmission and reception of traditions, with History foremost amongst them. ‘Inquiry’ 
(‘Forschung’) does not escape the historical consciousness of those who live and make 
history. In other words, History poses meaningful questions about the past by starting 
from a tradition that calls for inquiry. Thus in Gadamer’s terminology, my Case Study of 
the archaeological specimen excavated from Hulton Abbey begins from a tradition of 
archaeology and of history whose intention is to enquire into the past of fourteenth-
century medieval England. Ricoeur calls this “a contract” between the action of history 
and the historical investigation. No critical consciousness can escape from this without 
risking making its own research senseless, without meaning and credence. So my other 
photographic Case Study, ‘Waterside Side’ would be senseless, in these terms, without a 
pre-consciousness of other ethnographic fieldwork studies. 
 
Ricoeur is acutely aware of and interested in history and the manner of our interpretation 
and understanding of it, and towards the closing years of his life produced a major book 
exploring the issues, History, Memory, Forgetting.38 It makes an interesting comparison 
with a philosopher’s view of the idea of history given by Collingwood,39 and a 
contemporary professional historian’s view of what they are doing, given by Mortimer.40 
Meantime we shall stay with Gadamer.  
 
In Gadamer the historical condition of history is expressed through a history of effects. 
This is a category that arises from the reflective consciousness of methodology, thinking 
reflexively, not from procedures of historical methodology as such (e.g: searching ancient 
manuscripts). Ricoeur gives this as a consciousness of beings (people) exposed to history 
and its action. This is held to occur in such a way that the historical action upon them is 
subjective and cannot be objectified. It cannot because the efficacy of the action is part of 
its meaning as an historical phenomenon. (I find this claim curious, because surely the 
effect can be spoken and written about to others, whether as factual description - the 
                                                           
38 Ricoeur, P 2006: History, Memory, Forgetting. trans. Kathleen Blamey & David Pellauer. 
Chicago. Chicago University Press. 
39 Collingwood, R.G 1999: The Principles of History. Edited and with an Introduction by W.H.Dray 
and Jan Van der Dussen (eds.) Oxford. Oxford University Press. 
40 Mortimer, Ian 2010: Medieval Intrigue: Decoding Royal Conspiracies. London. Continuum. 
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historian Ian Mortimer would stand as an example, or as imaginative fiction - the 
historical novels of C.J.Sansom come to mind, or dramatised and performed - 
Shakespeare’s historical plays would be an obvious example). 
 
In Gadamer the consciousness of effects has negative and positive consequences. The 
negative is that it excludes from the subject “any view from above” that would allow us to 
master a view of the whole set of effects of the past upon us. Thus historical being is that 
which does not pass over into absolute knowledge. At this point the philosophy of 
hermeneutics is a philosophy of finitude (and unlike an Hegelian absorption into absolute 
knowledge). In a positive sense, the concept of effective history mediates our relations to 
the past. (I call it “active presence” in my thesis title). Starting from this mediation, 
something is deemed to be significant, interesting and memorable, worthy of being related 
through an historical enquiry. This has been the case with my work on the archaeological 
skeleton excavated from Hulton Abbey, tentatively identified as being Hugh Despenser 
the Younger, executed by drawing, hanging and quartering at Hereford in November 
1326, Case Study 1 (please refer to the book accompanying this thesis, and to the thesis 
Appendix). I will return to this point in my discussion of the photographic fieldwork case 
studies, both contemporary and archaeological, to discuss what they might mean in those 
specific contexts. 
 
Gadamer continues that the notion of ‘effective history’ does not imprison us within the 
past. This is attested to by the third key concept he proposes, that of a “fusion of 
horizons”. The ‘horizon’ is what a point of view picks out, and completes and corrects the 
notion of a “situation”.41 Talk of a fusion of horizons taken along with Dilthey’s 
hermeneutics means acknowledging that it is possible to transfer oneself into another’s 
point of view. This is no Husserlian psychological riddle but accepting the possibility of 
entering into a dialectic of points of view as a kind of performance. This is so because in 
the tension between self and other, a prior agreement about the thing itself leads inquiry to 
an agreement. This seems very abstract to me. However the Australian philosopher-
historian-anthropologist of the Pacific, Greg Dening, speaks in these terms about 
contemporary Polynesian and Melanesian islanders pragmatically thinking about and re-
creating and performing their pre and post-colonial histories.42 The significant point of 
these for Dening, as it is for Gadamer and for Ricoeur, is that a prior agreement cannot be 
transformed into an objective knowledge that would negate the alterity of multiple points 
of view by placing them all at a distance. Were that to be the case then no one would have 
anything more to say on the matter, no one could bring anything new to the dialogue 
because the horizon of understanding would effectively be closed upon itself. We do not 
live in such a world, we do not exist in closed horizons or in a unique horizon with an 
empirical-objective, or dialectical-speculative character. 
                                                           
41 Ricoeur 2013 HL? (ibid) p74. 
42 Dening, G 2004: Beach Crossings: Voyaging across Times, Cultures and Self. Pennsylvania 
University Press. 
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Thus Gadamer’s concept of a fusion of horizons has both negative and positive aspects. 
Negatively, it signifies the refusal of any objectifying closure. Positively it signifies that 
the transfer to another point of view, to another culture, which is the basis for historical 
knowledge, is possible. This is so because we start from a prior agreement about the thing 
discussed and this upholds the mechanical process of fusing horizons together (ibid). 
 
In conclusion, Ricoeur asks what all of this has to say about the relation between truth and 
method? In the first place, the relation is not one of simple opposition or mutual 
exclusion. This would be the case of historical understanding and scientific explanation 
were opposed on the same plane. That would be to interpret Gadamer’s Truth and Method 
as simply the methodological dichotomy that Dilthey could not resolve. Ricoeur states 
clearly, that hermeneutic philosophy is not anti-epistemological (as is the ontological 
model offered by Heidegger). What hermeneutic philosophy is, “…is a reflection upon the 
non-epistemological conditions of epistemology…”. Thus Gadamer’s three categories 
indicate, for Ricoeur, (I quote) are, “…the unsurpassable conditions for the constitution of 
a meaningful space in which something can have the value of an historical object…”(ibid, 
p75). Therefore, in Ricoeur’s eyes, it is possible to give Gadamer’s hermeneutic drawn up 
in Truth and Method a more dialectical interpretation between the two terms than others 
have previously done. It is a classic demonstration of Ricoeur’s characteristic procedure 
of mediating two apparently opposed terms and finding in them a new, fruitful synthesis. 
He feels able to do so because each of the three historical categories, Prejudice, Tradition 
and Authority, “…indicates the place of an appropriate critical moment that assures the 
mediation between hermeneutics and the objective human sciences…”. 
 
Ricoeur offers the following explanation. Prejudice does not signify submission to every 
tradition, but only the condition of the impossibility of removing the subject (i.e oneself) 
from the condition for historical transmission. Authority has nothing to do with blind 
obedience to commands, but with knowledge. In the last instance what has authority is the 
tradition from which we start inquiry. To admit this is not to sacrifice reason for the 
preservation of a cultural heritage does not happen without criticism and a tension 
between conservation and innovation. Gadamer uses the term “application” for the 
procedure that operates in regard to tradition, and this is held to operate in ways similar to 
verification of scientific hypotheses. Ricoeur comments here that it is juridical 
hermeneutics that this has been best recognised. Here ‘application’ is held to mark the 
space in which the judge is distinguished from the legislator. ‘Application’ also gets the 
nod of approval from ancient rhetoric, which is addressed to an audience whose passions 
it recognises, in order to convince or persuade it. Thus Ricoeur concludes that this is a 
fundamental category that attests the art of understanding is incomplete without there 
being a crystallisation of meaning within the conditions of a new cultural situation. 
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The category of effective history also has a critical counterpart. This is the concept of 
historical distance. Distance is, in the first place, a temporal fact. 1066 was 1,100 years 
ago. However, ‘taking a distance’ is a procedural move of methodology. The history of 
effects and efficacy takes place under the condition of distance. It does so in two ways, 
passive and active. The first operates in the sense of a passive being at a distance. The 
second operates as an active taking of a distance. In this way the history of effects 
becomes a matter of proximity to what is far away. How close, how far? The 
methodological illusion begins when we accept that such a distance ends our complicity 
with the past, and in so doing creates a situation comparable to objectivity in the natural 
sciences. Ricoeur here points to a paradox. The alterity of the past stems from the fact that 
effective history is efficacy at a distance. 
 
‘Alienation’ in Gadamer’s phraseology begins at the distance when the ‘moment’ at which 
events are held to have been made objective, is removed (Gadamer’s term is ‘abstracted’) 
from its’ concrete site. Expressed differently Gadamer is saying that alienation begins 
when the sense of the historian ‘belonging to the history’ that he or she undertakes to 
investigate is broken. 
Finally, the category “fusion of horizons” finds its critical complement in the structure of 
language, says Ricoeur. In effect, all understanding of the world is conditioned by a 
common linguistic practice. However if an objective language is reduced to a system of 
signs that can be manipulated, then it fails to signify that the prior agreement about the 
thing itself, referred to earlier, implies an actual agreement. 
Ricoeur concludes that the only logic appropriate to the concept of a fusion of horizons is 
dialectic. That is in the original sense of the word, of questions and answers. The 
epistemology of hermeneutics, he declares, leads to this art of dialogue. It marks the 
inclusion of the critical moment of the question into the hermeneutics of understanding, 
carried by the language based community (ibid p77). 
 
The Hermeneutic claim to Universal understanding called into question. 
Gadamer claims that the task of hermeneutics is understanding all of those situations that 
occur everywhere in human life in which we encounter meanings which may not be 
immediately or easily understood but require interpretive effort to unravel. The task of 
philosophical hermeneutics is to throw light on the fundamental conditions that uphold 
our ability to understand, in all of its variety. The fundamental task of philosophical 
hermeneutics is therefore ontological rather than methodological, in Gadamer’s eyes. He 
places understanding as primary to interpretation, which is a secondary phenomenon and 
not the final determination of meaning. Indeed it is his contention that the pre-occupation 
with method since Dilthey and Schleiermacher before him has distorted hermeneutics 
from its claim to universality by isolating a pre-occupation with the human sciences from 
general understanding. Gadamer asks in Kantian terms “…how is understanding 
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possible…?”43 This is, he says, a question that precedes any action of understanding on 
the part of the subject. Heidegger, he argues, has shown “convincingly” that 
understanding is the mode of being of Dasein itself. Hermeneutics for Gadamer denotes 
“…the basic being-in-motion of Dasein that constitutes its finitude and historicity…”. 
Hence it signifies the whole experience of the world. The nature of the thing itself is what 
makes the movement of understanding both comprehensive and universal (ibid). 
 
Ricoeur closely examines this claim. “The epistemological battle regarding 
hermeneutics..” he writes, “…crystallised around a precise point…”, the claim to 
universal understanding.44 There is an argument because hermeneutics sometimes claims 
to govern all scientific knowledge inasmuch as this is all rooted in a linguistic 
understanding that precedes it. At other times hermeneutics is limited only to the human 
sciences, Geisteswissenshaften. In the first case there can be doubt about universality, he 
writes. 
In the second case, the claim to universality becomes doubtful because ‘explanation’ falls 
outside of ‘understanding’. (Ricoeur later takes this dichotomy and the mediation of it as 
his starting point for the development of his hermeneutics II, as I will show below). 
 
Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen Habermas. 
In Ricoeur’s essay that we are examining, Hermeneutical Logic?, following the 
examination of Heidegger and Gadamer’s thought, he then proceeds through a 
consideration of two further key figures in the wider debate: Karl-Otto Apel and Jurgen 
Habermas. I shall follow him because they also form part of the essential background and 
context within which Ricoeur develops his thought about hermeneutics. Both Apel and 
Habermas, he writes, put the accent on the scientific mode of hermeneutics to the 
exclusion of its universality, and thus situate hermeneutics within a broader “scientific” 
setting. A move which might appear to take us closer to Russell. 
 
Habermas and the “interest in emancipation”. 
Habermas critiques Gadamer’s claim to hermeneutic universality in the following way (in 
summary): Gadamer borrows the rehabilitation of Prejudice from philosophical 
Romanticism. He borrows from Heidegger the notion of pre-understanding and adds it to 
his (Gadamer’s) concept of effective historical consciousness. Whereas Habermas 
develops a concept of “interest” that derives from the Marxist critique of ideologies 
interpreted through Lukac and the Frankfurt School. For the monistic Marxist  concept of 
“production”, Habermas substitutes a pluralism of interests, where each one governs a 
scientific domain. Within this pluralism of interests, any given interest is expressed in the 
signification of possible statements in ways that are linguistically prescribed and pre-
determined by that domain of concern. (In other words, expressions are couched in a 
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Donald G. London. Continuum. p xxvii. 
44 Ricoeur 2013 HL? (ibid) p 77. 
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technical language appropriate to that discipline). Ricoeur quotes Habermas as follows: 
“…to the technical or instrumental interest, defined as a knowledge-constitutive interest in 
possible technical control corresponds the sphere of empirical-analytic statements…” 
(ibid p79)45 To the practical interests of a scientific discipline and communicating them, 
corresponds the historical and hermeneutic sciences. In the historical domain propositions 
signify possible predictions and/or opportunities for further technical developments in 
knowledge. In the latter domain propositions signify the understanding of meaning. The 
understanding of meaning is transmitted in various ways. By using ordinary, rather than 
technical language with which to communicate; by the interpretation of texts derived 
through tradition; and finally understanding is transmitted through the norms of 
institutionalised social roles and status indicators, which actors learn and internalise, as 
Durkheim proposed, (I take this to mean such things as respectful and appropriate modes 
of address, appropriate communications between author and reader, author and critic, and 
so forth).  
 
Finally there is in Habermas a third and crucial “interest” that he calls an “interest in 
emancipation”. This, says Ricoeur, marks the distinctive opposition between Habermas 
and Gadamer. The interest in emancipation moves the focal point of the discussion from 
the historical-hermeneutic sciences towards the critical social sciences and analysis of the 
institutions of public life, on the one hand, and the norms and values of social actor to 
actor relations within communicative action in the sphere of the social imaginary. These 
social disciplines are identified as essentially being, a) the critique of ideologies, as with 
the Frankfurt School; and b) psychoanalysis in Freud. In this pair, a) the critique of 
ideologies provides a field of application. This is identified by Habermas in the following 
terms as, “…bundles of systematically distorted inter-human communication…” whilst b) 
psychoanalysis provides the model of explanation. This is identified as “…the quasi-
objectification of processes whose opacity makes them inaccessible to a simple 
explanation, in terms of their implicit pre-suppositions…”. It is “…the detour through 
quasi-observation and quasi-explanation that indicates the limits of hermeneutic 
understanding…”. Hermeneutics now appears to be limited to clarifying mis-
understandings within an homogenous understanding found in the tradition of 
Schleiermacher and Dilthey (ibid p80). Ricoeur observes that this, in fact, goes much 
further and deeper. He notes that the so-called quasi-observations “unblock” an enlarged 
and deepened self-understanding. For Habermas the principal fault of Gadamer’s 
hermeneutic lies in his insistence of an ontological hermeneutics. By this Habermas 
means Gadamer’s insistence on agreement, as though the consensus that precedes us was 
somehow given and constitutive with being. Habermas mistrusts what appears an 
ontological hypothesis of a rare experience, that of our dialogues being preceded by a 
happy agreement. Whatever else, such an hypothesis cannot be canonised as a paradigm 
of communicative action. 
                                                           
45 Habermas: Knowledge and Human Interests, 135 (this footnote is as given in Ricoeur 2013 HL?). 
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In the social domain what prevents consensus is ideology. If this were merely a matter of 
misunderstanding that questions and answers could resolve, then it would be possible, he 
says, to say where there has been misunderstanding there is a prior agreement. The 
critique of ideologies implies that what in hermeneutics is conceived as existing at the 
origin of understanding, in ideological critique is posited as a regulative idea placed in 
front of us. The regulative idea is a form of Kantian schema of unlimited and 
unconstrained communication. It is what ought to be, rather than what is; it is more 
anticipation than reminiscence. For Habermas it is this idea of an “emancipation” that 
gives meaning to sociological and psychoanalytic critique. Ricoeur expresses matters in 
this way: where in critique there is de-symbolisation there is only a project of re-
symbolisation. There is however no project in ideological critique, except in the sense of 
revolution and an eschatology, a final destiny, of an end to violence. This eschatology 
takes the place that, in a hermeneutic of traditions, is held by an ontology of linguistic 
agreement (ibid p81). 
 
Ricoeur then turns to an examination of Apel, who situates his evaluation of hermeneutics 
within a larger project of restoring the epistemic ground of the human sciences.46 I shall 
only summarise this without the detail Ricoeur supplies, in order to identify aspects of 
Apel’s thought that Ricoeur absorbs into his hermeneutic. Namely, the thesis of 
complementarity and the thesis of mediation, and the accent on the linguistic character of 
understanding the world that links to both Wittgenstein’s theory of “language games” 
considered as “forms of life” and to aspects of analytic philosophy. 
Apel argues that understanding is not limited to the psychological operation of logic. It 
does not have to do solely with a preparatory heuristic. Understanding brings into play a 
meaningful relation between a project and a situation. This is why understanding remains 
the irreducible mode of making history intelligible, inasmuch as a singular sequence of 
events draws meaning from the agent’s intended meaning and the relation of that to the 
singular situation as they comprehend it (p83 ibid).  
 
The linguistic character of understanding the world is linked to Wittgenstein’s theory of 
‘language games”, according to Heidegger, that are considered to be ‘forms of life.’ 
Hermeneutics absorbs this into its ontology. The notion in play is that language and 
linguistic articulations determine the limits of our world, whilst the idea is that games are 
simultaneously both private and public. This, according to Ricoeur, suppresses the 
Husserlian problem of the passage from an understanding that is first, subjective, to an 
inter-subjective understanding through the mechanism of transferring the intended 
meanings to others. 
 
                                                           
46 Apel, Karl-Otto 1984: Understanding and Explanation: A transcendental-Pragmatic Perspective. 
Trans. Georgia Warnke. MIT Press. 
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In the matter of scientific knowledge and hermeneutics Ricoeur states that the 
complementarity beween objective explanation and inter-subjective practical and 
linguistic agreement has to be shown (p85 ibid). “…It must be said of all knowledge that 
it unites the two dimensions of praxis: the technical and the ethical dimensions…” he 
writes. Indeed, he continues, “…it is the modern praxis most caught up in technology 
(that) presupposes a prior agreement about the possibilities and norms of what is taken to 
be a meaningful being-in-the-world…” Such knowledge presupposes a communication 
community that exists, about which it is the task of hermeneutics to thematize. Thus a 
complementarity between scientific thought and hermeneutics is attested to (ibid). 
Photography is surely one such field heavily dominated by technology. 
 
But why appeal to a third discipline between ideology and psychology to achieve this? 
Here Habermas and Apel distance themselves from Gadamer. For Gadamer the existential 
commitment to a tradition is to be understood as an “application” that mediates between 
past norms and present conditions. The model of interpretation has to be sought, therefore, 
in the way in which a judge takes a precedent and makes it an actual norm within the act 
of judging. Apel and Habermas see this a more of a limitation on a hermeneutic project 
than an aid to its being made concrete. An appeal to tradition, in their view, can only be 
made in terms of biblical texts and upholding their authority. Their normative value 
remains unchallenged. However this is not the modern relation to tradition. For Ricoeur 
this relation now is a passage through a radical doubt and what he describes as a “painful 
distanciation” (He does not say but is, perhaps, alluding to twentieth-century Russian and 
German history in particular that many today would wish to disown. But also the suffering 
of other people such as the French - his father died ‘needlessly’ in WW1 - and other 
European nations and ethnic groups who suffered greatly in their ideologically induced 
conflicts throughout the twentieth-century). This means, for Ricoeur that distanciation can 
no longer be connected to methodological alienation. The two are different. It is part of 
the modern condition in relation to tradition. Apel concedes the point, acknowledging that 
there is no neutral position from which one can consider every tradition from a distance. 
Unless, that is, one chooses to take the path of historicism and the historical determination 
of social phenomena. Here hermeneutics functions to reveal its naivety.  
 
The alternative is to practice a hybrid quasi-objectifying kind of science for which the 
model is psychoanalysis. This consists in treating alien cultural formations as symptoms 
of real relations belonging to another dimension than language (ibid p86). This is the case, 
says Ricoeur, for the meaningful effects that stem, for example, from relations between 
work and domination in Capitalist industrial economies. Here discourse, work and 
domination interweave networks of relations that are deliberately made and kept opaque. 
Their very lack of transparency is systematic and essential to their operations, not 
accidental and fragmentary (as we see about us everyday in both large public and private 
institutions such as Banking in a global economy, and health in the National Health 
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Service in the UK. Both seem opaque in their internal operations and effectively 
unmanageable). In the face of this, writes Ricoeur, a hermeneutics that bases itself upon 
making explicit what is implicit using only the force of discourse “…can be accused of 
linguistic idealism…” and, I would add, another kind of naivety.  
 
Apel on the other hand considers this in terms of natural history being prolonged in 
cultural history. The argument being that if there were not the opacity mentioned then 
human beings would be able to equate their meanings, and realize the ideal of mutual 
identification espoused by the Romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher and his 
contemporary and immediately antecedent fellow scholars (this is my naming of names, 
not Ricoeur’s nor Apel’s I should add). But people cannot. People have not in reality been 
able to make their history. What happens occurs for the most part behind their backs (as 
we see in my Case Study 1: Regeneration: Waterside South). Thus the integral reflective 
reprise of its meaning is impossible. All that remains is the analysis of contingent factors 
of social existence on the level of quasi-objective explanations, for which Freudian meta-
psychology is the model (ibid p86). 
 
At this level second order terminology and concepts in which actors do not engage, are 
called for in the construction of models of explanation. Hermeneutics, in return, observes 
that the semi-objective characteristic of the therapist’s role is always “a partially 
suspended communication”. The goal reached for is the re-integration within the patient 
of alienated, stressful meanings, in a mediated and deepened self-understanding. 
 
The consequence of this is that the semi-objective knowledge that comes from the 
therapeutic model cannot be absorbed into the objectivity of science. If it could then the 
metalanguage of therapeutic discourse would allow a technical mastery not only of the 
neurotic conditions examined, but also over human beings themselves. Ricoeur asserts 
that the only riposte to what he sees as a dangerous state of affairs is to sub-ordinate the 
quasi-objectivity of a critical social science to a self reflection within the framework of an 
ultimate self understanding that, he implies, hermeneutics can supply (ibid p87). 
At this juncture Ricoeur offers a reply from hermeneutics. 
 
The reply from hermeneutics. 
The defence of the claim to universality of hermeneutics was made by Gadamer and those 
close to him. 
At a first, formal level all agree in distinguishing between the universal aim of 
hermeneutics and the limited character of particular fields of experience from which 
reflection begins (ibid p88). On this basis, the limited character of the problem presented 
by the human sciences is “denounced”. However, Ricoeur points out that even within 
Truth and Method this does not cover the whole field. Historical experience is placed 
between the experience of art, on one side, and of language on the other. Art even has a 
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special status given it. This is because art makes the appearance of the truth of the thing 
clearly take precedence over aesthetic judgement. The experience of language, this is 
shown to have limits if the problem of the text is reduced to one of translation. It does 
however contain the principle, says Ricoeur, for surpassing all limited domains that are 
taken as starting points. 
 
 Hence Ricoeur states other starting points can be suggested for a universal hermeneutic 
than those offered by Gadamer in Truth and Method. He cites ancient rhetoric, although 
rhetoric has limits in that it deals with oral discourse rather than the written text. 
Furthermore its arguments are limited to persuasion and probable arguments. The claim to 
a hermeneutic universality lies in the unlimited ubiquity of rhetoric that we can still verify 
today. Both science and hermeneutics appeal to the same resources. 
 
Another starting point to the claim to hermeneutic universality is given by Jauss and his 
work on aesthetic experience within a literary hermeneutic. The hermeneutic character of 
this work is attested to  by the care taken to grasp the relationship between author, text and 
reader as a whole, without limiting analysis to an aesthetic theory of production. Jauss 
adds to the poetics of production, the aesthetics of reception and the cathartic dimension 
of communication. In this way it links to Kant’s 3rd Critique and further back to the 
rhetoric of Gorgias and Aristotle. Ricoeur observes that Jauss links to hermeneutics in 
another way, through the reflexive moment of interpretation in the primary experience of 
“understanding with enjoyment”. The plea for a comprehensive enjoyment sets Jauss in 
opposition to Adorno, who sees aesthetic pleasure to be entirely corrupted by bourgeois 
culture. Jauss sets the subversive and educational function of art (i.e literature) against this 
“aesthetics of negativity”, and justifies doing so because of the uncontrollable social 
character of aesthetic pleasure. In Ricoeur’s eyes, the work of Jauss fills an important 
lacuna in hermeneutics, this being the study of disinterested affects in relation to fiction 
and poetry. The enterprise has to do with the epistemological argument that sets common 
sense aesthetic experience over conceptual knowledge, and aesthetic communication over 
any theoretical consensus. 
 
Ricoeur continues another example, that of Ritter 1969: Metaphysics and Politics: Studies 
in Aristotle and Hegel and the relations between politics and ethics. Ritter begins by 
recovering the full meaning of the Greek concept of ethos in the act of inhabiting. 
Similarly the concept of polis to beyond its reduction to the State to all the lived relations 
in society. In this way the concept of praxis regains its full breadth of meaning as the life 
governed by a community’s customs. In Aristotle this finds expression in the concrete 
expression of “justness”, and in Hegel the philosophy of “right’. Both meaning human 
beings find their reality and freedom in the concrete life lived within ethical institutions. 
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In another direction hermeneutic philosophy gives force to the concept phronesis and 
common sense (sensus communis) in the face of the exclusive claims to knowledge made 
by science. 
 
On a second level, philosophical hermeneutics has replied to the charge of a narrow 
linguistic idealism and misunderstanding by integrating an explanatory segment, like that 
of the social sciences, into the process of understanding and interpretation. This is 
necessary, states Ricoeur, if hermeneutics is to preserve credibility by going beyond an 
incantatory affirmation of its universality. It does by folding explanation between an 
initial form of behaviour, such as is found in ordinary conversation, and a highly mediated 
kind of understanding that comes at the end. Ricoeur has introduced a close dialectical 
sense of ‘belonging-to” (ethos) that incorporates the interpreter into his domain of 
investigation, and the distanciation that makes explanatory procedures possible and a 
general critical attitude (Ricoeur 1991 What is a Text in FTA ibid). 
 
Conclusion. 
In this thesis I have asked the question how can a dialogue be opened between the practice 
of social documentary photography and the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur? I 
further ask how that can be achieved and what might we learn from doing so. What new 
understandings might be found. 
In answer  have pointed to both being grounded in epistemology and the photography also 
in realism. 
I have introduced from sociological theory Weber’s concept of “elective affinity” as a 
term of mediation between the two perspectives, from the practical interests of 
photography and the ideology of Ricoeur’s conceptual structure of hermeneutics grounded 
in the theory of the text, action and history. 
I have discussed and presented two photography Case Studies as evidence of a continuum 
of documentary practice running from an ethnography of the present and immediate past, 
and another from the present and immediate past to deep within medieval history and a 
concern with forensic sciences. Both are given written contexts that detail the social, 
political and economic context of their subject matter. These are presented as case bound 
hard back books that complement the written thesis. Combined they are my completed 
submission. 
I have discussed and given examples of a social documentary practice commonly referred 
to as that of the Concerned Photographer made by other people. In Chapter 3 I have 
looked in a little more depth at four examples of such work that I particularly admire. 
Alongside them I have presented an enumeration of the principle points made by Ricoeur 
that a hermeneutics of the text achieve, notably the concept of Discourse as essential to 
understanding, and the characterisation of hermeneutics as being the act of someone 
saying something about something to someone in a three-fold dialectic and mimesis of 
Author - World of the Text - Reader. 
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To round the discussion off I have finally presented an analysis of Ricoeur’s argument for 
a logic of hermeneutics as a theory of universal understanding that concludes the 
perspective is emancipating in opening to consciousness new levels of meaning and new 
ways of thinking about language that equally apply to photography. Ways that have 
perhaps been occluded hitherto in postmodern theory. 
I am satisfied that I have shown how a dialogue can be opened and what might be learned 
from that. The key lies in the return to a dynamic and active subject and consciousness at 
the centre of philosophical and photographic concerns and the agency of a “capable 
person” who is an active individual and being-in-the-world. 
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SUMMARY 
Documentary Photography, as I am writing about it here, I understand as a praxis and phronesis for 
visualising the object of the social sciences; a reflexive process of thoughtful and ethical social inter-
action whose value combines history, observation and aesthetics in a discourse over time. 
. 
Recent discussions about Photography frequently concentrate on two primary perspectives. As a 
medium of illustration and source of data in a complex of sociological methods and as a visualising 
text, often made by others, to be read, analysed and evaluated (Banks 2007; Rose 2001/2006). Both 
perspectives assume that photographs offer a description of knowledge as data and a correspondence 
to an empirical truth as evidence. Neither perspective offers insight into the social inter-action, 
interpretation and reflexive process of making documentary photography. Yet there is much to be 
learned from doing so and in referring to recent comments about this weakness by Becker and Banks, I 
am making this my starting point for discussion (Becker 1994; Banks ibid).  
 
The essay focuses on the activity of photographing, philosophical hermeneutics and ethnographic 
narrative. The hermeneutic activity and process of making documentary photographs of sociological 
value. On what Maynard refers to as the process of thinking and visualising through the medium of 
photography, Rorty as a hermeneutic of edification and Ricoeur as a hermeneutic of dialectical 
discourse, tacit knowledge, meaningful action and indirect description, comprehended in a move from 
explaining to understanding social worlds of inherent complexity. A re-describing of reality that I 
descriptive, sensory, affective and aesthetic and one not accessible to direct description alone. A visual 
equivalent to a fixing inscription by writing (Maynard 2000; Morin 2007; Ricoeur 1991/2007; Rorty 
2009). 
 
Whilst this essay is not in any sense an instruction manual for a meta-narrative of documentary 
photography practice I shall refer to the philosophical hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, the five-fold 
aesthetic of photography devised by the art historian John Szarkowski and to published observations 
from documentary photographers David Hurn and Henri Cartier-Bresson on how they think through 
their practices, offered here as thoughtful and pragmatic guides to broadening our understanding. 
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The essay is illustrated with examples of my past work and two case studies from current work 
(Appendix) as examples of a continuum of documentary practice running from an ethnography of 
identity to a visualisation of archaeology where empirical observation and aesthetics are indivisible to 
the interpretation. 
 
1. Introduction: Photographing. 
 
The art-science genre of documentary photography continues to offer a powerful visual means of 
combining phenomenological description with hermeneutic understanding to visual social science 
methodology. As single images but most especially when sequenced into an extended narrative, the 
visualisations made can act as a complement to and mediation of written, spoken or performed 
ethnographies; or they can stand alone as visualised ethnographic essays. By drawing attention to the 
process of making photographs, photographing, I am drawing attention to the subtle inter-play of 
observation, tacit knowledge, new knowledge and aesthetics in their making. To not only what is being 
described visually but to the manner of their visualisation. As Ruskin put it many years ago and 
Dening more recently, that in their manner of making of observations, their rhetorical poetics and 
historicised performance documentary narratives are a mutual dependency of ‘Form and Mental 
Expression’ for capturing the rhythms of daily life of a greater value than mere recording and 
illustration (Dening 1995; Ruskin 1853). Stills documentary visualisations are an empirical asset and 
contribution to theoretical and methodological clarification in the social sciences (Hogel 1997). 
 
1.1  The question is how to maintain a sense of action, the activity of making, as meaningful in the 
process of photographing in the formation of ethnographic narratives whilst being able to grasp the 
practice critically. Ulin points to a tension between a human agency and the structural constraints 
imposed by the circumstances in which it is operating that connects the formal properties of a text, or 
visual narrative in my case, to the conditions of its generation (Ulin 1992). The question in turn 
connects to mid-C20th philosophical hermeneutics and a shift from the epistemological question,  
“ How to read ? ” to the ontological question of “ How do we communicate at all ? ”. It is a 
discussion that Ricoeur develops as a conflict of interpretations through a move away from a semiotic 
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concern with structures of saying to a hermeneutic understanding of the manner of what is being said 
and their discourse (Ricoeur 1974; 1991). I discuss this further. 
 
1.2 The genre of Documentary Photography is alive and well. An art-science, creative process 
and a powerful visual means of inter-acting with people, the rhythms and complexities of their lives 
that is capable of embedding 'numerous social meanings, contexts and institutions', to borrow from 
Baetens excellent recent appraisal (Baetens 2009, p93-p96). Surprising, perhaps, that this should be so 
despite the fierce criticisms of documentary photography by the proponents of critical theory in the 
1970s and 1980s who, in deconstructing the practice, argued that humanist documentary photography 
such as that to be seen in Steichen's 1955 'Family of Man' exhibition1 was essentially an example of 
false consciousness, imperialistic and self serving (Solomon-Godeau 1991); despite its' more recent 
elevation to a supposedly higher status as an art form of subjective self expression albeit constrained to 
a post-modern, post-structuralist art historical discourse (Dexter and Weski 2003); and despite the 
predicted epistemological end-game to the debates about reality, truth and falsehood of the 
photographic image in a digital technological environment (Ritchin 2009). Arguable these are all 
closed theoretical models that "have omitted significant aspects of our humanness...that fail to address 
the complexity of why people photograph" (Noble 2010). Langford has recently commented that the 
predicted closure has not occurred. Rejecting the cynical she writes that "Instead...we see signs of 
persistent faith in photographic evidence, however fragmented, pixellated or otherwise mediated...". 
Faith in an appeal to the authority of the documentary photograph as an authentic inscription of a 
reality and response to the brute facticity of life (Langford 2009, p165; Savedoff 2008). 
 
1.3 The enduring strength of documentary photography lies in the strength of it being a genre 
rather than a set of prescriptive doctrines. It is a mutable and pluralist mode of discourse within which 
to work that links together tacit knowledge, observational and empirical content to the sensory 
aesthetic poetics of their performance in ways that can create levels of expectation, meaning, 
                                                
1 Edward Steichen (ed) 1955 The Family of Man New York. The Museum of Modern Art 
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interpretation and understanding beyond that of mere description (Bate 2009). As Ruskin found to his 
pleasure when discussing the Nature of the Gothic, there is plenty of room for innovation and creative 
thinking in documentary practice. Yet the results are recognisably of the genre and a Kantian idea of 
reason expressed in ethnographic narratives of complex thought, depth and subtlety whose articulation 
can achieve an horizon of insightful understanding approaching that which Ricoeur, for example, 
sought to achieve in his studies of the hermeneutics of language and discourses of text, time and 
narrative (Ricoeur 1984-88). A mode of thought and practice about the photographing, prosody and 
sequencing of images to which Morin's useful metaphor of inscribing complex social meanings and 
behaviour can apply. Morin writes of the complexities of human life and describing them as being a 
construction in movement, one that transforms in its very movement the constitutive elements that 
form it (Morin 2007). To continue with Morin’s musical metaphor for a moment, I often think of 
narrative documentary as being similar to the fugue, a marriage of precision and passion and a 
technique rather than a fixed form where the sequence of images can state a theme, a response, a 
theme, another response and so on with photographs working together as variation succeeds variation 
in a sequence of relational progression, to build an increasingly complex tapestry of the subject 
elements and an expression of reason (see, for example, W.Eugene Smith 1975: Minamata; James 
Ravilious 2007: An English Eye). As Gombrich has written "...concentration on the physiognomic 
properties of sights and sounds (i.e: Signs - my insertion)..will never yield a theory of artistic 
expression unless it is coupled with a clear awareness of the structural conditions of 
communication...the artist...will select from his palette...from among those available that to his mind is 
most like the emotion he wishes to represent. The more we know of his palette, the more likely we are 
to appreciate his choice." (Gombrich 1963 p62-63). Thus we can conceive the written, the spoken and 
the visual modes of representation as a complementary triad that enable us to gather empirical data, 
organise, structure, interpret and analyse it; that in certain areas overlap, such as combining text with 
images, images with sound and haptic performances, but in others remain discrete and separate in their 
individual modes of discourse and inscription. (see, for example, Coover 2004 and the use of 
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hypertext) 2. Howard Becker in an Afterword to Knowles and Sweetman's thoughtful collection of 
essays, 'Picturing the Social Landscape' writes of "...the need to find ways of using visual imagery that 
will be as natural and acceptable...as other forms of data..." and continues that, "...many people who 
work with visual materials have not realised that there are real skills involved and that you have to 
learn them, practise them and keep them in mind as you do your research and prepare it for public 
presentation...many people have failed to master the mechanics of writing clearly...and, similarly, most 
people do not know how to make a visual image that communicates clearly what's to be said...and 
certainly do not know how to deliberately control the many aspects of such images." (Becker 2004. 
p195; Knowles and Sweetman 2004).  
 
Strong words and he concludes on this theme that whilst there are good examples within visual social 
science, he nonetheless continues that, "...we'd do well to look also at the work of photographers who 
never pretended to be social scientists but who we would do well to claim as our own." citing Robert 
Frank and Walker Evans, "..with a lot of work yet to do..." (Becker p196-197 ibid). Hogel has 
commented that until very recently anthropological understanding and use of documentary 
photography remained to a large extent dominated by nineteenth century ideas of realism with film or 
digital technologies 'revered' as clear, precise and undistorted methods of gathering data for subsequent 
reading and analysis. Simple mirrors to the world without an analytical potential or aesthetic 
dimension of meaning (Hogel 1998 ibid). A conception in which interpretation and aesthetics seem 
often to be treated as synonyms for something artificial and added that corrupts the integrity of their 
descriptive and information value rather than being qualities that are implicit in experience and 
indissolubly integrated in the authoring and receiving of photographic images. An equal music of 
rationality and emotion in their making, understanding and appreciation rooted in our pragmatic 
experience of everyday life and humanity (Dewey 1934). 
 
                                                
2 Sadly perhaps the visual has a dynamic range of expression of about an octave because of its inherent and 
limiting semantic uncertainties and lack of syntax unlike the written text. Limitations that perhaps suggest a 
smaller scale of composition such as the essay is its’ natural form.  
 
 6 
Progress has been made in the years since Becker and Hogel published their articles. Baetens remarks 
that photography research has become inter-disciplinary and hybrid, incorporating and then breaking 
the constraints of an art historical perspective but ineluctably drawn towards issues of rhetoric, 
aesthetics and "questions of the pragmatic influence exerted on a non-passive audience by 
considerations...which some may call beauty". A move that crucially sees a shift in concern from 
photography as an object of picture taking to the appreciation of photography as a socially constructed 
practice of picture making and points to a useful distinction to be made between media theory and 
medium theory in understanding this (Baetens ibid p 94 - 95). Pink and Edwards have, in the interim, 
pointed towards concerns with photography in an anthropological context: to questions of inter-
subjectivity, the alleged fragmenting nature of photographs, the similarity of this with fieldwork 
practice and to the materiality of the medium. All of which are process related observations suggesting 
possible lines of development to be further worked on. Developments that allow for the recognition of 
affective, sensory and aesthetic subjectivities to understanding that are rooted in the experience of the 
aesthetic in everyday life and a category re-configuration that makes the photographic discourse more 
truthful to the complex dimensions of the ethnographic object, enriching our understanding of it in 
meaningful ways. (Dewey 1934 ibid; Edwards 1997; Pink 2004; Saito 2007). Yet for all this, in talking 
about the business of making photographs in the field, Banks comments that whilst there are useful 
guides such as Wright's The Photography Handbook (Wright 2007) there is nothing published 'quite 
equivalent for still photography' as Barbash and Taylor's Cross-Cultural Filmmaking (Banks 2007 ibid 
p124; Barbash & Taylor 1997). 
 
2. Photography or Photographing? 
To talk in terms of Photography is too abstract a category for so hybrid a medium and conceptually not 
helpful to us. The category is too broad to be meaningful and passive in its' spectator orientation as 
Elkins et al have recently discussed (Elkins 2007). I am talking in terms of Photographing and the 
specific and limited photographic genre of Documentary Photography: a social activity and reflexive 
process of making, interpretation and discourse of thinking about effective visualisations of social life 
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and their reception by varieties of other people and circumstances; a means and not an end whose 
instrumentality expands the domain of our understanding. This is an intending sociological action that 
I understand as an ethical Aristotelian praxis and phronesis directed towards interpreting cultural 
circumstances in ways that are meaningful and inscribing human beings actively living their lives in 
relation to each other and their cultural worlds, natural environments and their history in webs of 
semantic understandings.  
 
2.1 In speaking of photographing I am also drawing attention to the distinction between merely 
seeing and incisive looking; and to the nature, the prosody of the visual frameworks of understanding 
being used in their inscription. Frameworks that mediate, shape and constrain our capacity to 
experience, interpret, understand and communicate intelligibly to others and that reciprocally mediate 
their reception. We tend to think of seeing and looking as synonymous but they are not. Seeing is to be 
aware in a disinterested way. Looking is to scrutinise, to be fully engaged with the detail and minutiae 
of the object. A distinction akin perhaps to Barthes' studium and punctum dichotomy. Both seeing and 
looking are not immediately obvious and both are about perception and questioning the nature of our 
perceptions (Elkins 1999). Documentary photographing is very much about looking. Scrutinising the 
object of the enquiry with all senses alert to its visual possibilities, moods and qualities. In this it has a 
great deal in common with anthropological fieldwork and participating observation. Both have the 
quality of immediacy and presence yet both can only come to full realisation over an extended period 
of time and deepening understandings of the object of enquiry. 
 
3. Photographing as a hermeneutic discourse. 
Gombrich writes, "No artist is worth his salt who cannot keep the various dimensions of his language 
apart and use them for different articulations." (Gombrich p65 ibid). The significant question to be 
answered in documentary photographing is "How?". It is not only the choice of subject matter but how 
am I going to make photographs of it? Music is so much more than merely playing the notes so 
photographing is more than pointing the camera with all the settings on automatic.  
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3.1 Hermeneutic philosophy has been largely overlooked as an idea of reason that adds unity and 
coherence to our experience and as a guide to our thinking in discussions of photography. Ricoeur in 
his analysis of the text makes the crucial distinction between the speech act of saying, which is a 
dialogue, with what is said, which is the enunciation of the speaking transposed to writing. What we 
write, he says, is the noema of speaking, the meaning of the speech event, not the event as event 
(Ricoeur 1991 p146-147). Writing captures the fleeting event that appears and disappears in speech. In 
a similar way Photographing seeks to fix visually the fleeting and transient in the swirl of events. But it 
also seeks to capture and describe the event as event, exhibiting connections and distinctions which 
have hitherto lain hidden or cannot be as well expressed in writing. 
 
3.2 The answers to the question 'How' to make the photographs that fulfil their intention is by no 
means obvious although we have the habit of thinking photography is so easy as to be self evident. 
Simply put the camera on automatic and take a picture. What could be easier ? Ulin and Gombrich 
each in their distinctive ways point to a tension between human agency and the contingency of the 
circumstances under which work is necessarily performed. In using hermeneutic thinking to help 
conceptualise and evaluate this I am drawing most particularly on the work in hermeneutics of Paul 
Ricoeur who writes of the task of hermeneutics as being to resolve an aporia and perceived opposition 
between explanation and understanding, that is between an epistemological mode of knowing and an 
ontological understanding as a way of being and meaningful social behaviour (Ricoeur 1991/2007 p 
53-74). Hermeneutics in relation to documentary photographing should be viewed as a regulative idea, 
rather than constitutive, adding meaning, unity and coherence to our experience. A help and guide our 
thinking and understanding I argue 
 
3.3 Ricoeur defines hermeneutics as being the rules required for the interpretation of written 
documents. In his development of hermeneutics to the humanities and social sciences he distinguishes 
between a Weberian verstehen as a generalised comprehension and understanding and the concept of 
auslegang as stated by Dilthey. Auslegang being an interpretation and exegesis that implies something 
 9 
more specific, a limited category of signs fixed by writing in documents and in monuments that entail 
a fixation “...similar to writing...”. Ricoeur’s stated hypothesis is that the human sciences (in which 
are included anthropology and sociology) may also be said to be hermeneutical because they raise 
similar problems in their interpretation as are raised in the interpretation of written and spoken texts. 
He argues that the object of the human sciences display some of the features of a text as a text, and the 
methodology of their interpretation develops similar procedures as those of auslegang or text 
interpretation (Ricoeur 1991 p 144-145).  
 
I am suggesting that documentary photography when used as a medium of inscription and method of 
analysis (i.e photographing) in the social sciences displays features that are similar to those in writing. 
Especially so in the construction of linked sequences of photographs. Further that photographing as the 
action of inscription is a visualising discourse of a regulative equivalence enabling us the adoption of 
Ricoeur’s assertion that it is in discourse that language is either written or spoken. Ricoeur tells us that 
discourse, as he defines the category, is “...language-event or linguistic usage...” and the counterpart 
of what linguists call language systems or linguistic codes (ibid p145). Because language is capable of 
multiple semiosis that the word alone cannot encompass he shifts the unit of analysis from the semiotic 
word (sign) to the sentence as the base unit of discourse because it is better able to capture a plurality 
of multiple meanings. Therefore he says, “...it is the linguistics of the sentence which supports the 
theory of speech as an event...” (ibid). Without getting ahead of myself, I shall say here that for my 
purposes of analysis I regard the single photograph as the visual equivalent to the sentence in language.  
 
3.4: Discourse. 
Ricoeur proposes that discourse has four distinctive traits. First, discourse is always realised 
temporally and in the present (language is a-temporal and virtual). Second, discourse refers back to a 
speaker. It has a complex set of indicators that amount to an instance of discourse (unlike language 
which lacks a subject in the sense of “who is speaking?”). Third, discourse is always about something, 
it refers to a world that it claims to describe, to express or to represent (language signs refer only to 
 10 
other signs within the same system). Only in discourse is the symbolic function of language actualised. 
Fourth, in discourse all messages are exchanged. Discourse alone has a world that includes another, an 
interlocutor that is being addressed (language is only the condition for communication, for which it 
provides codes), thus we arrive at the category of speech as an event (ibid p145-146). 
 
He continues with a problem, the distinction between spoken and written language. Examining how 
these four traits are present in spoken and written language he realises there is a fundamental 
difference between the two modes of language. Speech is a transient fleeting event, which is why there 
is a problem in fixing it, of inscribing it. What we want to fix, he says, is what disappears. Referring to 
Plato’s Phraedrus it is writing, the grammata of external marks that solves the problem. Writing “is 
discourse’s destination...” Ricoeur says. Writing fixes the fleeting event of speech that would 
otherwise disappear. That same fleeting reality when all the faculties converge into "that moment that 
mastering an image becomes a great physical and intellectual joy" for Cartier-Bresson in photography 
(Henri Cartier-Bresson 1999 p16). Ricoeur continues by asking “...what in effect does writing fix?”. In 
answer he proposes that writing does not inscribe the event of speaking but the “said” of speaking. 
Here is our bridge between a hermeneutics of writing and a hermeneutics of photographing and 
visualisation in documentary photography. The “said” of speaking is, Ricoeur contends, the intentional 
exteriorisation of discourse thanks to which the saying, sage, wants to become the enunciation, aus-
sage. For writing this means the written text. For documentary photographing this means the visualised 
narrative. In short, he says, what we write is the meaning of the speech event. Speech itself insofar as it 
is said (ibid p146). 
 
3.5: Speech Act 
Drawing on the theories of the speech act to be found in the work of Austin and Searle, Ricoeur 
deepens his analysis. A speech act, or the act of speaking has, according to Austin and Searle three 
levels:  
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1) The Propositional or Locutionary: the act of saying.  (Inscription) 
2) The Illocutionary act: that which we do in saying.  (Inspiration) 
3) The Perlocutionary act: what we do by saying.  (Aspiration) 
Unwrapping these categories Ricoeur reveals their implications which are that (a) the Locutionary act 
is fixed in the sentence. The sentence thus becomes a propositional utterance with descriptive content 
that because of its sign structure can be identified and re-identified. (b) The Illocutionary is less 
completely inscribed in grammar, it dwells on the expressive aspects of the speech act that calls on 
prosody to articulate and inspire what could not otherwise be known. (c) The Perlocutionary is the 
least inscribable aspect. The Perlocutionary is the level of discourse as stimulus and aspiration; it acts 
upon the emotions, imagination and affective dispositions of people, typically through metaphor. Thus 
to fully understand the meaning of a speech act it is necessary to understand all three rational and 
aesthetic aspects of language where they are codified and gathered into paradigms that can be 
identified and re-identified as having the same meaning.  
 
When transposed to writing the sentence is a diverse indicator of subjective factors such as the 
personality of the speaker Ricoeur states. This too is an assertion also frequently made about 
photography. But there is a further problem because the subjective author and the written text are 
dissociated. The author’s intention and the meaning of the text no longer necessarily coincide. Thus, 
“...the dissociation of verbal meaning of the text and the mental intention is what is really at stake in 
the inscription of discourse...” says Ricoeur and interpretation is the only recourse we have to recover 
the meaning (ibid p147-148). Finally discourse is what refers to a world, it cannot fail to be about 
something. “Only man has world..” he says, a text has only a situation. The text has an ostensive 
reference but people have an ensemble of references, tacit knowledge, that are opened up by the text. 
People encountering a text are an audience that constitutes itself and one that utilises their prior 
knowledge. Thus, he concludes, to understand a written text is at the same time to understand 
something of ourselves and a new dimension to Self being-in-the-world. A Heideggerian project of 
discourse as projecting-a-world which is, he argues, its' justification as a social action: to establish the 
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relation of man to the world. Discourse is addressed to someone. This is the foundation of 
communication, Ricoeur writes, universal in its address as meaningfully oriented behaviour (ibid 
p148-150). 
 
3.6 I am suggesting that documentary photographing in a social science context can be found to 
share significant similarities and characteristics in its discourse with Ricoeur’s three-fold delineation of 
the written text. The photographs have locutionary description, illocutionary affects and perlocutionary 
aesthetics that arouse and fire the imagination. Both are evidence of a somebody saying something 
about something to a somebody. Ricoeur's analysis of the hermeneutics of discourse gives us a fresh 
understanding of the way in which documentary photographing can be critically understood to operate 
and how it does so. The reflexive participation of the observer is recognisable in the Locutionary 
manner by which the observation is described and visualised in photographs, what Wright has called 
the primary message (Wright 2007). Ricoeur calls this the reference, a literal description and in his 
nomenclature, mimesis1. The Illocutionary he calls the intentional sense of the inscription. A message 
and discourse that reveals aspects, qualities and values of a reality that he categorises mimesis2. The 
Perlocutionary he calls the indirect reference, re-describing a reality inaccessible to direct description 
and categorises mimesis3. These different aspects become apparent through the skill (phronesis) with 
which we photograph and the manner in which the primary and lateral messages that are descriptive, 
explanatory, affective, sensory, revealing values that stimulate the imagination are communicated that 
in their total, "...make the world one that can be inhabited" (Ricoeur ibid). 
 
Documentary photographing is a skill and no less a skill to be learned than the skill of writing. It is a 
practical way of thinking about the complexity of life that refuses the photography to be reduced and 
polarised as either science or art but in form and mental expression is dependent on both (Morin 2007; 
Ruskin 1853).  
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4. Photographing as practice. 
"...if I make a judgement it can only be on a psychological or sociological level...in order to give 
meaning to the world one has to feel oneself involved in what one frames through the viewfinder. This 
attitude requires concentration, a discipline of mind, sensitivity, and a sense of geometry...by an 
economy of means...one arrives at simplicity of expression. One must always take photographs with 
the greatest respect for the subject and for oneself. " (Henri Cartier-Bresson 1999). 
 
Photographing is about looking and imaginatively evoking worlds visually. For myself I reject the 
collapsing of documentary photography into Art and a mere art form as the only worthwhile form. It is 
entirely capable of standing on its own feet in a sociological context as method and analysis and to 
categorise it wholesale as Art and therefore 'worthy' is singularly unhelpful. As Paul Newman did not 
quite say, why eat hamburger when you are already eating fillet steak? 
 
As with the written word we can do it well or we can do it half heartedly or even misleadingly. This 
places considerable responsibility on the photographer and demands from them other skills in terms of 
prior knowledge and understanding; perception and sensitivity to current and unfolding events; an 
ability to build rapport and good working relations with other people; integrity and humility in 
recognition of the ethical responsibilities to the people, their lives and circumstances that they are 
allowing to be photographed, often intimately. To this we can then add the skills needed in a confident 
marshalling and selection of the visualising technologies and picture making techniques available; 
sensitivity to the structural and rhetorical tropes possible in the making of the photographs and 
integrity in the building of the sequence of images into a satisfactory and authentic narrative. None of 
this is specific to photography alone but would apply to a greater or lesser degree to film and video 
makers as it would to fieldworkers more concerned to write their fieldwork and data than render it 
visually. As Becker has pointed out, writing doesn't come easily! 
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There are some additional factors peculiar to both photography and film/video visualisation to be 
aware of Flusser reminds us. Flusser suggests there is a potential conflict of intentions between the 
users of camera based technologies and the intentions of the manufacturer of the equipment such that 
the camera may dictate to an uncomfortable extent what is possible and what it is not possible to 
record on the film or sensor (Flusser 2000/2007). To my mind it simply means recognising the 
limitations of the medium and working within them. 
 
4.1 In 1964 The Museum of Modern Art, New York, staged an exhibition of photographs called 
The Photographer's Eye. The exhibition was curated by the then Director of Photography, John 
Szarkowski, against a background that sought to establish Photography as a sovereign fine art medium. 
Szarkowski published a book of the same name in 1966 based on the exhibition. The thesis of the book 
is to investigate why photographs look they way they do, to move our appreciation of them from a 
picture making process of synthesis to one of selection. Szarkowski argued that a study of the 
photographic form "...must consider the medium's "fine art" tradition and its "functional" tradition as 
intimately interdependent aspects of a single history..."(Szarkowski 1966/1980 Introduction). 
Szarkowski proposed five key considerations a photographer must decide on in the "How to" process 
of making photographs. In summary these are: 1) The Thing itself, the subject of the photograph. 2) 
The Detail, the small but significant and meaningful elements of the picture. 3) The Frame, the 
boundaries of the picture that determine what is included, what is excluded and what is hinted at lying 
on the edges and beyond the frame. It also is a significant element of the internal geometry of the 
picture and creating the illusion of space, of a foreground and background gestalt. 4) Time, when to 
press the shutter and what shutter speed to select for the inscription of movement or freezing motion. 
5) Vantage, where to stand in relation to the subject, how close, how far, how low and how high, to 
one side or another. By such means suggested Szarkowski, pictures made with a mindless mechanical 
process could "...be made to produce pictures meaningful in human terms..." (Introduction ibid). 
Szarkowski is writing as a museum curator and photographic art historian. In seeking to identify what 
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made photography distinctive as a collectable art form he devised what amounts to an aesthetics of the 
medium that remains a thought provoking and influential text today. 
 
4.2 David Hurn the long time member of the Magnum photo agency and former head of 
documentary photography at Newport, Gwent, and Bill Jay the writer and critic of photography have 
written an excellent book together that attempts to unravel the processes of "how to think and act like a 
photographer". (Bill Jay and David Hurn 2007). It is a distillation of common denominators and basic 
principles they have found in a life-time of their own and many other photographer's experience. 
Amongst the hundreds of books available that give advice on how-to-make-better pictures Jay and 
Hurn's is unique. The book is arranged as a Socratic dialogue of questions and answers so, for 
example, when Jay asks what is it that transforms a simple record photograph of the appearance of 
something into something of lasting merit, Hurn replies that it comes down to the choice of subject. 
The photographer must have an intense curiosity and not just a passing visual interest in the subject. A 
curiosity that leads to intense examination, reading, talking, researching, and not least many failed 
attempts at finding a satisfactory visualisation over a long period of time (ibid p48).  
 
This sits well with fieldwork of course. It may sound trite to say it but photographing has to be worked 
at and a common mistake is to treat it as an add on, an afterthought. So put time aside to concentrate on 
making photographs, immerse yourself in photographing. It takes time, persistence and patience. 
Unlike working with formal or informal interview techniques, with listening and participating in 
conversations and the ebb and flow of the dialogue, or with observations and research that are going to 
be transcribed into spoken and above all written language in monographs and journal articles, 
photographing means looking for the visual. You are using a different part of the brain and a quite 
different mind set. You are making yourself alive to line, shape, form, colour, texture, patterning and 
configurations of elements and above all Light and the tone or mood of the photographs. James 
Ravilious frequently chose to shoot into the light, for example. The subject matter becomes backlit, 
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shadows are cast forward towards the viewer and the overall tone of the photographs of rural Devon 
farming communities is lyrical (Ravilious ibid). 
 
4.3 Photographing, you are in control deciding where to stand and when to press the shutter 
release; how to draw the image on the film or sensor according to the ways in which different lens 
focal lengths render light at the camera focal plane, so long focal length telephotos compress 
perspective, limit depth of field and allow differential focus to be used to isolate a subject from its 
surroundings. Whereas short focal length wide angle lenses expand and even distort perspective, 
generate deep depth of field rendering foreground and background sharp. Different shutter speeds will 
impact on how movement is made apparent in the image (slow speed) or stopped in its tracks (fast 
speed). What ISO rating of film or sensor will be used?  In making the crucial decisions about how to 
photograph something, a person, an event the photographer can choose which technology, which lens, 
the level of exposure, the shutter speed, the handling of contrast ratios and qualities of light, mood and 
atmosphere, the lens aperture, the depth of field and point of focus, whether to work in colour or black 
and white, the extent of post-production enhancement and manipulation of the image all grounded in a 
web of empirical references and significations. Not for nothing did Edward Steichen say that 
"Photography is a medium of formidable contradictions. It is both ridiculously easy and almost 
impossibly difficult". So it comes as a relief that he also felt able to say with great conviction that 
photography, "I believe...is potentially the best medium for explaining man to himself and his fellow 
man" (Steichen 1967). All that is required is, as Hogel says, 'that we work seriously with the media' 
(Hogel ibid p 33). 
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5. Some Examples 
 
Fig 1:  Occidental Petroleum, Piper Alpha, Igniting the Flare stack. North Sea. 
 
Oil rigs are noisy, fascinating and at times tedious places. In the early 1980s I was on the North Sea oil 
rig Piper Alpha. Soon after dawn I wandered the rig looking for interesting subject matter when I 
noticed a roustabout standing by the nozzle of the gas flare. When they burn the gas flare booms with 
noise.  That morning it was quiet and there were no flames because he had been cleaning the burner of 
carbon deposits. The rig however was noisy and flexing with vibrations from the well drilling deck. 
I watched in amazement as he reached into his pocket and taking out an ordinary cigarette lighter 
stretched an arm to the nozzle and lit the gas jet. It ignited and billowed and roared into flame. My 
camera was loaded with colour film, the lens focal length, settings and exposure already chosen 
because I had beforehand measured and evaluated the light and picture making possibilities of the 
early morning activities. But not this, I had no idea this is what happened. I managed to frame and 
shoot one exposure. Serendipity. 
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Fig 2: Fish filleting and process shed, Aberdeen. 
When not on the rigs I was undertaking research and fieldwork for an ethnography of the North East of 
Scotland inshore fisheries for a post graduate degree. Then as now my ethics were humanist. I was 
steeped in the realist tradition, discourse and expectations of documentary photography being 35mm, 
available light, black and white, shot on Kodak Tri-X at 400 ISO or more. The rhetoric of this 
photograph was formed by these expectations and by the light of a single fluorescent strip light in the 
ceiling of the railway arch housing a small family business. It was very cold and steam drifted from the 
buckets of hot water that the working women and one man used to warm their hands frozen from 
filleting the cold, wet fish. I tried hard to catch that sense of a Dickensian atmosphere and relentless 
hard work processing the morning catch and sending it to market as fresh as possible. The aesthetic of 
grainy black and white photographs fitted that. Colour would not. The photographs were always 
intended to be sequenced into a photo-essay and visual narrative with text and resulted from many 
months work building personal relationships, gaining acceptance and developing an understanding of 
the complex social structure through which the fisheries were organised and operated. I had seen the 
same events in this and other similar fish houses for a number of weeks before photographing them, 
during which time I worked out my story line and my visual rhetorics through which to make the 
photographs. 
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Fig 3: Royal Doulton Plc, Anne, aerobrush figurine decorator. 
 In 2004-2005 I spent six months photographing the work force, plant and manufacturing 
processes of the Royal Doulton ceramics company in their last British factory at Nile Street, Burslem, 
Stoke-on-Trent. After years of decline and loss making the factory was to close, production shipped 
overseas and the brand name sold to the Wedgwood Group. I chose to work on 6cm x 7cm medium 
format cameras with colour negative film. I was intending as complete a record as possible for 
exhibition, publication and as a doctoral research case study, with high quality negatives and archival 
durability. I was very conscious that I was photographing history. For this reason I wanted great detail 
and clarity in the photographs. Lighting governed the aesthetics and mood of the photographs with a 
complex mixture of ambient daylight and fluorescent strip lighting which I controlled and softened by 
using on camera fill in flash. 
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Figure 4: Hugh le Despenser the Younger, 1326, executed for High Treason. Cervical vertebra C3 
showing the inter-vertebral surface of the living bone where it has been sliced through by beheading. 
 
My current work is with documentary visualisations of archaeological skeleton remains for an 
HEA/JISC funded research project producing photographs for a Forensic Archaeology and Forensic 
Science teaching and learning DVD (Cassella, Brown, Lewis and Lucking 2008). The skeletons have 
been excavated from Hulton Abbey, Stoke-on-Trent, Staffordshire over a period of time (Klemperer 
and Boothroyd 2004). One unique skeleton has recently been identified as that of Hugh le Despenser 
the Younger, favourite of Edward 11, executed for high treason by being hanged, drawn and quartered 
in November 1326 at Hereford. The bones of the skeleton are scarred with axe and sword cut and 
chopping marks where the body was butchered into pieces and the head struck off. The intention was 
to produce clear and detailed images that can be used for teaching diagnostics of the pathology of peri-
mortem trauma without the need to handle the fragile bones. Lighting and the aesthetic quality of the 
light is the key to this. Here I have used contre-jour lighting that produces glowing highlights, clearly 
defined shadow regions and three dimensional drawing of the bone surfaces and butchering cuts and 
fractures. So successful has this been that the research project is continuing with further photography 
of these and other archaeological specimens. 
 
Documentary photography can readily span a range of intended methodologies in the social sciences as 
I have sought to show in these few examples. Common to all the different applications is an 
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appreciation of the aesthetic qualities of the photographing that far from corrupting the empirical 
content add immeasurably to our appreciation, understanding and interpretation of them. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
 
Case studies. 
1. HASDiP: The Hulton Abbey Skeleton Digitisation Project. 
HASDiP is an HEA/JISC funded research project to digitally photograph skeleton remains excavated 
from Hulton Abbey, Stoke-on-Trent in the recent past (Klemperer & Boothroyd, 2004). The purpose 
was to document the remains with as much aesthetic clarity and detail as possible to show their 
pathology. The photographs are to be used as a diagnostic teaching and learning aid in forensic 
science, forensic archaeology, forensic anthropology and other related fields. The final outcome has 
been published as a DVD for in class use, the intention being to remove the need to handle the very 
fragile remains (Cassella, Brown, Lewis & Lucking 2008). 
 
Hulton Abbey is a minor medieval Cistercian monastery (AD1219-1538). One skeleton stood out 
labelled as HA16. The decapitated remains are heavily scarred with what were, on initial diagnosis, 
suggested to be the cut marks of battle injuries. A recent re-analysis by Dr Mary Lewis suggests the 
skeleton is of a male and well known political figure who had been executed by being hanged, drawn 
and quartered. Lewis contends the remains are those of Hugh le Despenser the Younger, executed for 
High Treason in November 1326 at Hereford on the orders of Queen Isabella, wife of Edward II. 
Lewis's analysis and the new photographs that I made are the first osteological description and 
visualisation of the lesions associated with this form of execution (Lewis 2008: Antiquity 82 : 315).  
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(fig 1: Froissart: The execution of Hugh le Despenser, Hereford, 1326). 
 
(Fig 2: HA16 the surviving skeleton remains). 
 
Hugh le Despenser was the Chamberlain and favourite courtier of Edward II and widely hated by his 
Queen, Isabella, the Barons, Bishops and population for exploiting his position of power and authority 
to enrich himself at their expense (Fryde 1979). When Queen Isabella and the Marcher Baron Sir 
Roger Mortimer invaded England in September 1326 to depose him from the throne, Despenser was 
chased, captured and taken to Hereford for trial and execution for high treason. He was sentenced to 
death by being publicly drawn, hanged, emasculated, eviscerated and beheaded whilst still conscious 
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and his body then quartered. The manner of execution being reserved only for high status individuals, 
carbon-dating of the bones and the absence of several parts of the body including the head all point to 
Despenser and if so then "this is the first time such an execution victim has been identified" says Lewis 
(ibid).  
 
Fig 3: Cervical vertebra C3. This shows the moment of beheading. The spongy appearance of the 
inter-vertebral surface shows the living bone where the axe sliced through the flesh and fractured the 
neck vertebra.  
 
The head was displayed on London Bridge and his quartered body parts sent to the four corners of the 
kingdom and displayed there to confirm his death. Significantly the body was not only quartered but 
cut into smaller sections by being halved below the rib cage and the spine cut vertically. The chop 
marks on the bones show that the butchering was crudely done. Despenser's widow, Eleanor, later 
petitioned Edward III for the return of his bones to be buried in his family mausoleum in Gloucester 
Cathedral but only the head, a thigh bone and a few vertebrae were returned to her. These are the bones 
missing from the Hulton Abbey skeleton. Hulton Abbey formed part of the estate of Hugh Audley, 
Despenser's brother-in-law and a Knight in Edward II's household. It is possible the family may have 
chosen to bury what remained of him there so save him from eternal purgatory. 
 
As well as producing photographs of record the aesthetics of the lighting is crucial to the 
photographing.  
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Fig 4: Cervical vertebra C3: Another view of the same site of beheading. 
I used a lighting technique known as contre-jour and macro levels of magnification of each specimen. 
The lighting places the source high and behind the subject. The effect is to create glowing highlights as 
the light reflects from surfaces and builds shadows that create texture and three dimensional form.  
 
Fig 5: Lumbar vertebrae. The body was quartered and cut vertically down the lower spine from below 
the rib cage to the pelvis showing living bone surfaces. 
 
Cuts, slices, chopping marks and stress fractures are all brought out in great detail and clarity as can be 
seen on the right clavicle where the arm was cut away at the shoulder (fig.6). Multiple cut marks are 
visible suggesting that the butchering was crude, hasty and difficult. 
 
 25 
 
Fig 6: The right clavicle where the right arm was cut away at the shoulder. The bone shows as many 
as twelve cut lines, evidence of repeated slashing and the difficulty of cutting through the flesh and 
sinews. 
 
The photographic techniques used have been so successful that further evidence of the peri-mortem 
trauma has been revealed by the photography that visual examinations had not. The research 
programme is continuing with quantitative laser 3-D scanning of the bones.  
 
Fig 7: The thoracic section of the spine was also cut through vertically as the body was butchered 
 
Together the qualitative photography and the quantitative laser scans will establish new national 
visualisation protocols for this type of documentation, new knowledge to science and open new 
understandings of medieval life and the highly theatrical performance of public execution by drawing, 
quartering and beheading. 
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2. Place, Space and Identity, Waterside South, Hanley, Stoke-on-Trent. 
 
Fig 1: New housing along the Caldon canal where potbanks previously stood. 
In 2007 I was awarded an Arts Council West Midlands/RENEW Regeneration North Staffordshire 
community arts commission to document an area of Stoke-on-Trent undergoing Pathfinder 1 
regeneration. The area I chose is called Wellington traditionally and Waterside South in the 
regeneration scheme. It is an area of C19th terraced housing built for the people working in the paper 
mills and potbanks that lined the district to the south along the Caldon canal.  
 
Fig 2: Mrs Lottie Hughes, 4th generation resident. 
Up to four generations of people living in the district give it a vivid sense of self and identity, with 
many having lived there all their lives, marrying their neighbours, working in the same factories, 
sending their sons to war. Typical of these is Mrs Lottie Hughes who has lived all her life in the house 
she was born in and her parents and grandparents before her. Mrs Hughes home was recently 
demolished and she has been re-housed in a small bungalow development for the elderly. 
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I had three winter months in which to produce a documentary narrative and a public exhibition of the 
photography. The question was how to photograph something so transient as Identity. It seemed to me 
only possible through a mixture of portraits, events, places and interviews that could be used for 
captioning. I worked through the Resident's Association giving a presentation of my work and asking 
people to help me by giving me permission to photograph them and their homes. 
 
Fig 2: Residents Association meeting with the Regeneration Agency. 
Tensions were high because demolition was taking place, new housing being built, many older 
properties condemned but a lot of uncertainty of what was going to happen and when. 
 
Fig 3: Former Paper mill and Victorian housing and new build housing, Cresswell Street. 
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Fig 4: Mr and Mrs Jeffries 
 Many, like Mr and Mrs Jeffries were happy to welcome me into their homes, others were not. 
The older community was fracturing and with it a sense of self and identity that nonetheless people 
worked hard to maintain through the church, school and community centre organising luncheons, 
social activities and events such as the traditional children's Christmas lantern parade through the 
streets of the district. 
 
Fig 5: The Christmas children's lantern parade through the district 
North Staffordshire is famous for a local delicacy, the oatcake. This is a pancake of fermented wheat 
and oat flour. "The Hole in the Wall" is the last traditional shop selling from what used to be the front 
room of the house. The shop was to be demolished and it caused an outcry and became the focus for 
people's frustrations. 
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Fig 6: The Hole in the Wall oatcake shop 
 
Fig 7: Glenn Fowler and the Oatcake Girls. 
 They did not like the changes being forced on them and the manner they were being carried out 
without, it was felt, sufficient and proper consultation. 
 
Fig 8: Exhibition at the Community Centre 
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The photographs were exhibited in the district Community Centre and the church hall of the parish 
church, St Mary's. My work continues with documenting the changes and regeneration of Wellington 
and a book is planned for publication in late 2010. 
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